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Cloud Computing is considered to be the next-generation architecture for ICT where it 
moves the application software and databases to the centralized large data centers. It aims to 
offer elastic IT services where clients can benefit from significant cost savings of the pay-per-use 
model and can easily scale up or down, and do not have to make large investments in new 
hardware. However, the management of the data and services in this cloud model is under the 
control of the provider. Consequently, the cloud clients have less control over their outsourced 
data and they have to trust cloud service provider to protect their data and infrastructure from 
both external and internal attacks.  
This is especially true with cloud storage services. Nowadays, users rely on cloud storage 
as it offers cheap and unlimited data storage that is available for use by multiple devices (e.g. 
smart phones, tablets, notebooks, etc.). Besides famous cloud storage providers, such as 
Amazon, Google, and Microsoft, more and more third-party cloud storage service providers are 
emerging. These services are dedicated to offering more accessible and user friendly storage 
services to cloud customers. Examples of these services include Dropbox, Box.net, Sparkleshare, 
UbuntuOne or JungleDisk. These cloud storage services deliver a very simple interface on top of 
the cloud storage provided by storage service providers. File and folder synchronization between 
different machines, sharing files and folders with other users, file versioning as well as 
automated backups are the key functionalities of these emerging cloud storage services. 
Cloud storage services have changed the way users manage and interact with data 
outsourced to public providers. With these services, multiple subscribers can collaboratively 
work and share data without concerns about their data consistency, availability and reliability. 
Although these cloud storage services offer attractive features, many customers have not adopted 
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these services. Since data stored in these services is under the control of service providers 
resulting in confidentiality and security concerns and risks. Therefore, using cloud storage 
services for storing valuable data depends mainly on whether the service provider can offer 
sufficient security and assurance to meet client requirements. From the way most cloud storage 
services are constructed, we can notice that these storage services do not provide users with 
sufficient levels of security leading to an inherent risk on users' data from external and internal 
attacks. These attacks take the form of: data exposure (lack of data confidentiality); data 
tampering (lack of data integrity); and denial of data (lack of data availability) by third parties on 
the cloud or by the cloud provider himself. Therefore, the cloud storage services should ensure 
the data confidentiality in the following state: data in motion (while transmitting over networks), 
data at rest (when stored at provider's disks). 
To address the above concerns, confidentiality and access controllability of outsourced 
data with strong cryptographic guarantee should be maintained. To ensure data confidentiality in 
public cloud storage services, data should be encrypted data before it is outsourced to these 
services. Although, users can rely on client side cloud storage services or software encryption 
tools for encrypting user's data; however, many of these services fail to achieve data 
confidentiality. Box, for example, does not encrypt user files via SSL and within Box servers. 
Client side cloud storage services can intentionally/unintentionally disclose user decryption keys 
to its provider. In addition, some cloud storage services support convergent encryption for 
encrypting users' data exposing it to “confirmation of a file attack.” On the other hand, software 
encryption tools use full-disk encryption (FDE) which is not feasible for cloud-based file sharing 
services, because it encrypts the data as virtual hard disks. Although encryption can ensure data 
confidentiality; however, it fails to achieve fine-grained access control over outsourced data.  
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Since, public cloud storage services are managed by un-trusted cloud service provider, secure 
and efficient fine-grained access control cannot be realized through these services as these 
policies are managed by storage services that have full control over the sharing process. 
Therefore, there is not any guarantee that they will provide good means for efficient and secure 
sharing and they can also deduce confidential information about the outsourced data and users' 
personal information.  
In this work, we would like to improve the currently employed security measures for 
securing data in cloud store services. To achieve better data confidentiality for data stored in the 
cloud without relying on cloud service providers (CSPs) or putting any burden on users, in this 
thesis, we designed a secure cloud storage system framework that simultaneously achieves data 
confidentiality, fine-grained access control on encrypted data and scalable user revocation. This 
framework is built on a third part trusted (TTP) service that can be employed either locally on 
users' machine or premises, or remotely on top of cloud storage services. This service shall 
encrypts users data before uploading it to the cloud and decrypts it  after downloading from the 
cloud; therefore, it remove the burden of storing, managing and maintaining 
encryption/decryption keys from data owner's. In addition, this service only retains user's secret 
key(s) not data. Moreover, to ensure high security for these keys, it stores them on hardware 
device. Furthermore, this service combines multi-authority ciphertext policy attribute-based 
encryption (CP-ABE) and attribute-based Signature (ABS) for achieving many-read-many-write 
fine-grained data access control on storage services. Moreover, it efficiently revokes users’ 
privileges without relying on the data owner for re-encrypting massive amounts of data and re-
distributing the new keys to the authorized users. It removes the heavy computation of re-
encryption from users and delegates this task to the cloud service provider (CSP) proxy servers. 
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These proxy servers achieve flexible and efficient re-encryption without revealing underlying 
data to the cloud.   
In our designed architecture, we addressed the problem of ensuring data confidentiality 
against cloud and against accesses beyond authorized rights. To resolve these issues, we 
designed a trusted third party (TTP) service that is in charge of storing data in an encrypted 
format in the cloud. To improve the efficiency of the designed architecture, the service allows 
the users to choose the level of severity of the data and according to this level different 
encryption algorithms are employed. To achieve many-read-many-write fine grained access 
control, we merge two algorithms (multi-authority ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption 
(MA- CP-ABE) and attribute-based Signature (ABS)). Moreover, we support two levels of 
revocation: user and attribute revocation so that we can comply with the collaborative 
environment. Last but not least, we validate the effectiveness of our design by carrying out a 
detailed security analysis. This analysis shall prove the correctness of our design in terms of data 
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1 Introduction  
Cloud computing has been envisioned as the next generation computing model  that 
comes  from grid computing, distributed computing, parallel computing, virtualization 
technology, utility computing and other computer technologies. This combination of 
computing models provide cloud computing with more advantages such as large scale 
computation and data storage, virtualization, high expansibility, high reliability and low 
price service. The cloud computing model is mainly based on the network and has the 
format of service for the consumers. These services can take the form of application, 
software, and infrastructure and it can be accessed by users from anywhere and at any 
time. In addition, these services can be shared among a large number of users. For 
example, the cloud storage can be shared by multiple users and each user can increase or 
decrease his resources of storage based upon his needs. Since the cloud services are 
accessible from  anywhere in the world, the cloud appear as if it is a single point of 
access for all the computing needs of consumers. According to the U.S. National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) cloud computing can be defined as: "Cloud 
computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, 
and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management 
effort or service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability and is 
composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deployment 
models"[1]. 
Cloud storage is a newly developed concept in the field of cloud computation. It can 
be defined as a system that is composed of the cluster, grid and distributed file systems 
Page 2 
 
that using application software coordinates a variety of different type's storage devices 
together to provide data storage and access service. In other words, cloud storage allows 
users to outsource their data that has been managed internally within the organization or 
by individual users. 
The outsourcing of this data eliminates the concerns associated with the installation of 
the complex underlying hardware, saves increasing high cost in data center management 
and alleviates the responsibilities of its maintenance. Therefore, a large number of 
organizations and individuals are adopting these storage services by placing their data in 
their cloud storage. However, there are security concerns associated with cloud storage 
[2]. 
Recently, data security has been regarded as one of the main obstacles that block the 
development of cloud storage service. A study [3] surveyed more than 500 CTO and IT 
managers in 17 countries, showed that despite the potential benefits of cloud storage, 
organizations and individuals do not trust the existing cloud storage service providers 
because the fear of the security threats associated with them. The cloud system in general 
can be divided into several types according to the users and range of cloud [3].The same 
cloud system may serve different types of users ranging from customers, enterprises, 
individuals. The security issues and risk of each type is different. In cloud environment, 
data is stored in a public storage provider. This data is stored in the provider's hard drive 
and no one except the provider has control over it and knows where exactly it is saved.  
When individual users and organizations outsource their data to multi-tenant 
environment as the cloud, they expect to have the same level of data security as they 
would have in their own premises [4, 5]; However, this not the case in cloud. In 1999, 
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Scott Mc-Nealys, the CEO of Sun Microsystems, shocked the media by undermining 
privacy expectations in the digital world with the statement: “You have zero privacy 
anyway. Get over it” [6]. Ten years later, Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google, said that “If 
you have something that you do not want anyone to know, maybe you should not be 
doing it in the first place” [7].Therefore, users cannot trust cloud for their data 
confidentially. Data confidentiality ensures that CSP and unauthorized subscribers cannot 
learn any information about the outsourced data. In addition, the access control is not of 
same level as on premises. Access control is more than just controlling which users can 
access which resource. Access control manages users, files and other resources. It 
controls user’s privileges to files or resources. As a consequence, unauthorized parties 
must be prevented from gaining access to sensitive data so that data loss and leakage that 
can prevent [8]. 
All the above issues rises questions as who has access to the data, who encrypts the 
data, where are the encryption keys stored, who manages the access to the data, what is 
left behind when you scale down a service, and how is data protected. 
This idea of securing data in cloud storage services has attracted many researchers to 
work in this field with the aim of constructing a trusted control model of cloud storage. In 
this study, we are interested in providing a secure framework for data security in  the cloud 
storage services  such as dropbox, that offer more functionalities such as file sharing and 
synchronization besides cloud storage basic functionalities. After studying all the previous 
and the current research done in this area, we would like to provide data confidentiality 
against cloud and data confidentiality against accesses beyond authorized rights. Therefore, 
we design a dynamic collaboration environment utilizing the benefits of cloud storage 
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while ensuring strong data security and fine-grained data access. 
1.1 Problem Definition  
Many cloud service providers provide storage as a form of service; data is transferred 
from user machine to be stored on large data centers. Although cloud storage providers 
often state that they offer safe environment for stored data, there have been cases 
discovered where users’ data has been modified or lost due to some security breach or 
some human error.  
A recent security flaw in the Dropbox authentication mechanism [9] begins the debate 
about whether cloud storage services are sufficiently secure to store sensitive data. 
Moreover, a recent research [10] about dropbox has shown that it suffers from three types 
of attacks which are hash value manipulation attack, stolen host id attack and direct 
download attack. In these attacks, the attacker is able to upload and link arbitrary files to 
the victim’s Dropbox account once he have the host id. Moreover, Dropbox itself 
announced that it enables government agents to access customers’ data. This means that 
there is a back door mechanism to access data which might be exploited. Moreover, 
another cloud storage service as Box may not encrypt user files via SSL during transfer 
to/from Box and may not encrypt data within Box servers [11]. Even in the more secure 
storage service, SpiderOak, user's data is encrypted with his own private encryption key 
and his password which can make it inaccessible in case of password loss 
[12].Furthermore, [13] evaluated four cloud storage systems: Mozy, Carbonite, Dropbox, 
and CrashPlan. After the evaluation, it was found out that none of these systems can 
provide any guarantees for data integrity, availability, or even confidentiality. For all 
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these reasons, a lot of customers are not rushing to use cloud storage services in spite of 
their appealing features from backup, file sharing, and synchronization. 
From the above, we can notice that securing data in cloud storage services is an 
important aspect of quality of service. Since various cloud service providers use different 
methodologies to guarantee the safety of the data stored in their cloud. This raises the 
question of whether or not the methods used by these storage providers really secure the 
stored data. Because of the virtualized nature of cloud storage traditional mechanisms of 
handling data security will not be suitable in the cloud model [14]. Moreover, till this 
point little focus have been given to research addressing the issue of securing data in the 
advanced features of cloud storage services from file sharing and synchronization. 
Most of the research done in this field has focused on the following: (1) Using 
cryptographic primitives from different encryptions techniques for the purpose of data 
confidentiality. The most famous technique for providing data storage security is utilizing 
the homomorphic token with distributed verification of erasure-coded data [15]; and  (2) 
Verifying correctness of data storage by using data integrity techniques as in [16]. 
However, these techniques are useful for ensure the storage correctness without having 
users possessing data; they cannot address all data storage security threats because they 
do not take in consideration dynamic data operations.  
Cloud storage is considered to be an important service that allows data owners to host 
their data in the cloud and access it at any time from any place. Therefore, data access 
control is an effective way to ensure data security. However, cloud storage service 
separates the roles of the data owner from the data service provider, and the data owner 
does not interact with the user directly for providing data access service, which makes the 
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data access control a challenging issue in cloud storage systems.  Since  the  cloud 
storage service server is not a trusted entity that data owner can rely on for  ensuring  
efficient data access control  and traditional server-based access control methods are no 
longer applicable to cloud storage systems. Therefore, we need to define a cloud-based 
file sharing service that ensures data security in terms of data confidentiality against 
cloud and provider threats and data confidentiality against users' unauthorized access by 
implementing a fine-grained access control mechanism without relying on the cloud 
storage service for providing access control. 
Most of the research done in this field has focused on providing efficient data access 
control mechanisms between data owners and data users and cloud storage. The data 
owners encrypts the data and access control policies locally and upload the data  to the 
cloud and provide secret keys to users it want to share with and leave to cloud the task of 
managing the access control without have access to any keys. However, this model of 
access control is not feasible in cloud-based file sharing service where there is no direct 
interaction between the data owners and the data users. This means that most of the 
research has focused on data security in terms of access control in cloud storage models 
where the data owners can directly interact with data users. On the other hand, small 
amount of research is done about ensuring the data security cloud-based file sharing 
service where there is no direct interaction between data owners and data users [17]. 
As mentioned above, the current cloud storage services suffer from a number of data 






Research Question: How to construct cryptographic scheme that can enforce 
data confidentiality and distributed data access control efficiently in dynamic 
environments? 
 
In other words, we want construct a cloud-based file sharing service that ensures data 
security in terms of data confidentiality against cloud and provider threats and data 
confidentiality against users' unauthorized access by implementing a fine-grained access 
control mechanism. 
1.2 Motivation and Objective  
Cloud storage services have its advantages and disadvantages. The main advantages 
of  storage services are capital cost savings, because users do not need to invest their 
money to own storage servers nor do they have to maintain these servers, and scalable; 
since users can easily increase or decrease their storage capacity based on their needs. In 
addition, more features are added to cloud storage services such as file sharing and 
synchronization which make it more appealing for users to use. However, the main 
disadvantages that pushes users away from adopting cloud storage is usually whether it is 
sufficiently secure or not. 
As a large amount of electronic data is being generated, there is a need for dynamic 
storage systems that could be able to can hold that data. Moreover, users usually store 
their data on multiple devices and need to access the recent version of this data from any 
place. Therefore, storage systems that support synchronization and file sharing are 
required. The requirement is not just storing, sharing, and synchronizing the data but 
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performing these operations securely, i.e., the confidentiality, availability and integrity of 
the data should be maintained. The question of confidentiality, availability and integrity 
of data comes into the picture when the user’s data is being stored in third party storage 
systems like the cloud storage services. 
The primary motivation for this thesis is the increasing usage of cloud-based systems. 
Several large companies use highly scalable cloud storage and computation solutions 
internally, and some also offer their cloud services for commercial use and as a product to 
individuals. This results in the cloud being of significant importance in modern society 
with regards to how information is stored and communicated. Therefore, we believe that 
the use and importance of cloud-based solutions will be increasing significantly in years 
to come. Therefore, providing a secure service which handles sensitive data in cloud 
storage services is an interesting and new problem domain. The main objective of the 
thesis is to design cloud-based file sharing services that maintain data confidentiality 
against cloud and by implementing a fine-grained access control mechanism as well as 
ensuring data integrity. In other words, we want to design a secure file sharing service in 
which the data owners and data user can share data securely without direct interaction 
between them. In addition, we want to delegate the computational tasks to the cloud 
storage service without allowing him to have access to either the plaintext data or the 
access control keys used. Achieving this security is the obvious objective, but this has to 
be done in the context of maintaining compliance with the customer's security policies 
and meeting various regulatory and legislative requirements. 
Our main contributions in this thesis are: 1) to design trusted third party service that 
enables users to share data over any web-based cloud storage platform while data security 
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is preserved. This service protects the confidentiality of the communicated data and it can 
be employed locally or remotely; 2) to construct a new multi-authority CP-ABE scheme 
that achieve fine grained access control. Based on multi-authority CP-ABE [18], we 
realize efficient fine grained access control. Different from [18], we support many-write-
many-read for users(which means after the owner creates one encrypted file on the 
storage server, other users with appropriate attributes can also update the encrypted file at 
a later time without any help from files’ original owners)  instead of 1-write-many-read; 
3) to propose an efficient revocation approach for the proposed multi-authority CP-ABE 
scheme. Basing on the revocation method [19], we realize efficiently immediate 
user/attribute-level revocation while achieving both the backward and forward secrecy. In 
addition, we delegate the re-encryption right to cloud proxy servers. 
1.3 Organization of the thesis 
The rest of this proposal is organized as follows: chapter 2 explains the basics of 
cloud computing and surveys the threats to data in the cloud model. Moreover, it explains 
the cloud storage services in more detailed and provides a detailed analysis about data 
security threats in this model. Chapter 3 explains previous work done for securing the 
data. While chapter 4 discusses the proposed approach for securing the data in the cloud -
based data sharing services. Finally, in chapter 5, we will conclude the thesis and list 
some directions for future work. There is an appendix at the end of the document. 




2 Background  
2.1 Cloud Basics  
Nowadays cloud computing has become a significant technology trend either in the 
industrial or the academic field, and most of the experts expect that cloud computing will 
reshape -information technology (IT) processes 'and the IT market place. In Cloud 
Computing, users connect to the ’Cloud’, which appears as if it is a single entity as 
opposed to multiple servers. In this model, users can remotely store their data so as to 
enjoy the on-demand high quality applications and services from a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources [1].Although this pay-per-use model of the cloud 
services brings significant savings for users and offers flexibility and scalability in terms 
of capacity and performance, it involves giving the cloud service provider (CSP) some 
form of control over the user's data. 
In spite of the wide spread of cloud computing, different people evoke different 
perceptions about it. To some, it refers to accessing software and storing data in the 
“cloud” representation of the Internet or a network and using associated services. To 
others, it is seen as nothing new, but just a modernization of the time-sharing model that 
was widely employed in the 1960s before the advent of relatively lower-cost computing 
platforms. These developments eventually evolved to the client/server model and to the 
personal computer, which placed large amounts of computing power at people’s desktops 
and spelled the demise of time-sharing systems 
To formally describe cloud computing, the definition by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) is as follows:  
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to 
a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
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applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction.” [1]  
From the definition, we can conclude that the primary idea in cloud computing is that 
organizations no  longer manage or own their data, but have it delivered as a service by a 
CSP. Over the last years, there is a trend to outsource more and more of data to external 
parties. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: clouds characteristics are presented in 
subsection one. In subsection two, cloud service models are described, and description of 
cloud deployment models is carried out in subsection three. While in subsection four, a 
detailed explanation of cloud architecture is offered and an illustration of cloud storage is 
presented in subsection five. Finally, subsection six presents benefits and drawbacks of 
cloud. 
2.1.1 Cloud key characteristics  
According to NIST definition of cloud computing, the cloud model is composed of 
five essential characteristics. These characteristics are explored in the following lines. 
a.  On-Demand Self-Service: Cloud customer can make use of cloud resources 
without any human interaction between them and the cloud service provider (CSP).In 
addition; they can schedule, manage and deploy any of cloud services such as 
computation and storage when needed. This leads to reduction in the personnel overhead 
of the cloud provider, cut in costs of the offered services [20]. 
b.   Broad Network Access: Cloud services are accessible over the network via 
standardized interfaces which enables users to access the services not only by complex 
devices such as personal computers, but also by light weight devices such as smart 
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phones. In addition, the lowered cost of high-bandwidth network communication to the 
cloud provides access to a larger pool of IT resources that sustain a high level of 
utilization [20]. 
c. Location-Independent Resource Pooling: The cloud must be able to meet 
consumer’s needs from resources. To do so, the cloud use a technique called 
“virtualization”, which enables the cloud provider to pool his computing resources. This 
resource pool enables the sharing of virtual and physical resources by multiple 
consumers. As stated by NIST, “There is a sense of location independence in that the 
customer generally has no control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided 
resources but may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (e.g., 
country, state, or datacenter).”[20]. 
d. Rapid Elasticity: It is the ability of the cloud to allocate and release resources 
quickly and efficiently in order to meet the requirements of the self-service characteristic 
of cloud computing. This automated process decreases the procurement time for new 
computing capabilities when the need is there, while preventing an abundance of unused 
computing power when the need has subsided [20]. 
e. Measured Service: Cloud computing can dynamically and automatically measure 
the used resources by cloud customers.  These measurements can be used to bill the 
customer and provide them with a payment model based on “pay-per-use.” The NIST 
view of measured service is “Cloud systems automatically control and optimize resource 
use by leveraging a metering capability at some level of abstraction appropriate to the 
type of service (e.g., storage, processing, bandwidth, and active user accounts). Resource 
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usage can be monitored, controlled, and reported providing transparency for both the 
provider and consumer of the utilized service.”[20]. 
2.1.2 Cloud service models  
One of the main principles of Cloud Computing is the `as-a-Service' paradigm in 
which some services are offered by a Cloud Service Provider (CSP) to customers for use. 
These offered services are often categorized using the SPI Service Model. This model 
represents the different layers/levels of service that can be offered to users by cloud 
service providers over the different application domains and types of cloud available. 
Clouds can be used to provide as-a-Service: software to use, a platform to develop on, or 
an infrastructure to utilize [21]. Figure 2.1[21] summarizes the SPI Service Model. 
 
Figure 2-1 SPI Service Model [21] 
2.1.2.1 Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) is a service that can provide the functionalities of a 
whole infrastructure including storage, networks, any platform and any number of 
desktops. The customers can make use of this service by configuring a virtual machine on 
the infrastructure, on which an operating system is installed. They deploy the middleware 
for communication with other applications, and install the CRM software. There is no 
need to buy extra servers, when the application needs more resources, extra CPUs and 
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storage can be assigned via a web interface or via the CSP, the customers only pay for the 
used computing power and data storage [4]. 
According to NIST, Infrastructure as a Service is defined as: “The capability provided 
to the consumer is to provision processing, storage, networks, and other fundamental 
computing resources where the consumer is able to deploy and run arbitrary software, 
which can include operating systems and applications. The consumer does not manage or 
control the underlying cloud infrastructure but has control over operating systems; 
storage, deployed applications, and possibly limited control of select networking 
components (e.g., host firewalls).”[20]. Examples of IaaS are Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud and Terremark Enterprise Cloud [20]. 
2.1.2.2 Platform as a Service (PaaS) 
In the Platform as a Service (PaaS) model, the CSP offers a development platform on 
top of the services delivered with IaaS. The CSP offers a development platform, on which 
applications can be built. In other words, software developers can develop their 
application through virtual development platform, accessible via a Web browser, without 
the need to install the software building tools on their own computer. This helps the 
developers to later distribute or deploy their apps to the cloud easily. In order to avoid 
confusion of this service with SaaS, it is good to imagine it as a cloud OS. The providers 
of the service enable its users to install their applications on a platform, which can 
provide any operating system or even emulate various types of hardware [20].  
      According to NIST, PaaS is described as follows: “The capability provided to the 
consumer is to deploy onto the cloud infrastructure consumer-created or acquired 
applications created using programming languages and tools supported by the provider. 
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The consumer does not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure including 
network, servers, operating systems, or storage, but has control over the deployed 
applications and possibly application hosting environment configurations.”[20]. 
Examples of PaaS platforms are Amazon Elastic Beanstalk, Microsoft Azure Platform, 
Force.com and Google App Engine [20]. 
2.2.3 Software as a Service (SaaS) 
SaaS is a very popular service in which cloud service providers deliver software 
applications over the Web. A SaaS provider deploys their software, which is hosted on 
their own server infrastructure or use another vendor’s hardware, on user's demand .This 
operation is usually done using a licensing model where applications may be licensed 
directly to an organization, group of users or, a user or, or through a third party that 
manages multiple licenses between user organizations, such as an ASP. The user then can 
be able to access the applications through any well defined and Internet device, which is 
most probably a Web browser. 
According to NIST, Cloud Software as a Service (SaaS) is defined as follows: “The 
capability provided to the consumer is to use the provider’s applications running on a 
cloud infrastructure. The applications are accessible from various client devices through a 
thin client interface such as a web browser (e.g., web-based e-mail).The consumer does 
not manage or control the underlying cloud infrastructure, including network, servers, 
operating systems, storage, or even individual application capabilities, with the possible 
exception of limited user-specific application configuration settings.” 
The pioneer of providing SaaS was a company called Salesforce.com. Another 
common example of a SaaS provider is Google with its email and office tools like word 
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processor, spreadsheet or calendar. It could be any type of application and users can even 
create their own, hosting them on the provider’s servers [20]. 
Benefits of the SaaS Model: 
1- It reduces the cost licensing, management hardware, and other resources required to 
internally host the application by outsourcing the application hosting to an independent 
software vendor (ISV). 
2- It increase the control over the use of the software — by limiting the distribution of 
unlicensed copies and allowing the software vendor greater upgrade and patch 
management control. 
3-It enables the provider to control and create multiple revenue streams with a one-to-
many model leading to reduction in the duplication of software packages and overhead 
[20]. 
Table 2-1[20] shows the three primary SPI framework services, paired with an 
example of the service the vendor supplies for that layer. While figure 2.2[22] shows the 
cloud computing stack. 
 





Figure 2-2[22]: Cloud Computing Stack 
2.1.3 Cloud deployment models  
Cloud computing offers four basic deployment models. These deployment models are 
the public, hybrid, community and private cloud. Each of these models has its own 
characteristics. These characteristics can be described as are who owns the infrastructure, 
who manages the infrastructure, where the infrastructure located is, and who accesses the 
cloud services. Figure 2.3[22] shows types of clouds based on deployment models. 
 





2.1.3.1 Private cloud  
It is the cloud infrastructure in which the services are completely dedicated to one 
customer/organization. In other words, resources are not shared by other entities; it is 
only dedicated to the one customer. Moreover, it can be referred to as internal cloud or 
cloud computing on private networks, which are built for the exclusive use of one 
customer, providing full control over data, security, and quality of service. Furthermore, 
in this type of cloud, the users are considered as trusted by the organization, in which 
they are either employees, or have contractual agreements with the organization. [22] 
In addition, according to NIST, private cloud is described as follows as:" a cloud 
infrastructure operated solely for an organization, managed by the organization or a third 
party and existing either on premise or off-premise. The private cloud is typically hosted 
within the boundaries of the owner organization."[20].Figure 2.4[23] shows an example 
of private cloud. 
 
    Figure 2-4[23]: Private Cloud 
2.1.3.2 Public cloud  
It is the cloud infrastructure in which the services are offered to the general public or 
a large industry group and is owned by an organization selling cloud services. In other 
words, resources are shared among all customers. This means that cloud users are 
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considered to be un-trusted, where they are not tied to the organization as employees and 
that the user has no contractual agreements with the provider. 
In addition, according to NIST, public cloud is described as follows as:" The cloud 
infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general public. It may be owned, 
managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government organization, or some 
combination of them. It exists on the premises of the cloud provider."[20]. Figure 2.5[23] 
shows a public cloud. 
 
Figure 2-5[23]: Public Cloud 
2.1.3.3 Hybrid cloud 
Hybrid cloud is a combination of public, private, and community clouds. It leverages 
the capabilities of each cloud deployment model. In addition, each part of a hybrid cloud 
is connected to the other by a gateway, controlling the applications and data that flow 
from each part to the other. Moreover, it allows the organizations to manage some 
supporting resources in-house and has others provided externally. Furthermore, the users 
of hybrid clouds can be considered as trusted and un-trusted. Un-trusted users are 




In addition, according to NIST, hybrid cloud is defined  as “a composition of two or 
more clouds (private, community, or public) that remain unique entities but are bound 
together by standardized or proprietary technology that enables data and application 
portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load-balancing between clouds).”[20]. Figure 2.6[23] 
shows a hybrid cloud. 
 
     Figure 2-6[23]: Hybrid Cloud 
2.1.3.4 Community cloud 
It is the cloud infrastructure that is shared by several organizations and supported by 
multiple companies. Moreover, the shared cloud may reside on any member’s premises, 
or even on a third-party site, and managed either by the organizations or a third party. 
Furthermore, community users are also considered as trusted by the organizations that are 
part of the community. [20] 
In addition, according to NIST, community cloud is defined as:"The cloud 
infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a specific community of consumers 
from organizations that have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, 
policy, and compliance considerations). It may be owned, managed, and operated by one 
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or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or some combination of 
them, and it may exist on or off premises."[20]. Figure 2.7[23] shows a community cloud. 
 
Figure 2-7[23]: Community Cloud 
2.1.4 Cloud Architecture  
The cloud is composed of a massive network of servers or even individual PCs 
interconnected in a grid. These computers operate in parallel, merging the resources of 
each computer to produce a power similar to that of supercomputers. In other words, the 
cloud is simply a collection of computers and servers that are publicly accessible via the 
Internet. These machines (computers and servers) can run any combination of operating 
systems; it’s the processing power of the machines that matter. Although this architecture 
appears to be simple, it does require some intelligent management to connect all those 
computers together and assign task processing to multitudes of users. Figure 2.8 [24], 
shows the architecture behind a cloud computing system. As shown in the figure, it 
begins with user interface for the user to interact with the cloud and selecting a task or 
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service (either starting an application or opening a document).After selecting the required 
service, a request is passed to the system management. In the system management, 
correct resources are found and then the appropriate provisioning services are called. 
Later on, these services choose the necessary resources in the cloud, launch the 
appropriate web application and either creates or opens the requested document. After 
that, the web application is launched and then the system’s monitoring and metering 
functions track the usage of the cloud so that resources are apportioned and attributed to 
the proper user(s).[24] 
 
Figure 2-8[24]: Architecture behind the cloud computing system 
2.4.1.1 Cloud computing reference architecture 
In this section, we are going to explore the NIST cloud computing reference 
architecture. This reference architecture identify the five major actors, their activities, 
and functions in cloud computing. These actors are: cloud consumer, cloud provider, 
cloud carrier, cloud auditor, and cloud broker. Each of these actors is an entity (a 
person or an organization) that participates in a transaction or process or performs 





   Figure 2-9[23]: The Conceptual Reference Model 
1. Cloud Consumer 
The cloud consumer is the main actor that makes use of the cloud computing 
services. It can be a person or an organization that maintains a business relationship 
with, and uses the service from, a cloud provider. Moreover, a cloud consumer 
navigates through the service catalog offered by a cloud provider in order to request, 
set up, and use the appropriate services.  
In order for the cloud consumer and provider to set a framework for their 
relationship, they make use of Service-Level Agreements (SLAs).In these SLAs, the 
cloud consumers specify their required technical performance requirements from 
quality of service, security, and remedies for performance failures. On the other hand, 
cloud provider uses these SLAs to impose a set of restrictions or limitations, and 
obligations that cloud consumers must accept. 
The cloud consumers can make use of the three main services offered by the 
cloud providers-SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS. The SaaS consumers can be either an 
organization which provide its members with access to software applications or an 
end users who directly use software applications, or software application 
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administrators who configure applications for end users. These customers can access 
applications through the network. While the PaaS customers employ the tools offered 
by cloud providers to develop, test, deploy, and manage the PaaS applications hosted 
in the cloud. These consumers can be application developers who design and 
implement application software, application testers who run and test applications in a 
cloud-based environment, application developers who publish applications into the 
cloud, or application administrators who configure, monitor, and manage applications 
deployed in a cloud. For IaaS consumers, they use the virtual computers, network-
accessible storage, network infrastructure components, and other fundamental 
computing resource offered by the cloud. These consumers can be system developers, 
system administrators, or IT managers who are interested in creating, installing, 
monitoring, and managing services and applications deployed in an IaaS cloud [25]. 
2. Cloud Provider 
A cloud provider is the entity in charge of making a service available to interested 
parties. It can be either a person or an organization that acquires and manages the 
computing infrastructure required for providing the services, runs the cloud software 
that provides the services, and makes the arrangements to deliver the cloud services to 
cloud consumers through network access. 
The cloud provider offers three main service models which are SaaS, IaaS, and 
PaaS. In SaaS cloud, the cloud provider is mainly responsible for deploying, 
configuring, maintaining, and updating the operation of the software applications on a 
cloud infrastructure. However, it's mostly responsible for security, managing the 
applications, and the cloud infrastructure. On the other hand, the SaaS cloud 
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consumers are offered limited administrative control over their applications by the 
provider. While in the PaaS cloud, the provider is mainly in charge of managing the 
computing infrastructure for the platform and running the cloud software that 
provides the components of the platform. In addition, the provider supports the 
development, deployment, and management process of the PaaS cloud consumer by 
providing tools such as integrated development environments (IDEs),  software 
development kits (SDKs), and deployment and management tools. On the other hand, 
the provider offers the PaaS cloud consumer some control over their applications and 
possibly over some of the hosting environment settings, but  no or limited access to 
the infrastructure underlying the platform such as network, servers, operating systems 
(OSs), or storage. For IaaS, the cloud provider owns the physical computing 
resources underlying the service, including the storage, servers, networks, and hosting 
infrastructure. In addition, it runs the cloud software necessary to render the necessary 
computing resources to the IaaS cloud consumer through a set of service interfaces 
and computing resource abstractions, such as virtual machines and virtual network 
interfaces. In return, the provider provides the IaaS consumer access to more 
fundamental forms of computing resources and thus he/she has control over more 
software components in an application stack, including the OS. The IaaS cloud 
provider, on the other hand, has control over the physical hardware and cloud 
software that make the provisioning of these infrastructure services possible [25]. 
3. Cloud Auditor 
A cloud auditor is an entity that performs an independent task of examining the 
cloud service controls with the intent to express an opinion thereon. Moreover, the 
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auditor evaluates the services provided by a cloud provider such as security controls, 
privacy impact, and performance in order to verify their conformance to standards 
through a review of objective evidence [25]. 
4. Cloud Broker 
A cloud broker is a party that manages the use, performance, and delivery of 
cloud services and negotiates relationships between cloud providers and cloud 
consumers. The cloud consumers may ask for cloud services from a cloud broker, 
instead of directly contacting a cloud provider. In general a cloud broker is divided 
into three main categories: Service Intermediation, Service Aggregation, and Service 
Arbitrage. 
a) Service Intermediation: In this category, the cloud broker improves a 
given service by enhancing some specific capability and providing value-added 
services to cloud consumers. These enhancements can take many forms as identity 
management, enhanced security, managing access to cloud services, performance 
reporting, etc. 
b) Service Aggregation: In this category, the cloud broker merges multiple 
services into one or more new services where it provides data integration and ensures 
the secure data movement between the cloud consumer and multiple cloud providers. 
c) Service Arbitrage: This category is similar to service aggregation except 
that aggregated services are not fixed. Service arbitrage means that a broker has the 
flexibility to choose whatever services from multiple agencies. For  example, the 




5. Cloud Carrier 
A cloud carrier plays an intermediate role between cloud consumers and cloud 
providers in providing connectivity and transport of cloud services. Cloud carriers 
provide consumers access to services through network, telecommunication, and other 
access devices. For example, cloud consumers can obtain cloud services through 
network access devices, such as desktop computers, laptops, mobile phones, and 
other mobile Internet devices (MIDs) [25].  
2.1.5 Cloud Storage  
One of the main uses of cloud computing is data storage. Cloud storage is considered 
to be an online virtual distributed storage provided by cloud computing vendors. In other 
words, data stored in cloud is stored on multiple third-party servers, rather than on the 
dedicated servers used in traditional networked data storage. In addition, it appears to 
users as if the data is stored in a particular place with a specific name. But that place does 
not exist in reality. It is just a virtual name used to reference virtual space carved out of 
the cloud. In reality, the user’s data could be stored on any machine in the cloud and the 
user can access it via a web service interface, or a web based user-interface. Security and 
finance are the two main advantages of cloud storage. Financially, cloud users can save 
space, cost and complexity of installing their own storage devices. Moreover, this cloud 
storage is much cheaper than dedicated physical resources connected to a personal 
computer or network. As for security, data stored in the cloud is secure from hardware 
crashes or accidental erasure, because it is duplicated across multiple physical machines; 
since multiple copies of the data are kept continually, the cloud continues to function as 
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normal even if one or more machines go offline. If one machine crashes, the data is 
duplicated on other machines in the cloud [26] [27]. 
2.5.1 Overview on Cloud Storage products 
There are many commercial cloud storage services offered by different vendors. 
However, we have to differ between basic cloud storage services and advanced Basic 
cloud storage services. 
Basic cloud storage services: they are services mainly offer storage space and some 
limited functionalities as file sharing. These services are not designed to be accessed 
directly by users but are embedded into custom software using application programming 
interfaces (API). Examples of such basic cloud storage services are Amazon S3 [28] and 
Google Cloud Storage [29]. 
Advanced cloud storage services: They are services that employ the basic cloud 
storage services functionalities, however, they differ from basic cloud storage services in 
that they provide interfaces such as client or web applications for allowing all types of 
user to use them. Moreover, this interface allows them to offer more functionalities than 
basic cloud storage services as file sharing, synchronization. An example of such 
advanced cloud storage services is Dropbox [30]. 
In the following few lines, we are going to give examples, and brief descriptions, of 
two basic cloud storage services and one advanced cloud storage services.  
a. Amazon Simple Storage Service (Amazon S3) 
Amazon S3 is one of the cloud storages offered by Amazon. It provides data storage 
and retrieval facilities with any amount at any time via web services interfaces, such as 
AWS Management Console. Moreover, it stores data as objects within buckets. An object 
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is a file and any optional metadata that describes this file. Amazon S3 best fits in cases of 
large file, (e.g. up to 5 terabytes of data). But in case of small size files, it is better to use 
other Amazon’s data storage. Furthermore, for managing these files , Amazon S3 use 
NoSQL database solutions instead of using -traditional relational database systems or 
MySQL that are very complex and inapplicable in some cases. In addition, to reduce 
complexity, Amazon S3 has purposely minimal functionality, so data can only be written, 
read and deleted. Every object/file is stored in a bucket and retrieved via a unique key. It 
supports storing 1 byte to 5 terabytes of data, and the number of files to be stored is 
unlimited [28]. 
b. Google Cloud Storage 
Google Cloud Storage is a service offered by Google’s cloud for developers to write 
and read data. In addition to data storage, Google’s cloud offered users direct access to 
Google’s networking infrastructure, authentication and sharing mechanisms. Moreover, it 
is accessible via its REST API or by using other tools provided by Google as Google 
storage manager and gsutil.  
In order for Google Cloud Storage to be more efficient and reliable in storing, 
sharing, and managing data , it provides the following  features and capabilities: High 
capacity and scalability ,Strong data consistency , OAuth 2.0 authentication , Cookie-
based authenticated browser downloads, Google APIs Console Projects , Google account 
support for sharing, REST API, and Bucket locations. 
Google Cloud Storage uses ACLs for controlling access to the objects and buckets. 
Every time a user requests to perform an action on an object, the ACL belonging to that 




Dropbox is considered to be an advanced cloud storage services that have the same 
functionalities of basic cloud storage services for the actual storage of data, but provide 
interfaces such as client or web applications for allowing user to directly use the service. 
Dropbox can also be understood as a file hosting service that allows users to store and 
share their data across the internet. It makes use of file synchronization for sharing files 
and folders between users’ devices. In addition, it  provides user clients for many 
operating systems on desktop machines, such as Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X and 
Linux, and also on mobile devices, such as Android, Windows Phone 7, iPhone, iPad, 
WebOS and BlackBerry. Moreover, users can also access their data through a web-based 
client when no local clients are installed [30]. 
Dropbox makes use of Amazon’s cloud storage, namely Amazon S3, as their data 
storage. Dropbox founders claim that it has a solid security for users’ data, and they use 
the same security solutions as banks. For synchronization, Dropbox uses SSL file transfer 
protocol, and the stored data are encrypted at the server side using AES-256 encryption 
[31]. 
2.5.2 Cloud Storage Security Requirements  
 In the process of storing data to the cloud, and retrieving it back from the cloud, there 
are mainly three elements involved, which are the client, the server (CSP) and the 
communication link between them. In order to make sure that the data is stored securely, 
all the three elements must have a solid security. For the client, he/she has to make sure 
that unauthorized party can access his machine. While for cloud storage provider (CSP), 
he has to make sure that data have confidentiality, integrity and availability in rest. Last 
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but not least, the communication between client and server must be performed through a 
secure channel, i.e. the data must have confidentiality and integrity during its transfer 
between server and client. One of the ways to achieve secure communication is having a 
cryptographic protocol, such as SSL [32]. 
2.1.6 Benefits and drawbacks of cloud  
a) Benefits 
The benefits of using cloud computing are varied. They include a cloud’s 
inherent flexibility and resiliency, the potential for reducing costs, 
availability of very large amounts of centralized data storage, means to rapidly 
deploy computing resources, and scalability [20]. 
1) Flexibility and Resiliency 
Cloud computing offers much more flexibility than past computing methods. 
They provide their customers with the ability to choose among a number of 
computing and storage resource configurations at different capabilities and costs what 
fits their requirements. 
On the other hand, resiliency can be achieved through the availability of multiple 
redundant resources and locations. In addition, with the advancement in autonomic 
computing, self-management and self-healing mechanisms helps in ensuring the 
increased reliability and robustness of cloud resources [20]. 
2) Reduced Costs 
Cloud technology is paid incrementally, saving organizations money. Instead of  
 buying large servers for storage and backup, the organization can hire what it 
need from the cloud. This leads to reduction in  capital costs and  saving the money 
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for managing operating expenses .Another factor to be considered is that client 
organizational support and maintenance costs are reduced dramatically because these 
expenses are transferred to the cloud provider, including 24/7 support. 
All in All, cloud computing offers reductions in system administration, energy 
costs, software licensing fees, provisioning expenses, and hardware costs [20]. 
3) Centralization of Data Storage 
The cloud provides much data storage recourses than that available in local, 
corporate computing systems. Moreover, there is flexibility in increasing or 
decreasing these cloud storage resources according to operating cost adjustments. 
This form of centralization of storage infrastructure results in cost efficiencies in -
utilities, trained personnel, and real-estate. In addition, it will be much easier to 
implement and monitor data protection schemes in a centralized system than on large 
numbers of computing platforms. However, there is one main disadvantage of having 
centralization of data storage of large amounts of sensitive information stored in a
 centralized; it provides an attractive target for hackers or criminal organizations to 
 gain access to critical information by focusing on a central repository [20]. 
4) Reduced Time to Deployment 
As cloud provides means to make use of powerful computational resources in a 
short period and with large amounts of storage without the need to require sizeable 
initial investments in hardware, software, and personnel. This leads to rapid 
provisioning that can accomplished at relatively small cost and offers the customers 





Cloud computing allows the customers, with limits, to provision their 
computational resources in order to meet their demands, either increasing or 
decreasing .This approach provides an alternative to in-house systems that are used 
only during peak periods and stay with partial capacity most of the time [20]. 
b) Drawback 
Although cloud computing provides a number of benefits and advantages over the 
previous computing paradigms, there are still a number of challenges. These challenges 
include: performance, security and privacy, control, bandwidth costs, and reliability [33]. 
1) Performance 
The performance can a major issue in case of intensive transaction-oriented and 
other data-intensive applications because cloud computing may lack adequate 
performance. In addition, users who are long distance away from their providers may 
suffer from high latency and delays [33]. 
2) Security and Privacy 
Customers are always worried about vulnerability to attacks, when their data is 
sent to the cloud as they have no control over it [33]. 
3) Control 
Some customers are worried because cloud computing providers have full control 
of the platforms. However, cloud computing providers do not typically design 
customized platforms for companies. Therefore, all cloud computing providers will 
have control over their customer's platforms [33]. 
4) Bandwidth Costs 
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Although most companies using cloud computing save money spend on hardware 
and software, they need much more money to acquire higher network bandwidth. 
Bandwidth cost varies depending on application type. It can be low for smaller 
Internet-based applications, while could be significantly high for data-intensive 
applications [33]. 
5) Reliability 
Cloud computing do not offer high reliability all the time. There were some cases 
where cloud suffers from reliability problems, a few-hours outages [33]. 
2.1.7 Cloud Service Provider infrastructure  
In the following sections, we are going to describe the technical infrastructure of a 
cloud   service provider (CSP) .In Section 2.7.1.1, we will give a detailed description to 
virtualization in cloud computing. As for Section 2.7.1.2, we will describe how data is 
stored in cloud computing. Finally, in Section 2.7.1.3, we will describe how this data 
storage is combined with a virtualized environment.  
2.7.1.1 Virtualization 
In recent few years virtualization has had a significant impact on cloud computing. 
Virtualization in cloud enables multiple operating systems and applications to run 
concurrently and in isolation from each other on a single physical machine. Each 
operating system with its applications represents a virtual machine. These virtual 
machines (VMs) share the physical resources of the single physical machine leading to 
better utilization, optimization and resource efficiency. In addition, virtualization allows 
resources to be automatically allocated when and where needed and for dynamic 
provisioning and de-provisioning. Moreover, CSP offers two options in delivering a VM: 
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a client can create its own VM with operating system and configuration, or the CSP 
delivers a standard VM with pre-installed operating system [34]. 
Figure 2.10[34]  illustrating the concepts of multiple virtual machines running on and 
utilizing a single host operating system and the physical computer hardware. 
 
     Figure 2-10[34]: Virtual Environment 
The primary benefits of virtualization are a reduction in costs, server consolidation 
and utilization. Figure  2.11[34] shows the major benefits including disaster recovery and 
service continuity (availability), easier or quick deployment, seamless portability and 
migration, increased flexibility and service agility, reduced downtime, easier and quicker 
developments and testing, ease of management and administration, isolation, and 




Figure 2-11[34]: Virtualization Benefits 
The management of VMs on a physical machine is performed by the hypervisor, 
which is also known as virtual machine manager. The hypervisor presents a virtual 
operating platform to the guest operating systems and manages the execution of the guest 
operating systems. In addition, it gives the guests operating systems the impression that 
they are running on physical hardware, by assigning processing capacity, data storage and 
networking facilities. Examples of hypervisors are VMware [34]. 
2.7.1.2 Data storage  
In data centers, data is not stored on server's hard disk, but they are stored on large 
storage clusters. An example of these storage clusters is Storage Area Network (SAN). A 
SAN is a dedicated storage network that provides access to consolidated, block level 
storage. In addition, these SANs are used to make storage devices that are accessible to 
servers appear as if they are locally attached to the operating system. Moreover, A SAN 
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has its own network of storage devices that are generally not accessible through the 
regular network by regular devices [35]. 
It is also important to note that, the SAN itself does not provide file abstraction, but 
only block-level operations. In contrast to SAN, there is Network Attached Storage 
(NAS), which use uses file-based protocols such as NFS or SMB/CIFS where the storage 
is remote, and computers request a file rather than a disk block [35]. 
2.7.1.3 Data storage virtualization 
The customers of cloud think that their operating system writes directly to their 
dedicated hard disk, while this is not true. In reality, the hypervisor converts customer's 
operations to a virtual disk. These virtual disks are often referred to as LUNs (Logical 
Unit Numbers).A LUN can be defined as a logical reference to a portion of a storage 
subsystem , which can comprise a disk, a section of a disk, a whole disk array, or a 
section of a disk array in the subsystem. This logical reference, when it is assigned to a 
server in the SAN, acts as a physical disk drive that the server can read and write to. 
Using LUNs simplifies the management of storage resources in the SAN [35]. 
In addition, it is important to know that the CSP usually move data to different 
countries. There are two main reasons that make CSP do this. Firstly, dynamically 
spreading data over multiple locations leads to more redundant and delivers higher 
availability. When one data center becomes unavailable, other data centers can take over 
the tasks. Secondly, storing and processing data at different locations leads to more 
efficiency, when data can be stored or processed at a location with spare capacity or low 
processing (e.g. electricity) costs for specific moments, e.g. when solar power is available 
in overcapacity [35]. 
Page 38 
 
2.2 Cloud Security Issues  
2.2.1 Overview  
Although cloud computing saves enterprises millions and encourages more 
innovation by simplifying access to scalability for greater numbers of developers and 
organizations, it suffers from multiple security threats that come from the way cloud 
computing infrastructures are constructed. As a result, security issues have many 
guises both technical and socio-technical and covering all these security issues in-
depth within the cloud is an impossible task. Therefore, this chapter will cover only 
two classifications of security issues. The first classification will present threats to 
Cloud Computing according to European Network and Information Security Agency 
(ENISA) [36], which classifies security risks related to cloud computing into three 
main categories: Policy and Organizational, Technical, and Legal. While the second 
classification will present seven top threats to cloud computing according to Cloud 
Security Alliance [37], which is a non-profit organization that seeks to promote the 
best practices for providing security assurance within the cloud computing landscape. 
These threats are Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing, Insecure 
Application Programming Interfaces, Malicious Insiders, Shared Technology 
Vulnerabilities, Data Loss/Leakage, Account and Service Traffic Hijacking, and 
Unknown Risk Profile. 
2.2.2 Top Security Risks Categories  
The security risk should always be understood in relation to overall business 
opportunity and appetite for risk – sometimes risk is compensated by opportunity. 
Therefore, the risks of using cloud computing should be compared to the risks of 
staying with traditional solutions, such as desktop-based models. Because cloud 
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services are not only about convenient storage, accessible by multiple devices, but it 
includes benefits such as more convenient communication and instant multi-point 
collaboration. Moreover, it is important to note that the level of risk may vary 
significantly with the type of cloud architecture. 
In addition, it is possible for some risks to transfer to the cloud provider from  
Cloud customer and these risks should be taken in consideration against the cost 
benefit received from the services. However, not all risks can be transferred to cloud 
but if a risk is transferred to the cloud, it may lead to the failure of the business, 
serious damage to reputation or legal implications. At that moment, it would hard or 
even impossible for any other party to compensate for this damage.  
In the following sections, we will go through the three main categories of security 
risks related to cloud computing. In each category, we will highlight some the 
associated   risks. 
2.2.2.1 Policy and Organizational 
Figure 2.12[38] shown below illustrates the policy and organization risks. 
 
Figure 2-12[38]: Policy and Organizational Risks 
a) Lock In 
Lock-in means that the data is locked to a certain CSP because there are no 
standards followed in data formats or in services interfaces that could guarantee data, 
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application and service portability. This make the customer migration from one 
provider to another or migration of data and services back to an in-house IT 
environment a difficult task. This implies that there is not much portability or 
interoperability for data and services provided by the current cloud providers. 
Moreover, lock-in is considered to be a very high risk for a company as it may cause 
the following vulnerabilities: lack of standard technology and solutions, poor provider 
selection, lack of supplier redundancy, and lack of completeness and transparency in 
terms of use. These vulnerabilities may affect the following assets: company 
reputation, personal sensitive data, personal data, and service delivery – real time 
services. In addition, they may also cause catastrophic business failures that could 
drive the cloud provider to go bankrupt [38]. 
b) Loss of Governance  
While using cloud infrastructures, the client cedes control of a number of issues 
which may affect security to the cloud provider leading to loss of governance and 
control. Although there are SLAs between cloud provider and client, these SLAs do 
not offer clear promise to provide such issues on the part of cloud provider. This leads 
to a gap in security defenses which in turn leads to loss of governance and control. 
This loss of governance and control severely affect the organization’s strategy and 
ability to meet its mission and goals. In addition, it make it impossible to comply with 
security requirements leading to  lack of confidentiality and integrity, un-availability 
of data, and a deterioration of performance and quality of service, not to mention 
compliance challenges. Furthermore, this shall affect the company reputation, 
customer trust, employee loyalty and experience, personal sensitive data, and service 
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delivery – real time services [38]. 
c) Cloud Service Termination or Failure 
In any IT market, competitive environment, inadequate business plan, and lack of 
financial support may push some cloud providers to go out of business or at least 
force them to restructure the services they offer. In other words, some cloud 
computing services may terminate in the short or medium term due to any of the 
reasons stated above. This is considered to be a medium risk that may lead to a loss or 
deterioration of service delivery performance, and quality of service, as well as a loss 
of investment.  
Moreover, failures in the services outsourced to the cloud provider may have a 
great impact on the cloud customer’s ability to meet its duties and obligations to its 
own customers and employees. The customer of a cloud provider may hold liable for 
any injuries suffered by its own customers and employees [38]. 
2.2.2.2    Technical 




    Figure 2-13[38]: Technical Risks 
a) Management interface compromise 
The customer management interfaces of public cloud providers are accessed via 
the Internet and this allows clients to access to larger sets of resources (than 
traditional hosting providers). Therefore, an increased risk is posed especially when 
combined with remote access and web browser vulnerabilities. Examples of these 
vulnerabilities include man-in-the middle, script attacks etc. In addition, back-end 
technology could allow unauthorized connections leading to data theft and account 
compromise. Moreover, management interface includes customer interfaces which 
control a number of virtual machines and the CP interfaces controlling the operation 
of the overall cloud system [38].  
b) Denial of Service (Dos) 
An attacker could launch a denial of service by using the public channel to use a 
customer’s metered resources. The mitigations against DoS attacks would depend on 
the capabilities and configurations of the provider’s cloud technology [38]. 
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c) Loss of encryption keys 
Poor management of keys may cause disclosure of secret keys (SSL, file 
encryption, customer private keys, etc) or passwords to malicious parties. This shall 
either lead to corruption or loss of those keys and potentially may result in 
unauthorized use for authentication and digital signatures [36]. 
d) Isolation Failure 
Two of the main characteristics defining the cloud are multi-tenancy and shared 
resources. These two characteristics make computing capacity, storage, and network 
shared among multiple users. This leads to the creation of a class of risks that include 
the failure of mechanisms separating storage, memory, routing, and even reputation 
of different tenants of the shared infrastructure [38]. 
2.2.2.3 Legal 
Figure 2.14[38] shown below illustrates the legal risks. 
 
    Figure 2-14[38]: Legal Risks 
a) Risk from changes of Jurisdiction 
In cloud, the user's data is stored in multiple jurisdictions, some of these 
jurisdictions are unsafe at all and this exposes the data to high risk. High-risk 
countries are those lacking the rule of law and having an unpredictable legal 
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framework and enforcement, autocratic police states, and states that do not respect 
international agreements, etc [38].  
b) Data Protection  
The cloud computing model poses a number of data protection threats to both 
cloud providers and customers. These threats include the following: 
 The task of checking data processing that is carried out by the cloud provider is the 
main responsibility of the cloud customer (data controller). Although this task is 
difficult for the cloud client, he has also to make sure that the data handled by 
provider is handled in a lawful way.  Failure to comply with data protection laws may 
lead to administrative, civil and also criminal sanctions, which vary from country to 
country, for the data controller. 
 The cloud provider does not notify the cloud client of any data security breaches that 
may take place. 
 The cloud customer may lose control of the data processed by the cloud provider. 
This issue is increased in the case of multiple transfers of data (e.g., between 
federated cloud providers) [38].  
2.2.3 Top Threats to Cloud Computing  
2.2.3.1 Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing 
Legal CSP can be abused for nefarious purposes, supporting criminal or illegal 
activities towards the cloud customers. As a result, the provider's services can be used to 
host malicious code or facilitate communication between remote parties. This abuse for 
CSP can also lead to provision of purposefully insecure services used for data capture. 
Moreover, the abused CSP may attack potential users with offers that seem to be true. For 
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example, the attack may promise the customer with unlimited resources or '30 day free 
trial' for certain service. During the registration process the customer will be asked to 
provide extra information than usual under the pretense of providing service 
personalization. Attackers can then use this extra information for nefarious purposes. 
Even if the CSP was not malicious, the disclosure of personal information to CSP can 
also be considered an abuse of service by the CSP himself. For example, the CSP can 
make use of the extra information collected by marketing them to third parties for data 
mining purposes. 
This type of attacks can be prevented by using strong initial registration and 
validation process, powerful monitoring and coordination for credit card fraud, and 
comprehensive introspection of customer network traffic [39].  
2.2.3.2 Insecure Interfaces and APIs 
 
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and other interfaces are used by cloud 
customers to access their data in the cloud. Any errors or malfunctions in these interfaces 
software or the software used to run the cloud can lead to disclosure of user's data and 
rebut upon the data's integrity. An example of this attack is the flaw in apache server 
which allows an attacker to gain complete control over the web server. Moreover, 
exposure of data can take place when a software malfunction affects the access policies 
governing users data leading to user's data exposure to unauthorized entities.[40][41]. 
Threats can also exist as a result of poorly designed or implemented security 
measures. Regardless of any threat APIs are exposed to, APIs need to secure against 
accidental and malicious attempts to circumvent the APIs and their security measures. In 
addition, strong authentication and access controls should be implemented besides the 
encrypted transmission. Good understanding of the dependency chain associated with the 
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API and security model analysis of the APIs should be achieved so as to prevent any 
attacks to the APIs [39]. 
2.2.3.3 Malicious Insiders 
 
The cloud customers trust the cloud providers by leaving their data under their 
control. Although the CSPs may be honest, their employees may not be. A malicious 
insider is an employee working for a certain CSP and abuses his position by collecting 
user's information/data either for nefarious purposes or for marketing this data to third 
parties. In other words, CSP employees will have access to consumer's data for legitimate 
purposes but they abuse this power for their own means [42]. Another form of the 
malicious insider problem is in PaaS based services. If developers were allowed to 
interact with users through the service provider platform, users may ignorantly allow 
these developers to access their data. For example, in Facebook platform once a user adds 
an application, the application will automatically   have the ability to access the entire 
user's information, regardless of the applications function. Even if the application 
developers are not malicious this does not mean that the application cannot be hacked 
[43] [44]. 
 2.2.3.4 Data Loss or Leakage 
 
Although insecure APIs can lead to data loss or disclosure of information, there are 
other means in which customers can lose their information / data. The two most 
important means that lead to data loss are availability and data leakage. 
a) Availability issues appear when the customer is unable to access his data. This lack 
of availability can be a result of data deletion, access privilege revocation or restricting 
physical access to the data itself. Attackers can also use flooding based attacks to 
attribute customer's data availability [45]. For example, Denial of Services attacks, 
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attempt to flood the service with requests in an attempt to overwhelm the service and halt 
all of the services intended operations. 
Fault tolerance protocols are mainly used to resist the node failure within the cloud. 
Fault tolerance protocols can be defined as protocols that duplicate the data across 
different machines, and data centers,  so as to ensure that if part of the cloud fails for 
whatever reason, customer's data in this part will still be available in other places within 
the cloud. However, poorly designed fault tolerance protocols can lead to availability 
issues. Furthermore, the presence of multiple copies of the same data can introduce 
confidentiality problems because the increased number of data instances increases the 
attacker's chance of accessing the data [39]. 
b) Another form of data leakage comes from the disclosure of information. This 
disclosed information, through hidden, is deduced from freely available information. 
Famous examples of this type of attacks include: unwelcome linkage and social graph 
merging. Usually when users interact with a service, they may leave a public trail which 
takes the form of status/update messages or new postings. Unwelcome linkage take place 
when new information identifying an individual is obtained through analysis of the 
individual's public trail i.e. links. This unwelcome linkage could be accidental or the 
result of the individual not covering their tracks. A social graph is a graph that describes 
the person's social information such as friends, groups and interests [46]. Social graph 
merging is similar to unwelcome linkage; however, the links formed occur through the 
aggregation of social graphs [39]. 
 
2.2.3.5 Account or Service Hijacking 
 
During the communication between the customer and the CSP, malicious entities may 
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seek to affect the integrity and authenticity of this communication. There are several 
ways in which the authenticity and integrity of a customer's session can be impugned. 
Customer uses browser-based interfaces and authentication in order to establish a session 
with their service provider. A malicious entity can attempt to capture or hijack this 
session in order to steal the customers credentials, or access/influence the users data from 
within the browser [47].Since most browsers operate using the same origin policy which 
states that client scripts are allowed to access resources if they share the same origin, 
attackers can make of this policy to access users resources.  
Furthermore, the effects breaking session integrity between the customer and provider 
are two-fold, for one the attacker will be able to steal the identity of their victim, and 
secondly the fake data will confute the reputation of the victim .These man-in-the-middle 
attacks will have lasting repercussions such as violation of the services terms of use. 
Moreover, these man-in-the-middle attacks may affect the confidentiality of data if the 
attacker has the ability to read the data as well as modify it [48] [39]. 
2.2.3.6 Shared Technology Vulnerabilities 
The vulnerabilities related to the construction of the cloud and the services 
themselves represent a more interesting form of confidentiality issues. In the following 
lines, we will explore two issues related to the cloud itself. These issues are virtualization 
issues and service aggregation. 
a) Virtualization Issues 
The virtualized architecture of the cloud gives IaaS service providers the ability to 
host several machine images on a single server. This architecture brings into the cloud 
more vulnerability. The attackers could make use of this architecture to map the internal 
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structure of the cloud so as to determine  if two virtual machines were running on the 
same physical machine or not. Moreover, the attackers may be able to add a virtual 
machine to the cloud so that it was co-resident with another machine. Finally, once the 
attacker is able to co-resident his machine with another in the cloud , he would be able to 
launch several attacks that would allow him to learn information regarding CPU cache 
use, network traffic rates and keystroke timings[39][49]. 
b) Service Aggregation 
Service aggregation can be defined as combination of the functionality of existing 
services so as to allow rapid service construction. Although service aggregation offer new 
functionalities than that of normal cloud, it has several interesting problems [49]. In 
service aggregation data is shared across multiple service providers. Each provider has 
his own privacy policy that is subject to change. Furthermore, service aggregation can 
occur in an ad-hoc and rapid manner implying less stringent controls to be applied to the 
protection of data, thus increasing the likelihood of a problem [39]. 
2.2.3.7 Unknown Risk Profile 
Risk Management can be defined as a business process that users can use to identify 
and mitigate threats. It also allows customers to know their current position towards the 
security of their data. Auditing information such current security practices, and software 
version, code updates are used as a basis for determining this position. In order for the 
customers to adopt any service, they have to accept the Terms and Conditions (including 
privacy policy) of the service, together with any Service Level Agreements made. These 
Terms and Conditions together with the SLAs define the existing laws and regulations 
that customers as well as providers need to comply with. However, there is not any clear 
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information about security practices and legislation that the CSP follows to secure its 
customers. Therefore, the consumers are left with an unknown risk profile and they are 























2.3 Cloud Threat Models  
2.3.1 Overview  
The threat model is used to organize the system threats and vulnerabilities into 
general classes so as to be addressed by the storage protection techniques. In other words, 
thread modeling can be defined as a proactive systematic engineering approach that 
identifies all possible vulnerabilities and threats irrespective to their probability of 
occurrence. Therefore, it is important for engineers and system designers to aware of all 
the threats and vulnerabilities present in the storage system before they begin designing 
or implementing any storage protection solution. Because  the type of threat determines 
the security counter measure that can be used , threats analysis cannot depend only on 
brainstorming or respond to threats that have recently occurred as this will leave large 
portion of the attack space unprotected. In this chapter, we will go through two different 
processes to creating a threat model for storage systems: 
(1) A threat model process based on the CIAA principles of confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, and authentication and (2) a threat model process based on the Data Life 
cycle model. 
The CIAA thread model is based on the four basic security requirements which are 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, and authentication. Each threat presented in this 
model is classified based on its relationship with each requirement not with the context of 
its implementation. While the Data Life cycle model considers the original of the threat 
and when the threat is likely to occur during the service operation [50]. 
2.3.2 Threat Overview  





The knowledge of threat origin can basically come from the attacks the system is 
exposed to. Attackers need only to find one security flaw to compromise the whole 
storage system. Attackers are generally classified into broad categories which include 
organized crime, espionage, terrorists, individual criminals, hacker cells, and insiders 
with privileged access, individual attackers, and nation-states – real attackers rarely fit 
neatly into one of these categories. However, in this paper we shall divide the origin of 
threats to data into three categories [50]: 
1) Outsiders: These are entities that exist outside the system and attempt to damage 
and destroy the security infrastructure of the service. They also work on stealing user's 
account and password, disguising as a legitimate service so as to trap the users. In 
addition, they can stand in the data transmission process for starting middle man attack, 
stealing user data in transmission network, modifying the data, and even creating some 
invalid data. 
2) Insiders: These are entities that exist inside the system. Examples of these types 
 include current or past employees of the CSP and users of cloud services. These 
 employees have great knowledge of the actual infrastructure including that of the 
security; therefore, they represent the most serious type of threats. Moreover, since the 
CSP have full control over resources in cloud, including user’s data, they can easily move 
or backup the user’s data modify user's profile information and gain the unencrypted 
information in memory when data is in use stage without data owner knowledge.  
3) Natural: Both insiders and outsiders cause errors to infrastructure and these errors 
 are intended errors; however, not all errors are intended. There are errors that take 
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place naturally due to software or hardware failures. Example of this nature error is the 
software update that Google offered to Google Docs. This software malfunction changed 
the sharing settings of several users' documents to include those with whom the affected 
users had share documents before [40]. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the attacker type so as to understand the 
resources and capabilities they have at their disposal. 
2.3.2.2 Goals 
Attackers are always goal driven towards a particular asset. These assets (system 
resources) can be either tangible (e.g. data) or abstract (data consistency). It is impossible 
to find a threat without finding its corresponding asset because assets are the threat goals. 
Hasan, Myagmar et al. [50] provides an incomplete list of what these assets maybe. 
However, we added more items to the list that are cloud specific asset. 
An incomplete list of possibly targeted assets includes: 
 Data blocks 
 Buffer cache      
 File handles       
  Device drivers 
 Communication channel      
 Storage media        
 Data management software       
 Data availability 
  Data secrecy      
 Data integrity      
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 Data consistency      
 Virtual image availability        
 Virtual image secrecy 
 Service availability 
2.3.2.3Means 
Attackers usually need to gain access to the assets in order to accomplish their goals. 
The access points could be configuration files, hardware ports, open sockets, RPC 
interfaces, and file system read/write. Hasan, Myagmar et al. [50] provides an incomplete 
list of access points that may be exploited by attackers: 
• Access data from outside through network connection 
• Access data from inside via trusted access or system compromise 
• Physical access to SAN fabric 
• Management interface from remote location to SAN fabric 
• Compromised server accessing data and SAN fabric 
However, it is important to note that internal attacker does not need to exploit any 
technical insecurity because he has direct access to the data or he can gain access through 
privileges escalation. 
 
2.3.3 The Lifecycle of Data  
Data life cycle can defined as the entire process from generation to destruction of data. 





    Figure 2-15[51]: Data Life Cycle 
1)   Data Generation 
This is the initial stage of the data life cycle in which the data is created or modified / 
altered /updated by the user. After the creation process, the data is ready for uploading to 
the cloud for consumption [51]. 
2)   Transfer 
The second stage of data life cycle is the transfer and store stage. In this stage, the 
data is transmitted from the user machine to the cloud. This data that is transmitted across 
enterprise boundaries requires both confidentiality and integrity measures through the 
entire transfer process   so as to prevent data from being tapped and tampered with by 
unauthorized users[51].  
3)  Use  
In this stage, the data is usually viewed, processed or used in other sorts of activities 
except data modification. Data in this stage can be divided into two categories: static and 
dynamic data. Static data is usually stored on the cloud without any manipulation over it, 
while dynamic data is the data that operations are performed over. Due to the multi - 
tenant feature of cloud model, all users' data that are processed by the cloud is stored 
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together. Therefore, data should be encrypted so as to protect it from security problems. 
However, static data is feasible for encryption as it is not processed, while dynamic data 
are not feasible for encryption as data encryption will lead to problems of indexing and 
query [51]. 
4)   Share  
Data sharing is the process of making data accessible to others. In other words, the 
data owner can authorize other parties to have access his data. In cloud model, when a 
user give other party the right to access his data, this party can in turn share this data with 
others without the data owner's permission. Therefore, the data owner has to make sure 
that the party he is sharing his data with follows the protection measures and usage 
restriction [51]. 
5)  Storage  
The storage process is the process of committing data into the storage repository. In 
cloud model, the SPI model divides the data into two groups :(a) Data in IaaS 
environment; (b) Data in PaaS or SaaS environment related to cloud based applications. 
The data stored in cloud storage is similar to other traditional storage where it needs to be 
secured against security issues. Therefore, three aspects of information security, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability, should be taken into consideration when dealing 
with data in cloud. Data confidentiality can be solved easily by using encryption 
algorithms. While in data integrity two challenges should be considered: a) checking the 
integrity of data without having to download it then upload it; b) ensuring the integrity in 
cloud with traditional methodologies which may not be effective. Finally, data 
availability in the cloud is exposed to more threats than traditional external attacks. These 
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threats include: (1) The availability of cloud computing services; (2) the cloud provider 
continuity to operate in the future? (3) the ability of the cloud storage services to provide 
backup? [51] 
6) Archival 
Archiving means that the data leaves its active state and enters long term storage. In 
cloud environment, the CSP should regularly replicate data for archival purposes. This 
means that a copy of the data will be transferred to an external storage. Therefore, the 
storage media should always be under the control of the CSP because otherwise the data 
will be exposed to leakage risk. In addition, the CSP have to provide off-site archival of 
the data in order to assure the availability of data, because if the CSP did not do so, the 
data availability will be threatened. Moreover, the storage duration should be consistent 
with archival requirements so as to protect the data from availability or privacy threats 
[51].  
7) Destruction  
When the user no longer needs the data, he asks the provider to permanently delete 
this data. But the question here is whether the provider actually deleted the data 
completely from the storage or not, because the physical characteristics of the storage 
medium, the d may remain the deleted data in the storage which makes its restoration an 
easy task for attackers. Therefore, the user has to make sure that his deleted data no 
longer exist in the cloud after deletion [51]. 
2.3.4 Data Lifecycle Threat Models  
The presence of data in the cloud exposes it to more risks than in traditional computer 
systems. Therefore, a strong threat model is needed to identity risks and vulnerabilities so 
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that appropriate solutions are found to address these vulnerabilities. Earlier in this chapter 
two threat models, which are the CIAA and data life cycle, were presented. The CIAA 
Model is used to model threats to data, however, it lacks context. While the Data Life 
cycle classifies the threats , first by placing them within the data life cycle and then using 
the CIAA model.  
Figure 2.16 [50] shows storage attacks based on data life cycle. 
 
   Figure 2-16[50]: storage attacks based on data life cycle 
Next, we shall discuss the different stages of data life cycle model with associated 
threats: 
1. Data Creation/ generation: In this stage, the data is created by the user. After the 
generation of the data, data could have security risks. For example, the attacker can 
tamper user's data and modify its access right leading to loss in his rights [14]. 
2. Data transmission: After the creation of data, the data is transferred from user's 
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machine to the cloud. Through the transmission process of the data, the data may expose 
to the following risks: a) attackers may sniff data on the communication channel, b) 
attackers may alter the data by performing a man-in-the-middle attack, c) the 
communication channel may by disturbed with DoS attacks and d) real or fake data may 
be created using a stolen identity [14]. 
3, 4) Data usage/ Data sharing: Data is either used by its owner or shared with other 
users. This data may be used by corrupted users to cause data leakage. Therefore, data 
confidentiality, integrity, and consistency should be maintained [14]. 
5) Data storage: In this stage, the data is stored in the cloud datacenters. This stored data 
may encounter many security threats. These threats may include unauthorized access and 
data tampering from malicious CSP and network intruders; the aging risk of backup 
medium; the risk of Information leakage during the backup; the mistake from legitimate 
users [14]. 
6) Data archival: the data in this stage is replicated to disk or tape for backup purposes; 
therefore, it will not be used temporally. However, this archived data will suffer from 
security problems. These security problems include the following: a) Backup media may 
be stolen, b)the backup software is less-protective; for example, a buffer-overflow 
vulnerability in backup software may allow the attacker to take control of system leading 
to the execution of malicious code and the launch of DoS attacks; c)backup  availability 
can be denied by attacking backup timing synchronization, power supply, storage media, 
or network; d) the attackers devices may masquerade as trusted storage system 
component so as to receive a copy of replicated data; e) if the data is archived to online 
storage, it may be exposed to illegal access[14].   
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7) Data destruction: when the data is no longer used, it is deleted from the storage 
media. The problem appears when the data is not completely destroyed as this may lead 
to risks of illegal restore. The following attacks can be executed during this stage: a) An 
attacker may snoop on deleted storage blocks; b) meta data can be changed so as to 
subvert accurate evaluation for deletion and discarding; c) attackers may disguise under a 




















2.4 Data Security Requirements  
2.4.1 Overview  
In this chapter, we shall explore the set of security requirements needed to have 
secure data in cloud. we address these requirements from two perspectives: user's 
prospective and cloud storage provider prospective because the data is shared 
between the user and the provider. 
2.4.2 Confidentiality  
Confidentiality is one of the most important aspects of data security. It can be defined 
as the assurance that sensitive information is not revealed to unauthorized users, 
processes or devices. Therefore, measures should be taken so as to protect users' 
confidential data from cloud service providers and external attackers, because if the 
confidentiality is violated either maliciously or accidentally, serious problems will take 
place. In order to prevent these confidential violations, sensitive /personal data should be 
encrypted. Encryption of sensitive or personal data should be used in all data forms e.g.  
when the data is in transit, when the data is at rest, and when the data is in manipulation. 
Moreover, the communication channel between the cloud provider and the customer as 
well as data centers should be encrypted .Remote administration of the cloud platform 
should only take place via a secure communication channel. Furthermore, if the user is 
not going to only store data in cloud but plans to process it, he must take in consideration 
that encryption cannot be used during processing of data(except for very specific 
computations). However, current research in encryption tried to solve this problem. 
Although data confidentiality is primarily solved via encryption, there are other 




I. User and Resource Privacy 
In the cloud computing environment, data confidentiality extends to how the data is 
being processed / used. The means that CSP used to store or process the data are bounded 
by the law and these laws must be followed. Example of this include: auditing records 
indicating access attempts and changes (and their results) to the data; properties of the 
data including size, access policies and origin [52] [53]. 
II. Deducible Data 
Deducible data refers to the hidden data that can be deducted from existing ones. It is 
important to unable the attacker to use existing information or information related to 
confidential data (e.g. meta- data) to deduce any other information. In addition, such 
attacks should be made as difficult as possible so as to protect data [52] [53]. 
Confidentiality is an aspect that both the customers and CSP need to be aware of. 
Although the security of data is the responsibility of the cloud provider, in some cases 
(e.g. an IaaS storage service) the cloud customers have to encrypt the data by themselves 
before sending it to the cloud. Specifically, the confidentiality of the plain-text data itself 
should be the responsibility of the customer before it goes into the cloud. The CSP should 
guarantee the user and resource privacy, and deducible data because he is in a better 
position to provide such guarantee [52] [53]. 
2.4.3 Integrity and Consistency  
In the cloud computing model, the mobility of data increases the threats that can 
affect the data integrity. Integrity can be defined as the protection of data from 
unauthorized access that can take place either maliciously or accidentally during 
processing, storage or transmission of data. As the data being transmitted to and from the 
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customer and the cloud service provider, and also internally within the cloud, data 
integrity should be guaranteed within the cloud. Ensuring data integrity can performed by 
several techniques which include:1)cryptographic authentication mechanisms( e.g. 
message authentication codes or signatures) that is used to detect alterations to personal 
data 2) creating hashes of stored data and comparing them with newer hashes of the same 
files. In addition, there should be a secure communication channel between the customer 
and the provider in order to ensure integrity of data during transit. It is also important to 
check the data accuracy during manipulation so as to prevent fraud. Moreover, 
interference with the integrity of IT systems in the cloud can be prevented or detected by 
means of intrusion detection / prevention systems (IPS / IDS).There should also be rules 
on using “lossy” compression techniques on files that are not text based[51][52]. 
Data consistency can be defined as a measure of accuracy and integrity of data. In 
other words, if there are several copies of the same data, these copies should be identical. 
Consistency problems appear in the cloud because of two main failures which are 
omission and commission failures. Omission failures take place when an entity fails to 
act upon input. Examples of omission failures include crash failures, failing to receive a 
request, or failing to send a response. While commission failures are these types of 
failures that take place when an entity responds to input with an output that is not what 
was expected. Examples of commission failures include processing a request incorrectly, 
corrupting local state, and/or sending an incorrect or inconsistent response to a request. 
Data stored in the cloud is replicated for many reasons such as availability, scalability or 
archival purposes. This replicated data may be exposed to inconsistent state, therefore, 
the consistency of the replicated data must be ensured [52] [53]. 
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2.4.4 Availability  
Another issue that should be addressed when considering data security requirements 
is data availability. Data Availability can be defined as availability of data for access 
whenever it is requested. In other words, availability means timely and reliable access to 
personal data is always ensured. 
The availability requirements of the data vary depending on how critical the data is. If 
the data is highly critical, then data should be made redundant and it should also be 
backed-up regularly so that the data is available even under hard circumstances. But if the 
data is not that many important, regular backups are not important and one or two copies 
of the data are sufficient. It is also important to note that, it is the responsibility of the 
CSP to guarantee the availability of data. If the data was unavailable for whatever reason, 
the users will not be able to access their data and become unsatisfied and this will lead to 
loss for both the user and the provider. The most severe threat that availability exposed to 
in cloud is accidental loss of network connectivity between the client and the provider or 
of server performance caused by malicious actions such as (Distributed) Denial of 
Service attacks. While other threats to availability could include accidental hardware 
failures both on the network and in the cloud processing and data storage systems, power 
failures and other infrastructure problems. To minimize or eliminate these types of 
attacks, data controllers have to check whether or not CSP has adopted measures to cope 
with the risk of disruptions, such as redundant storage ,backup internet network links and 
effective data backup mechanisms[52][53]. 
2.4.5 Access and authentication  
The cloud is a public place where services are exposed over HTTP, public medium. 
Access to these services need to be managed and access should be kept to only authorized 
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users. Moreover, as data is stored and managed remotely, users should trust the service 
offered by CSPs and security offered by providers over their data. On the other hand, 
CSP must ensure that anyone trying to access the data is not only who he says he is 
(authentication) but also he has the right to do so (authorization). Doing this is not an 
easy task because it require from the CSP ,who is interacting with multiple users from 
multiple companies (domains) , to offer different levels of management and access 
policies ;all these operations are done remotely[52][53].  
 
Remote access should include the following operations: 
a) Authentication  
In this process, the CSP should make sure that anyone trying to access any service is 
authenticated to do so. Unauthenticated users should not be able to access the data under 
any condition. In other words, the identity of the users must be assured and this implies 
some form of identity management.  
b) Authorization 
Once the user is able to authenticate himself to the CSP, he is able to gain access to 
CSP services and to his data in the cloud. Therefore, CSP should regulate and control the 
access to its services and data so as to prevent unauthenticated users from accessing 
services and data they are not authorized to access. For example, two users subscribe to 
the same CSP but work for two different companies should not be able to access each 
other's remote data held by the CSP unless the access has been explicitly allowed.  
c) Location 
Users usually do not access their data and CSP services from one fixed location. They 
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can access it from home or work. Therefore, user authentication should always be 
performed and should not be linked to the device from which the he accesses the service.  
d) Revocation  
An important requirement is that of revocation. The revocation of access to individual 
data and to the service itself must be permissible.  
2.4.6 Data retention  
Data retention is used to define policies related to persistent data and records 
management. These polices should meet legal and business data archival requirements. In 
addition, each data retention policy should weighs legal and privacy concerns against 
economic concerns so as to determine the retention time, data formats, archival rules and 
the permissible means of storage, access, and encryption. In cloud environment, the user 
generally should aware of the following when concerning data retention: 1) how long are 
the data retained by CSP and is this retention period enough to satisfy his legal 
obligations? 2) when the CSP destroys the data, what process is used, is this process 
robust enough to actually destroy the data, and is this process secures enough? while in 
case of cloud storage, the user should ensure that 1) data retention rules are clearly 
define2) stored data and the storage duration are well defined3) the data retention policy 
has to form the basis of the storage plan because without a coherent plan and retention 
policy, the user will just be busting money and this will only result in underutilized 
technology and capability [52]. 
2.4.7 Audit-ability  
Audit-ability can be defined as the task of auditing a system or an environment In 
cloud model, it should be identifiable who created, viewed, and modified the data 
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because this will make it possible to track back everything that has been done over the 
file throughout its entire lifecycle. This collected information about the file is required for 
auditing and control. A security audit can be defined as a systematic evaluation of CSP 
security by measuring how well the CSP conforms to the set of established criteria. These 
audits usually assess the security of the system's physical configuration and environment, 
information handling processes, software, and user practices. On the other hand, data 
audit-ability is required for compliance with many regulations even if there were no 
regulation enforcing data audit-ability. it is also important for Cloud Service Consumer to 
ensure that the integrity and confidentiality of their data is respected by the Cloud Service 
Provider. Poor audit-ability means that the system has poorly-maintained records and 
systems that enable efficient auditing of processes within the cloud, therefore, good audit-
ability should be maintained so as to get better security within the cloud. Audit-ability is 
also an enabler of accountability where it allows any action to audit against a pre-
determined policy to determine if the action was compliant or not [52]. 
2.4.8 Portability  
Presently, most CSPs do not follow any standards for data formats and service 
interfaces facilitating interoperability and portability between each other. Therefore, if a 
client decided to leave his current CSP and migrate to another CSP, this may be 
impossible or at least there may be difficulties in the transfer process due to the lack of 
interoperability. The same will also be true for services developed by the client on a 
platform offered by the original cloud provider (PaaS). As a result, the cloud client 
should check that the provider he is using guarantees the portability of data and services 
prior to ordering him [53]. 
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2.4.9 Accountability  
Accountability can be viewed as the ability to demonstrate what a user did at a certain 
point in time in the past and how he did. Accountability in the field of data protection can 
be defined as the ability of parties to demonstrate that they took appropriate steps to 
ensure that data protection principles have been implemented. In cloud computing, 
accountability is used to investigate personal data breaches, where cloud components 
from cloud clients, providers and sub-processor bear a degree of operational 
responsibility in order to provide reliable monitoring and comprehensive logging 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the CSP should provide documentary evidence of effective 
measures that deliver data protection required outcomes. Examples of these measures 
include: independent certification procedures, respond to access requests, allocation of 
resources, and procedures to ensure the identification of all data processing operation 
[53].  
2.4.10 Erasure of data  
Data should be deleted when it is no longer needed or after fixed time interval. After 
the data deletion, cloud providers have to attest that the data that has been destroyed will 
never be reconstructed. However, many cloud providers will not be able to do so(will not 
be able to attest the deletion) because of the way cloud data is rapidly replicated and 
relocated on many disk drives, servers, and data centers.  
 The principle of erasure of data applies to personal data regardless of whether they 
are stored on hard drives or on other storage media (e.g., backup tapes). Since personal 
data may be stored redundantly on different servers at different locations, it must be 
ensured that each instant of the data is deleted irretrievably.  Moreover, cloud client 
should be aware of the fact the log data facilitating audit-ability may be considered as the 
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personal data of the person who initiated the processing operation. In order to ensure 
secure erasure of personal data, we need that either the storage media to be destroyed or 
demagnetized or the stored personal data is deleted effectively through overwriting. The 
overwriting of data requires special software tools to be used. These software tools 
should overwrite data multiple times in accordance with a recognized specification. The 
cloud client should also make sure that the cloud provider ensures secure erasure in their 
SLAs. The same holds true for contracts between cloud providers and subcontractors[53]. 
2.4.11 Transparency  
In cloud computing, transparency means that the cloud client should be aware of all 
subcontractors contributing to the provision of his cloud services as well as of the 
locations of all datacenters that his personal data may be processed at. In addition, if the  
provision process of the service requires the installation of software on the cloud client’s 
machine, the cloud provider should  inform the client about this circumstance and explain 
its effect on the his data protection and data security . Inversely, the cloud client should 
raise any issue that is not addressed sufficiently by the cloud provider. 
Transparency is considered to be an important key for a fair and legitimate processing 
of personal data. Moreover, transparency should be ensured in the relationship(s) 
between cloud provider, cloud client and subcontractors (if any). The cloud client is able 
to lawfully assess the processing of his personal data in the cloud only if the provider 
informs him about all relevant issues [53].  
2.4.12 Isolation  
In cloud computing infrastructures, resources such as memory, networks, and storage 
are shared among many users. The sharing of these resources within one cloud creates 
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risks of data disclosure and processing for illegitimate purposes.   Therefore, isolation 
between user's data is required so as to protect them from each other. Isolation means that 
guarantees should be taken so that user's data is not used beyond its initial purpose and its 
confidentiality and integrity is maintained. In order to archive isolation, two procedures 
shall be followed:1)adequate governance of the rights and roles for accessing personal 
data  should be review on regular basis so that implementation of roles with excessive 
privileges is avoided (e.g., no one even the no administrator is allowed to access the 
entire cloud). More generally, users including the administrators must be able to access 
information related only to their legitimate purposes (least privilege principle). 
2)isolation should not be applied on users  only but also on technical measures such as  
proper management of shared resources and the hardening of hypervisors  if virtual 














2.5 Principles of Cloud Storage Services  
This section introduces the typical features of cloud storage services. A particular 
service must offer at least one of these features, and may offer multiple features at the 
same time. 
2.5.1 Features  
In this section, we shall explore the main feature of the clouted storage services. 
These features are: copy, backup, synchronization, and file sharing. Any storage service 
must include at least one of these features, and may include multiple features at the same 
time. Figure 2.17[54] show the main features of the cloud storage service. 
 
 
Figure 2-17[54]: Features of Cloud Storage Services 
2.5.1.1 Copy 
The copy feature creates an image of the user's local data into cloud. The user uses 
this copy to make sure that his data is always available even if there is a local hardware 
failure (e.g. a hard disk crash).Moreover, this copy will help the user to access his data 
from any place (e.g.  through web browser) even if his local hardware is not available. 
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This gives the user two ways to store his data in the cloud. In the first way, the user 
manually uploads his files and folders into the cloud through the web browser. while in 
the second way, the user make use of a client software, that is locally installed in user's 
machine ,to automatically upload his files and folders from a given folder belonging to 
the client to the cloud storage. It is also important to note that the copy feature is different 
from backup feature. Where in backup feature the data is stored in predefined periods of 
time, while in the copy feature the data is stored continuously[55][56]. 
2.5.1.2 Backup 
 The backup feature allows users to restore any previously stored version of a file or a 
folder over a long period of time (usually  years).To create backups, the cloud storage 
services usually make use of an automatic process. In this process, data is copied, 
transmitted, and stored periodically in the cloud so as to be recovered in case of original 
data loss. To perform this process, the cloud storage service providers have to offer client 
software that is installed locally in the user's machine. This software enables the users to 
select the data to be backed up, to configure the retention period, and schedule for 
backups. In addition, this software can either run   continuously in background or is 
configured to perform the backup on regular basis so as to backup the newly created or 
changed files. Moreover, one more task for the client software is to check which data 
needs to be backed up. Finally, it could enable users to monitor the backup process since 
the previous backup [55] [56]. 
2.5.1.3 Synchronization 
Synchronization means having consistency among data stored in different sources. 
For example, a user can own a set of devices, e.g. a pc, laptop, tablets and a Smartphone, 
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and wants to have the same data available on all devices and whenever data is changed in 
one device the others are modified with these changes. Therefore, the cloud storage 
service providers have to provide users with client software that is able to detect any 
changes in any file in any device and reflect these changes to other devices. This client 
software Can do this by offering the user a number of choices: merge the files, overwrite 
one version, or keep both versions by applying a renaming scheme [55] [56]. 
2.5.1.4 Sharing 
Data sharing is the process of sharing data files or folders with others. Cloud storage 
service providers offer users different forms of sharing. Users can share data with other 
subscribers of the same service, with a closed group of people from other services, or 
with everybody. For example, users can collaborate with colleagues, project partners, or 
friends. It is also important to note that any shared file / folder has a set of fixed or 
configured access rights as read, write or delete[55][56]. 
2.5.2 Interfaces  
This section shall illustrate the different interfaces that the user can use to access the 
data stored at the cloud storage provider. 
2.5.2.1 Proprietary Software Clients 
The most comfortable interface offered by the cloud storage service providers is the 
proprietary software clients. Each provider has his own proprietary client and users make 
use of this client software by just installing it on their machines. This proprietary client 
offers the users a variety of services that they can use .These services include: selection 
of data to be transmitted to the cloud, management of service and configuration of 
features like synchronization or sharing [54] [57]. 
Page 74 
 
2.5.2.2 Browser Interface 
A web browser interface is a method used to access user's data. Accessing the date 
from any place and from any device that do not have a software client installed is the 
main advantage of this method. A browser interface is usually preferred by organizations 
that do not want to spend time and money in managing software for their employees. 
Moreover, it is also preferred by end users who want to share their data whenever they 
desire [54]. 
2.5.2.3 Application Programming Interface 
Most cloud storage providers provide their users with access to application 
programming interface (API).Developers can use these APIs to integrate access to cloud 
storage service into their applications. e.g., to provide games for a mobile device game 
across multiple devices and platforms. In order for cloud storage providers to grant 
customers with access to APIs, they need to expose a web service or web application that 
can be accessed using a standardized communication protocol[54][58].  
2.5.3 Optimization  
In this section, we shall explore some optimization techniques that are provided by 
some cloud storage services so as to save bandwidth. These optimization techniques are: 
de- duplication, delta encoding, and compression. 
2.5.3.1 De-duplication 
The term De-duplication (also Data De-duplication) describes a popular technique 
that allows cloud storage providers to significantly decrease the amount of needed storage 
space. The principle of de-duplication is as follows: only a single copy of each piece of 
data is stored. If a user wants to store data that the cloud storage provider already has 
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stored in the past, the storage provider simply creates a link to that data instead of storing 
another copy. There are some variations of how de-duplication may be realized: 
In other words, De- duplication is a technique that is used frequently by cloud storage 
providers. This technique works by only keeping a single copy of each piece of data 
stored and if a user wants to store an already stored data, the provider only creates a link 
to this data instead of storing another copy. By using this technique, cloud storage 
providers can significantly decrease the amount of storage space needed to store user's 
data. De- duplication can take many forms as we shall illustrate in the following lines 
[59]: 
(1) File level de-duplication vs. block level de-duplication 
 File level de-duplication means that de- duplication is performed on file basis 
where  only a single copy of each file will be stored. While Block level de-duplication 
means that de- duplication is performed on block basis, where each file will be divided 
into blocks and only a single copy of each block will be stored. Identical files  or 
blocks are detected by comparing the hash value with a list of known files or blocks [60]. 
(2) Server-side de-duplication vs. client-side de-duplication 
 Server-side de-duplication is a file level de- duplication, in which de-duplication 
is performed on server side. For each file transmitted from the user, the provider checks if 
he has to store the file or it is already present and only a link needs to be created. By 
using this method, the user cannot detect if de - duplicated is performed or not. While in 
client -side de- duplication, the client software only send a hash value of the file not the 
file itself to the provider. Only if the transmitted hash value is not present at the provider, 
the file is sent to be stored [60]. 
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(3) Single user de-duplication vs. cross user de-duplication 
Single user de-duplication means that de-duplication is performed for each user 
separately. For example, if user A wants to store a file that he stored in the past or in 
different folder, the cloud provider only creates a link to that file. While in case of cross 
user de-duplication, de - duplication is done across all users. For example, if user a want 
to store a file that user B already stored, the cloud provider only creates a link to that file 
instead of storing another copy of the same file [60]. 
2.5.3.2 Delta Encoding 
Delta encoding is a technique used for minimizing the data transfer, thus saving the 
bandwidth. It works by only uploading the differences to uploaded file from the last 
change instead of transmitting the whole file with the new modifications. Suppose that a 
user modifies a certain file and wants to store it. In this case, instead of uploading the 
new modified file, it would be sufficient if we store only the modifications (Only store 
parts that were modified ).It is important to note that, delta encoding make no sense with 
encrypted data  because an encrypted file with modification differs completely from the 
encrypted file without modification[54]. 
2.5.3.3 Compression 
Compression is a technique used to save bandwidth. It works by compressing data on 
client side. The main drawback of this technique is that it consumes computing power of 
the user, and this may cause troubles to users because the transmission of data to the 





2.6 Security Requirements in Cloud Storage Services  
In this section, we shall explore the minimal set of security requirements needed to 
have secure cloud storage services. These security requirements include interaction with 
the web application via web browser in login and registration processes, the transmission 
of data through transport layer, actual data storage and basic as well as special features of 
cloud storage client applications as file sharing, synchronization and de-duplication. Last 
but not least, it is important to note that this proposal focuses on some security 
requirements of cloud storage services not all; however, we might explore the other 
security requirements in future work.  
2.6.1 Registration and Login  
Before the cloud customers are able to make use of cloud storage services such as 
synchronization, file sharing and backup, they have to register for an account in any 
storage service. In the beginning of the registration process, the customer provides the 
service provider with his email, username and password to tie him to an account. Later 
on, during the registration process, the service provider and the cloud customer agree 
upon credentials that shall manage their relationship. These credentials shall later be used 
in the login process and in using the services. Furthermore, this registration process if not 
secured properly, it shall suffer from the following security problems: 1)If an attacker is 
able to eavesdrop on the communication channel between the provider and the customer, 
he might obtain a version of the credentials, and later he can compromise the account and 
gain access to all customer's uploaded data. 2) If an attacker is able to manipulate the 
messages exchanged between the provider and the customer, he might act as a proxy and 
deceive both of them. In order to protect the customers from these and other attacks, the 
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following procedures should take place: 1) all communications between the service 
provider and the customer must be secured in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
authenticity. In order to achieve these goals, we have to use the Transport Layer Security 
(TLS) protocol [61]. Because the service providers need to authenticate themselves 
against the client machine by presenting a certificate, the customer can examine this 
certificate to make sure that they are communicating with their service providers.2) In 
case of a security breach, the best way to minimize potential data theft is to limit data 
collected to the minimum needed to operate the service.3) The service provider can 
optionally bring a third party payment service that can handle the entire process.  
After the customer completes the registration process, he is able to login to the 
services offered by the service provider. These login systems are publicly accessible, 
therefore, they are exposed to attacks as brute - force attack or directory attack on the 
credentials .In order to guard themselves against these kinds of attacks, service providers 
should enforce complex passwords(ideally, these passwords contain 12 characters which 
include letters, numbers and special characters) that are difficult to be hacked. However, 
these complex passwords cannot guarantee that attackers will not able to guess them in 
the given time. To end this problem, service providers should implement additional 
measures to make these attacks infeasible. These measures could be time penalties or a 
temporary account lock down after a certain number of incorrect login attempts within a 
time frame[54][10]. 
In addition, the service providers have to provide its customers with strong 
authentication method in order to ensure that only authorized customers have access to its 
services. These authentication methods do not have to rely only on the knowledge of 
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credentials but rather demands possession of a token as smartcard or mobile phone. 
Example of this authentication schemes is two-factor authentication which combines 
something that is known to the customer, like username and password with something he 
owns, like a mobile phone or smartcard. Overall, these schemes can significantly improve 
the security level of the login process [54] [62]. 
Moreover, let's assume that the service provider builds a strong authentication 
mechanism with a sufficiently high security level; it also needs to implement additional 
measures to protect standard processes during account management. The e-mail 
verification during registration process is an example of these additional measures. The e-
mail used by the customer during the registration should be verified by sending an 
activation link to the customer so as to complete the process. This verification step 
prevents any possible incrimination where an attacker registers using an email address 
which does not belong to him. Because if the system was implemented in such a way that 
credentials are directly associated with any newly created account without any 
verifications, the attack could abuse the password-reset process to gain a customer access 
to the service. This type of attack is called a denial of service attack. To prevent this type 
of attack, the provider has to send the customer an email containing a link leading to a 
password-reset form or temporary credentials that have to be changed directly after the 
first login. Furthermore, the provider should not provide feedbacks in the form of careless 
error messages through its web applications to customers because attackers can make use 
of these messages to gather information. For example, if the registration or login process 
informs the customer that the entered e-mail  address or username already exists, the 
attack can use this piece of information to collect valid e-mail addresses and usernames 
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and sell them to spammers. Worse, the attack can use the valid user names and guess the 
associated password to hijack the customer's accounts. To prevent this type attacks, the 
provider should not reveal more information to customer than necessary [63]. 
2.6.2 Transport Security  
The cloud storage providers provide its customer with client software that resides on 
their machines. This client software assists the customers in setting up synchronization or 
backup schemes on their local machines. Moreover, they handle the actual transmission 
of all data with remote storage servers which make them more exposure to attacks in case 
of insecure communication channel between them and the client. In these attacks, the 
attackers may be able to steal credentials, learn the content of the data or even manipulate 
it. As a result, the server must authenticate itself to the client software and make sure that 
all its communication with the client is encrypted and integrity is satisfied. In addition, 
the server must ensure that appropriate, up to data cryptographic functions are used. 
Therefore, standard protocol TLS is the appropriate solution for transport security [54] 
[61]. 
2.6.3 Encryption  
One of the main reasons that make both individuals and companies use cloud storage 
provider is to always have a backup of their valuable data. This backup will always make 
the data available at any time so that the customers can easily access it in whatever time 
and place they want. Before the popularity of cloud storage, both individuals and 
companies had their own backup strategies so as to protect their data against any loss or 
damage. These strategies always rely on additional physical devices which are usually 
present at the same location as the original data. This mean that the data owner has full 
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control over his original and stored data, therefore, the protection of the data is not an 
important issue. However, nowadays with the widespread of cloud storage providers, 
customer's data in the cloud is not safe, since it is stored on public servers that are visible 
to data storage over on the internet. This makes the data subject to external as well as 
internal attacks. The external attacks come from outside the cloud while internal attacks 
come from the cloud storage provider itself. Therefore, the data itself should be protected 
in such a way that even if an attack successfully take place, the content of the stored data 
remain unchanged (secure). To this end, all data stored in the cloud storage needs to be 
stored in an encrypted form and there are a lot of secure encryption schemes that are 
freely available for use. Most cloud storage providers nowadays encrypt all data stored on 
their servers with a company key which is only known to them. This scheme of 
protection may protect customer's data from external attack, but does not protect it from 
internal attacks. Therefore, all customers' data need to be encrypted locally with a key 
unknown to the provider before it is transmitted to the cloud. The customer can do this by 
either encrypting the data by himself or use standalone software. However, this 
standalone software has a number of drawbacks: the software has to be installed, 
administrated and operated on the customer's machine in addition to the client software of 
the cloud storage provider. It is important to know that the key used to encrypt the data 
needs to be distributed across all devices that have access to the data; because if the key 
is lost, the data can never be decrypted again. Another method that can be used by 
customer is to sign their data. This method enhances security because it enables to user to 
verify his data [64] [65]. 
2.6.4 File Sharing  
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File sharing is one of the features that distinguished advanced cloud storage from 
basic cloud storage. Cloud storage providers usually offer file sharing in three different 
flavors: 1) Sharing files with other subscribers of the same service. 2) Sharing files with a 
closed group who are not subscribers of the same service 3) Sharing files with everybody. 
Sharing files with a certain group of people, as in case one and two, creates a group of 
closed users and the data owner (sharing user) plays the role of an administrator of this 
group. As an administrator, the data owner has control over the data and has the right to 
assign privileges to others. This group of users including the owner requires from the 
provider the following security requirements: 
1) The shared files should be accessible only to privileged used. 
2) It should be possible to regain sharing for any file. 
3) The provider should grant the user the right to access the list of their shared files either 
through their client applications or through the web interface of the provider. 
4) The user (sharing user) should have the right to grant, edit or remove individual access 
rights from other users. 
5) If the sharing user use client side encryption to their files, this sharing should not 
weaken the security level. In other words, the cloud storage service provider should not 
be able to read the content of the shared files. 
6) If the sharing user use client side encryption to their files and there is a user disinfected 
from the sharing group, the encryption key used should be new and the old key should be 
discarded. 
Usually sharing files with non-subscribers of the same service, as in case two, is 
accomplished by providing users with URLs to the shared files. These URLs usually 
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contain important information about users and the files and knowing these URLs means 
having the right to access the shared files. Therefore, additional security measures should 
be taken so as to prevent any attack. These security measures shall include the following: 
1) The URL should be inscrutable. This means that the URL should not contain any 
information about the user or the file itself; because if the URL contains any of this 
information, the attacker can easily gain information about the user. Moreover, if the 
URL is free from any credentials, it should contain a randomly generated unique 
identifier. Because if the identifier size is too small or it is just an increment from 
published documents, the attacker can easily guess it by iterating over all possible links 
and thereby gain access to all published files.2) The cloud storage service provider should 
exclude the shared files that are hosted on the web server from being indexed by search 
engines 3) The cloud storage service provider should allow the user to choose the option 
and credentials they want to secure their shared files. This will help in preventing 
unauthorized from having access to shared files. 
Sharing of files with everyone requires from the cloud storage provider to hide any 
information related to user, e.g. username, in order to maintain the user security [66] [67] 
[68] [69]. 
2.6.5 De-duplication  
Data de-duplication is a compression technique that is used to eliminate duplicated 
copies of repeated data. This means that only one unique instance of the data is retained 
in the storage media while the redundant data is replaced with a pointer to the unique data 
copy. This data de-duplication technique is employed in most cloud storage providers so 
as to save large amounts of storage space, thereby reducing costs. There are different 
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types of de- duplication techniques that can be used by cloud providers. All these 
techniques were described in section 2.5.3.1. However, the two main de-duplication 
strategies are file-level and block-level duplication. Any of these strategies can be used 
with one of the two basic approaches of de- duplication: client-based de-duplication or 
cross-user de-duplication. In client - based de-duplication, the de duplication is 
performed at the client side and this saves the bandwidth. The result of applying this 
approach is that the client can observe whether a certain file or block is de-duplicated. 
While in cross-user de-duplication is performed between the data of different users. This 
results in saving both storage and bandwidth. Although these two approaches save 
bandwidth and storage, they are the ones that suffer mostly from privacy and security 
issues. The following are examples of attacks that they can be exposed to: 
1) An attacker who has an account at the cloud storage provider can easily know about 
files stored in cloud storage by using de-duplication. He can do this by transmitting a file 
to the storage provider and observe what happens to this file. If the file is uploaded by the 
client software, he knows that the file already exists at the storage provider. That is, he 
knows that the file exist, but he does not know the owner of the file. 
2) If the attacker is able to get hash value of the file, he can easily know the content of the 
file. However, with the use of a well known hashing algorithm with a sufficiently large 
hash size, the probability that an attacker can guess valid hashes for (random or specific) 
files is negligible. Therefore, these types of attacks are hard to take place. 
3) The attacker can also make use of the information described above in case 1 to deduce 
information about specific user of the cloud storage provider .Assume that an attacker 
knows that a specific user stores his files at the cloud storage provider and these files take 
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yes/ no format. The attacker can easily create different versions of these files and in each 
he inserts the user's name and the answers to the yes / no questions. After that, he 
consecutively uploads these files to the cloud storage provider and observes what 
happens. If one of these files is not uploaded, the attacker knows that user already stored 
this file, and thus the attacker knows the content of this file. Therefore, it is mandatory 
for the provider to protect its users from these attacks.  One of the solutions that can be 
used regarding the de- duplication problem is based on the introduction of a random 
threshold. This threshold is assigned by the provider to every stored file. De-duplication 
will only take place if the number of uploads of a certain file exceeds this file's specific 
threshold. This means that the attacker who wants to know if a specific file has been 
uploaded by another user, will has to repeatedly upload the file until the de-duplication is 
performed. But at this point he cannot know exactly if the de-duplication is performed 
because the file is de-duplicated or because he has reached the threshold. 
 Ideally, in order for the provider to offer a secure service, he has to use client-side 
de-duplication within a single account or, when using cross-account de-duplication; 
Because in these two cases the provider would always upload any files added by the user 
even if they are already on the server and this will disable any feedback that the attackers 
can make use of. In addition, currently there are no known privacy issues related to 
server- side de-duplication [70] [71] [72] [73] [74]. 
 
2.6.6 Synchronization  
Another important feature that distinguishes advanced cloud storage services from 
basic ones is synchronization. Synchronization is  the process of making two or more 
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data storage devices or programs (in the same or different computers) having exactly the 
same information at a given time. Nowadays with the rapid development of ubiquitous 
computing, a typical user has multiple devices to access his data from depending on his 
current location. These devices might include the user's personal computer at home, the 
user's computer at work and his Smartphone. The user wants to be able to access the most 
recent version of his data from any of these devices depending on his current location. 
Therefore, multiple different devices shall be associated with a single user account. Each 
of these devices added to the user's cloud storage account have a different location. As a 
result, the way a new location is added to cloud storage account should be taken in 
consideration when considering the security of that account. Moreover, the security of 
backup, file sharing and storage of multiple independent devices associated with one 
account should be considered. 
During the installation of any new device to the user account, the user should provide 
his credentials, the credentials he created during the registration process, to add the new 
device to his account. After the first login from the newly added device, the credentials 
are stored locally in that device. Later on, the user can directly use the cloud storage 
applications without having to enter his credentials in each login. This direct use of cloud 
storage applications creates a trade-off between usability and security. Because this 
usability may allow an attacker to steal the user credentials (e.g. the attacker may inspect 
the user's username and password from an unsecured channel) which he can later uses to 
attach his device to that user account. Worst, if this attack is not noticed, the attacker, in 
addition to, accessing the data will be able to notice any changes or modifications 
performed in the user account. A famous cloud storage services that is exposed to this 
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type of attacks is Dropbox. In Dropbox, the data configurations are stored in a file called 
"config.db". This file contains information about the user's email, dropbox_path and the 
host_id. If an attacker is able to copy this file from the user's machine, he can easily gain 
access to all users' data. Worst, the dropbox did not notify the user when a new device is 
added by the attacker [9]. To guard the user account against these attacks, any newly 
added device should be activated by the user. Even if the user's credentials are secure and 
are never compromised, there is still a chance for third parties to gain access to user's 
data. For example, when a user's Smartphone that have access to file stored at cloud 
provider is lost, anyone who finds the phone will have access to all user's files through 
the cloud storage application on that phone. Therefore, the user should have the right to 
remove certain devices from his account. This can be done easily by providing the user 
with a list of devices currently attached to his account [9]. 
2.6.7 Server Location  
The cloud storage service provider has to indicate exactly where its servers are 
located. In other words, which country will host the user's date? Ideally, the cloud storage 




3 Approaches for Securing Data in cloud Storage 
This thesis focuses on security problems in cloud computing. Specifically, it 
addresses outsourced data security in cloud storage services, secure and efficient cloud-
based content delivery service, and secure cryptographic key usage in cloud-based data 
computing service. In this chapter, we review the previous state of the art research related 
to data security in cloud storage services. First of all, we shall explain the current work 
done in the service level agreements between cloud customers and cloud service provider 
for ensuring data confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) in cloud storage. 
Second, we review modern researches on security problems in the area of cloud 
computing with two categorize. The first category is concerned with securing data in 
cloud storage service in terms of data confidentiality and integrity. While the second 
category focuses on efficient data access control in the cloud storage 
3.1 Service Level Agreements (SLAs)  
To mitigate the security risks associated with data in the cloud, there should be a clear 
security mechanism for securing data in the cloud. This mechanism should be formalized 
in a form of a contract so as to force both parties to follow. A Service Level Agreement 
(SLA) is a common way to specify the conditions under which a service is to be 
delivered. Although several SLAs are offered by different cloud service providers to 
regulate the relationship between the customer and the provider, all these SLA s are 
usually limited to availability levels and credits/penalties. The absence of effective 
security measures in SLAs has been a major hurdle for the adoption of cloud services, 
especially for enterprises and cautious consumers. Recently, researchers have tried to 
solve this problem by offering a number of secure SLAs 
In [75], the author argues that the current research on SLA and QoS metrics has given 
more attention for areas as e-commerce and web services. However, this work produced 
good SLAs metrics that satisfy the required purpose, the SLAs metrics in these 
technologies are not suitable for cloud computing as the nature and type of resources 
being provided and delivered is different. Therefore, new SLA metrics are still required 
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to provide flexible the main requirement of the cloud which is security. This paper 
presents the requirements and the main points that should be followed at each stage of the 
SLA design to ensure that it addresses all aspects required by the cloud. It specifies the 
parameters (from data security, availability, integrity.....etc.)  needed to ensure that a 
service provider delivers the agreed terms of services to the cloud consumer so as to 
maintain the trust and reliability between each of the parties involved in the negotiation 
process. SLA metrics for Storage as a service is an example of SLA metrics offered in 
this paper. In this metric the author tries to address all the basic requirements for data 
storage service metric.  
In [75], the author states that the cloud vendor has to provide some assurance in their 
service level agreements (SLA) about the security issues.  Since guaranteeing the security 
of data in the cloud is a difficult task because the cloud provides different services. Each 
of these services has its own security issues. Therefore, the SLA has to describe different 
levels of security and their complexity based on the services in order to provide the 
customer with a good understanding of how these security policies are implemented. In 
other words, there should be a standard SLA irrespective to a specific provider. Although 
there is a huge effort done in the area of providing standard SLAs that satisfy cloud 
customers and providers needs, there is no guarantee if the services do not met the 
agreement. 
In [77], the author presents a framework to ensure data security in cloud storage 
system through SLAs. In addition, he discusses a number of technologies that can be used 
to provide safe storage for data in the cloud. These technologies are mainly divided into 
three categories: storage security, transfer security and authorize. In secure storage, the 
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main requirement is ensuring data security during data crash, stolen or disaster, such as 
fire and storm. While in secure transfer, Transport Layer Security (TLS) and its 
predecessor, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) should be used to ensure that data transferred in 
secured communication channel over networks such as the Internet. Finally, authority is 
important means to assure unauthorized access. For the storage provider, it needs to do 
user authority and access control.   
In [78], the author provides a way to manage the security of SLA through its life 
cycle. He makes use of a framework for security mechanisms as input to contract 
requirements. Security SLAs is an important area of study, however, current SLAs did 
not resolved all issues related to security SLAs. Although this paper tries to cover most of 
the security requirements, there are still more requirements that need attention from SLAs 
designers. They have to be aware that security is something that cannot be handled in 
isolation from other requirements.  
In [79], the author presents Service Level Agreements for Security (Sec-SLAs). In 
Sec - SLAs, the author tires to provide an overview of what service levels the provider 
will offer to the customers and the difficulties faced during the security metrics definition 
process. The Sec-SLA deals with the “what” good security metrics should be, not the 
“how” they are implemented. 
There is an important remark that should be noted about SLAs. Although they offer a 
good framework for data security measurements in the cloud, there are no guarantees that 
cloud providers will follow these security measures. Because there is not any good way 




3.2 Data Confidentiality  
Currently, cloud computing systems pose serious limitation to protecting users' data 
confidentiality. When data is moved to the cloud, there are some changes to user's data. 
First, the data will be stored away from the customer's local machine the control over the 
data will be provided by the cloud provider. Second, the data is moving from a single-
tenant to a multi-tenant environment. These impose high risk over users' data in the cloud 
[80]. In the following subsections, we shall explore the data confidentiality from external 
as well as internal attacks through the data life cycle. In other words, we will explore data 
confidentiality in transit, at rest, in use and data remanence. 
3.2.1 Data-in-transit  
When using a public cloud, user's data as well as user's credentials are transmitted 
over the network links to either be stored or processed over the cloud. Therefore, it is 
important to ensure the security of the communication channel between the cloud 
customer and the cloud service provider. Moreover, in cloud model, the data storage and 
processing is logically centralization in the cloud side which results in a major increase in 
the amount of network traffic flowing over the Internet backbone. The Secure Sockets 
Layer (SSL)/ Transport Layer Security (TLS) [60] protocol is a network security protocol 
that provides secure key agreement and encrypted network traffic between client and 
server. This protocol uses symmetric encryption for data transmission security. However, 
relying on these network security protocols for providing confidentiality and integrity of 
network data transport in cloud communication systems would be infeasible and 
inefficient in the cloud environment.  
The main disadvantages of these encryption protocols (e.g. SSL and TLS) are: 1) 
They provide rigid security services with complex APIs which make their 
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implementation difficult and make them prone to development errors. This can also have 
negative effect on the network security of the entire cloud service; 2) They never consider 
the particularities of the data components comprising the enterprise service and their 
security requirements. They encrypt all data transmitted over the network with the same 
encryption algorithm irrespective of their sensitivity. This can lead to unnecessary or 
even energy-inefficient for some cloud services supporting battery-operated client 
devices as in the case of mobile clients. Therefore, we have to design network security 
protocols that are easy to implement and specialized in content categorization to cope 
with the nature of cloud services [81]. 
 X. Wang et al. [82] proposed a way for ensuring data security in transmission. All 
the data to be transmitted will be encrypted with homomorphic encryption, thus 
improving the security of data, even if the data is stolen, there is no corresponding key 
cannot be restored. In other words, the user is the only person who knows the key, while 
the clouds do not know the key. While Y. Xiang et al. [83] propose a secure protocol for 
trusted path suitable for the Cloud Computing Environment (CCE). The proposed 
protocol analyzed the current protocols and proposed the one that most fits the 
requirement of the data security over the network. The proposed protocol make use of 
session keys and tickets to ensure security of communication channel while it delegate 
the authentication to the Application Server (AS) and Ticket Granting Server (TGS).The 
proposed scheme have advantages over SSL in that it gets session key and ticket by 
surpassing cryptographic protections unlike SSL which uses only symmetric key that 




When using cloud computing, the users have to perform remote user authentication 
which requires a secure channel for confidentiality of user authentication information. 
The majority of remote user authentication systems use SSL/TLS protocol for securing 
the communication channel. However, these protocols are vulnerable to phishing, web 
spoofing and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The two main reasons for making this 
protocol vulnerable are: 1) the end user usually does SSL/TLS server authentication 
poorly which leads to a situation in which the user communicate with MITM, thereby 
revealing his/her credentials; 2) Developers decouple SSL/TLS session establishment 
from user authentication which helps the MITM to reuse the credentials they revealed to 
spoof on the users. 
A. J. Choudhury et al. [84]  propose a strong user authentication framework that 
provides identity management, mutual authentication, session key establishment between 
the users and the cloud provider. The proposed scheme ensures that legitimate user 
proves his/ her authenticity before entering into the cloud by using two-step verification 
to verify the user authenticity. Moreover, the proposed scheme uses two separate 
communication channels to make it difficult for the adversaries to attack in two different 
channels at the same time. 
R. Hauser et al.[85] propose a SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication (TLS-SA) 
protocol for secure user authetication solving the MITM problem. The proposed scheme 
does not depend only on user’s secret credentials when performing user authentication 
but also depends on state information related to the SSL/TLS session in which credentials 
are transferred to the server. K. Sarikaya et al.[86] proposed three protocols for user 
authentication of SSL/TLS extension based on username/password information. The first 
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protocol uses ElGamal encryption and client certificate in order not to enable 
authentication of an attacker with reveal of secrets in the server’s database. As a result, it 
supports perfect forward secrecy (PFS) in which the attacker cannot learn any 
information about past sessions. The second and third protocols use Chebyshev 
polynomials. While in the second protocol, the security of protocol is based on the 
security of server’s database. Therefore, the attacker is able authenticate itself to the 
server, if the attacker is able to compromise the database. As a result, this protocol is not 
able to satisfy PFS. Finally, the third protocol it makes use of session-specific random 
values in order to create the pre-master secret key. Therefore, an attacker cannot calculate 
the pre-master secret key, even if he compromises the server’s database.  
3.2.2 Data-in-use  
When using public cloud computing, the data transferred to the cloud is usually 
encrypted using standard methods to secure the operations and the storage of the data. 
Since the processing of data is performed on a remote server, this implies that the cloud 
providers need to access the raw data for processing purpose. Therefore, encrypting data 
before uploading it to the cloud introduces much difficulty to performing effective 
processing over the data. As a result, a method is needed to execute operations on 
encrypted data without decrypting it. In addition, this used method shall provide the same 
results after calculations as if it has been done directly on the raw data. In other words, 
we want to delegate processing of data to remote server without giving away access to it. 
Searchable encryption provides a solution for searching for keywords over encrypted 
data. While fully homomorphic encryption provides a solution for performing operations 
and calculation over encrypted data. 
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Song et al. [87] proposed the first practical approach for symmetric searchable 
encryption. In this approach, each word in the document is encrypted with a special two-
layered encryption algorithm. Later on, users can search this encrypted data with certain 
keywords. Goh [88] proposes an improvement to the work done in [87] by formalizing a 
definition of the security requirements of searchable symmetric encryption. The proposed 
scheme by Goh introduces a bloom filter to construct secure indexes for the keyword 
search. This filter allows the server to examine whether the document include a certain 
keyword without decrypting the entire document. Curtmola et al. [89] try to overcome the 
shortcomings presented in [87] [88], by considering the adaptive adversaries which could 
generate queries depending on the outcomes of previous queries. Curtmola et al. propose 
an adaptive security definition for searchable encryption schemes by using “index” 
approach. The proposed approach build an array and a look-up table to contract the entire 
document collection. In each entry of the array, an encryption of document identifier set 
is stored associated with a certain keyword. On the other hand, look-up table is used to 
allow the users to locate and decrypt the appropriate element from array. 
R. Koletka et al. [90] propose improvement over the previous searchable encryption 
techniques by providing a searchable secure storage for searching over encryption data. 
Through this scheme the user will be able to store their data securely on an un-trusted 
cloud storage service with the ability to search this encrypted data. Client/Server 
architecture model is used in this scheme for secure search for user's data. The client side 
of the architecture will perform all the cryptographic operations, while the server side 
will perform the search operations over the encrypted data. In addition, this scheme 
supports secure sharing of files between users with the ability of users to search through 
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encrypted content and to return results matching such queries. 
M. S. Islam et al. [91] propose an efficient scheme for similarity searchable 
symmetric encryption. The proposed scheme uses locality sensitive hashing (LSH) based 
on secure index for fast similarity search in high dimensional spaces for encrypted data. 
In addition, the proposed scheme maintains confidentiality by defining strict security 
requirements and following them. 
M. Li et al. [92] propose a fine-grained authorization framework for authorized 
private keyword search (APKS) that allows data owners to share their files with data 
users for performing keyword search over them. In this scheme, the data owner encrypts 
his data with a keyword index to be available for authorized data users for performing 
search over it. The authorized users obtain their privileges over the data through a local 
trusted authority that assign to each user certain attributes that satisfy his search 
privileges. In addition, the authors propose two solutions APKS over encrypted data 
based on Hierarchical Predicate Encryption (HPE). In the first solution, the APKS 
provides enhancements in the efficiency of search by using attribute hierarchy. While in 
the second solution, APKS provides enhancements in query privacy via the help of proxy 
servers.    
Although a lot of work have been done in searchable encryption, this work still is not 
suitable for data sharing in cloud computing. Because  the current searchable encryption 
schemes for data sharing work by distributing private key  on authorized users and this 
implies that operations are performed only by a group of users with the private key 
leading to the risk of key exposure and key abuse. In addition, this methodology of search 
makes user’s search and decryption revocation very hard. Moreover, the currently used 
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methodologies do not provide an efficient solution for searching in multi-user system 
with differential searching privileges [93]. 
J. Li et al. [93] proposed novel framework for searching in multi-user system with 
differential searching privileges on hybrid cloud, which is composed of a trusted private 
cloud and public cloud storage. The proposed framework provides keyword-based search 
on encrypted data for authorized users without sharing the same private key. In addition, 
the authors offer a two-layered access control to achieve fine-grained sharing of 
encrypted data. In the first layer, the trusted private cloud provides access control 
mechanism so as to realize users’ authorization and revocation. While in the second 
layer, the data owner is responsible for enforcing access control and restricting users’ 
access to the encrypted data.  
Homomorphic Encryption is a method that is used to perform operations over 
encrypted data without decrypting it. Recently, cloud computing deploys full 
homomorphic encryption to perform dynamic as well as static operations over encrypted 
data so as to preserve the confidentiality of the encrypted data in the cloud. C. Gentry 
[94] proposes the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme for performing operations 
over encrypted data stored in the cloud. The proposed scheme evaluates an arbitrary 
number of additions and multiplications over data that enables it to perform any type of 
function on encrypted data. M. Brenner et al. [95] propose a secret program on an un-
trusted resource for performing dynamic operations over encrypted data using fully 
homomorphic encryption. The secret program uses algebraic homomorphism that 
constructs boolean circuits as cryptographic foundation for encrypted storage access with 
encrypted addresses and encrypted branching. 
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M. Tebaa et al. [96] propose a scheme for executing calculations over encrypted data 
using fully homomorphic encryption. Initially, the user encrypts his data before 
uploading it to the cloud. Later on, he/she asks the cloud service provider to perform a 
number of calculations over encrypted data using fully homomorphic encryption and 
returns the results back to the client that can then decrypt the data. The resulted results 
are the same as the ones performed on unencrypted data on local machine. 
Although fully homomorphic encryption provides secure computation over 
outsourcing data, all these results are theoretical results that have not been applied in 
practice. In addition, fully homomorphic encryption has not offered a clear encryption-
based access control till now [97]. 
3.2.3 Data-at-rest  
Data-at-rest means that the data that is stored in a readable form on a cloud 
computing service, whether in a storage product like S3 or in a virtual machine instance 
as in EC2. Since the data is stored on the cloud, users loss their control over their data 
and this is the main issue of data at rest. In order to protect data-at-rest, we need to 
prevent unauthorized access from users sharing the same storage in the cloud 
infrastructure and from system administrators who run the cloud computing service from 
reading the data. Moreover, we need to protect data against data alteration and theft. 
There are a number of protection mechanisms that can be used to protect data at rest as 
encryption, marking data with different access levels to enable access control, and 
integrity verification. In addition, backup techniques, such as a redundant array of 
independent disks and data recovery, insure against data loss [98] [99]. 
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Traditionally, most the cloud storage service providers will be offering a way to 
protect their customers’ data from disclosure by unauthorized insiders or outsiders. A 
common way used by service providers to protect user data is encryption of data before 
the storing it in the cloud. This implies that the providers will be responsible for the 
storage, encryption/decryption, and key management of the data. Although this appears to 
be a convenient way of providing easy data access for their customers from everywhere 
and also of allowing customers to share their files with others, it forces the customers to 
put a high level of trust in the cloud storage service provider. As a result, customers will 
lose their control on the file encryption process and on who may have access to their data.  
A straight forward solution to this problem is user encrypting his data before 
uploading it to the cloud and saving the encryption keys on his side and decrypts it when 
he needs to retrieve it. However, this solution appears to be a simple solution, it suffers 
from a number of problems. First, the user has to do all computation on his side and the 
communication traffic between the user and storage servers is high. Moreover, not all the 
users have the computation power to encrypt the data on their side. Second, it is the 
responsibility of the user to manage his cryptographic keys. If for whatever reason the 
keys stored on user's machine are lost or compromised, the users will not be able to 
retrieve the data forever.  
W.-G. Tzeng et al. [100] propose a threshold proxy re-encryption scheme and erasure 
codes for securing users data. In this scheme, data is encrypted locally by user then the 
user distributes his cryptographic key to key servers that shall perform cryptographic 
functions on user side. In the other hand, the threshold proxy re-encryption is used to 
encode, forward, and partial decryption operations in a distributed way. For example,If 
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the user wants to forward his data to other users, he calculates a re-encryption key using 
the other user public key  and send it to cloud storage which in turn uses proxy re-
encryption to transform the user's encrypted data into data encrypted in the other user 
secert key.S. Kamara et al. [101] propose a cryptographic scheme for providing 
confidentiality and integrity of data stored in the public cloud storage. The proposed 
scheme is composed of four components that reside on user machine. These components 
are data processor (DP) which is main responsibility is encrypting data before uploading 
it to the cloud; and data verifier (DV), which is responsible for ensuring the integrity of 
data; and a token generator (TG), that generates tokens that enable the cloud storage 
provider to retrieve segments of customer data; and a credential generator that is 
responsible for implementing the access control policy for the file sharing. However, the 
proposed scheme tries to solve the problem; it leaves the key management process for the 
user as each user has his private master key for encryption and decryption. 
Amazon S3 [28] provides server-side encryption for data at rest. The data stored on 
Amazon cloud servers is encrypted by an encryption key and an S3 master key and both 
keys are stored at Amazon’s servers. Amazon S3 encrypts users' data while it is 
performing write operation to the disks in its data centers and decrypts it when users 
request access to it. Therefore, Amazon is able to arbitrarily decrypt data. As a result, it 
cannot provide confidentiality or integrity. A similar solution is provided by Dropbox 
because Dropbox rely Amazon S3 for its backend storage. Wuala [102] is cloud storage 
services that is similar to Dropbox, but it provides client side encryption to users’ files. 
Based on the user’s password, a public-private key pair is generated that serves as the 
basis for confidential file sharing. Every file is encrypted with a symmetric key that is 
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derived from the file’s content and the user’s password. However, if the user forgets his 
password, it is not possible to recover decryption credentials. Other solution for providing 
data confidentiality at rest can include encryption tools as TrueCrypt  or 
BoxCryptor[103][104]  that provide encrypted virtual hard disks that can be mounted into 
the user’s local file system and synchronized with. Since encrypted data by itself is not 
feasible for sharing among users, these tools will not help much unless Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) key are shared among participating users over a secure out-
of-band channel. This is clearly a drawback in terms of usability. 
J. Hwang et al.[105] propose a Business Model for Cloud Computing Based on a 
Separate Encryption and Decryption Service. In this model, cloud users will make use of 
two cloud computing service providers. The first provider will used to perform 
encryption and decryption of data while the other is used for storing encrypted data. This 
models implies that an agreement between these service providers to establish a model 
for cooperation and division of responsibilities in providing a common service to clients. 
This model seems to be infeasible since it is very difficult that to guarantee that these 
providers will not collude with each other. V. Joshi et al [106] propose a general 
framework for securing the data by using three tier securities in cloud environment. In the 
first tier, the problem of data leakage is solved by classifying the data based on 
importance of data to either confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA) before storing it 
in the cloud. Data is encrypted before uploading it to the cloud. Each of the 
classifications (CIA) offers different security level to solve the problem. While in the 
second layer, the clients are categorized according to the three rings. Each ring represent 
certain users with certain privileges (e.g. ring 1=> core users, ring 2=> employees, and 
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ring 3=> external users).Users within the same ring belong to same group and have same 
privilege. This aggregation of users helps in preventing unauthorized access and increase 
security level. Finally in the third tire, a face fuzzy vault technique is used to provide 
unique identification where it binds ring secrete key with user’s face feature to provide 
controlled data access to authorized user. The proposed system works initially when the 
user/company uploaded data marked to either CIA and certain ring. Later on, when a 
certain user requests for data access, user authentication and authorization the tier 
architecture are used to allow only authorized users to have access to the data. L. Hao et 
al. [107] propose a cloud security storage system for securing data in private cloud 
storage systems. The proposed system tries to solve the problems of information 
isolation, accessing control, virus detection, metadata safeguard of crucial data and fast-
speed retrieval. The proposed system designs a prototype of private cloud security 
storage system. The prototype consists of five entities: connect interface, a distributed file 
system, an access control module, a security-auditing module and a classification-write 
module. Each of these entities tries to solve the problems listed above. F. Rocha et 
al.[108] in their paper showed that malicious insider can steal user's confidential data in 
the cloud, therefore, users have not to trust cloud provider for securing their data. The 
paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, the authors show four attacks performed 
by malicious insider to steal user's data. These attacks are compromising passwords, 
cloud users’ private keys, files, and other confidential data that might be extracted from a 
hard disk. If the malicious insider succeeds in any of these attacks, he can easily get 
access to all users' data without users being aware of this unauthorized access. While in 
the second part, that author discusses how a set of recent research mechanisms fail to 
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protect data from the previous attacks, however, this does not mean that these 
mechanisms are not useful. 
3.2.4 Data Remanence  
Through the data life cycle, it is important not only to secure data storage, processing 
and transmission but also to secure the deletion of data. Typically, in most storage media 
when a file is deleted, only the file name is removed from its directory or folder, while 
the file’s content remains stored on the physical media until the data blocks are 
overwritten [109].In order to ensure the confidential of deleted data, three methodologies 
can be accomplished: 1) physical destruction of the storage medium; 2) overwriting all of 
the sensitive data; 3) secure overwriting the key of encrypted sensitive data.  
1. Physical  Destruction 
Data can be deleted physically by many ways including smelting, shredding, sanding, 
pulverization, or acid bath. Another method that erases data permanently from the storage 
media is magnetic degaussing that work by exposing a hard drive platter to an inverted 
magnetic field, which leaves data unrecoverable [110]. Although, these methods for data 
deletion assuredly delete the data permanently, they make the storage medium unusable. 
Moreover, this method is not suitable for deleting only one file. Therefore, this method 
does not support flexible security policies.  As a result, physical destruction is not a 
suitable method for assured file deletion in the cloud environment that contains huge data 
centers [111].  
2. Data Overwriting 
There are three main methods for deleting data securely from electronic storage 
media using data overwriting. These methods are: 1) overwriting the file content; 2) 
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deleting the file normally, and then overwrite all free space in the partition; 3) erasing the 
entire disk or partition. All the three methods are easy to use. However, they are not 
suitable for cloud environment, because are initiated by the cloud provider and there is no 
guarantee that the provider is honest enough to do so [112]. 
3. Erasing the key of encrypted data  
  The third method to assuredly delete data from storage media is erasing the 
encryption key of the data. Usually most of the data stored on the cloud is encrypted, 
therefore, deleting the encryption key will make the data inaccessible and we are sure that 
no one can access the data. Although, this method suits the cloud environment, it requires 
that all data stored in the cloud is encrypted data. Moreover, it requires that the data 
encryption is not performed by the cloud provider because if the provider encrypts the 
data, he will have full control over encryption keys and there will be no guarantee that he 
assuredly deleted the encryption keys [113]. 
In the cloud environment, most of approaches used to assure the deletion of files use 
cryptographic protection, which removes the cryptographic keys that are used to decrypt 
data blocks to make the encrypted blocks unrecoverable. Y. Tang et al. [114] propose a 
policy-based assured deletion, in which data can be assuredly deleted according to 
revoked policies. While R. Perlman[115] proposes a scheme for assured deletion with 
three flavors; 1) deletion based on expiration time known at file creation; 2) deletion of  
individual files on-demand ;3) deletion based on custom keys for classes of data. In this 
scheme data is encrypted on nonvolatile storage, and keys are destroyed at the 
appropriate times. Whereas A. Rahumed et al. [116] proposed a layered scheme of 
cryptographic protection where the data is encrypted with the first layer of keys called the 
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data keys, and later on these data keys are encrypted with another layer of keys called the 
control keys. Each control key corresponds to a fine-grained policy that specifies how 
each file is accessed. In order to access a file you must have both the data key and the 
control key. Therefore, if the policy associated with file is revoked, then its associated 
control key is deleted and the file will be inaccessible. However, this scheme assuredly 
deleted the file; it would be difficult to manage the keys with the increase of number of 
files and versions. 
3.3 Access Control  
Access control in cloud is gaining attention as being critical security mechanisms for 
data protection in cloud applications by only allowing authorized users have access to 
valid data. Since large amount of information stored in the cloud is sensitive, care should 
be taken for access control of this sensitive information. Unfortunately, traditional data 
access control approaches used to solve this problem assumes that data is stored in a 
trusted data server for all users and the cloud service provider(CSP) is in charge of 
enforcing the access policy. However, this assumption cannot hold in cloud computing 
because this approach gives CSP has access to the plain data. In addition, the data gets 
compromised once the CSP gets compromised. Moreover, the access control policy is not 
bound to the data because the access control policies are maintained by CSP (CSP have 
full control over policies).Thus users do not have mechanisms to bind the access control 
policy to the data, they can rely on the server to enforce access policy[19].  
In general, access control is divided into three types: User Based Access Control 
(UBAC)[117], Role Based Access Control (RBAC)[118], and Attribute Based Access 
Control (ABAC). In UBAC, users are authorized to access the data based on an access 
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control list (ACL) which contains a list of users who are authorized to access data. This 
type of access control not feasible in cloud because there are many users each with 
different privilege and this makes the management of keys impossible. In RBAC, users 
are authorized to access the data based on a role he/she is assigned to by the system. Only 
the user with the matching role can access the data. In ABAC, users are given attributes 
and the data is attached with access policy. Users having set attributes satisfying the 
access policy can easily access the data.  
The first trials to protect sensitive data shared in the cloud is to encrypt the data 
(using either symmetric-key, also known as private-key encryption(PKE), or asymmetric-
key)before uploading it to the cloud storage, while the decryption keys are disclosed only 
to authorized users. However, this trivial solution succeeded in the beginning later on it 
brings in a number of problems. The first problem associated with solution is that it 
requires an efficient key management mechanism to distribute decryption keys to 
authorized users, which has been proven to be very difficult. Moreover, with the wide 
spread of cloud computing, more users joined the cloud which make adopting the 
previous solution inefficient as it lacks scalability and flexibility. Furthermore, when a 
data owner wants to revoke a data user, all data related to this user has to be re-encrypted 
and new keys must be distributed to the remaining data users. Last but not least, data 
owners need to be online all the time so as to encrypt or re-encrypt data and distribute 
keys to authorize users. Moreover, these methods incur high storage overhead on the 
server, because the server should store multiple encrypted copies of the same data for 




Attribute Based Access Control (ABAC): An access control method in which the user 
requests to perform operations on objects. These operations are granted or denied based on 
assigned attributes of the subject and a set of policies that are specified in terms of those 
attributes and conditions. 
Attributes are characteristics of the subject, object, or environment conditions. Attributes 
contain information given by a name-value pair.  
A subject is a human user or non-person entity (NPE), such as a device that issues access 
requests to perform operations on objects. Subjects are assigned one or more attributes.  
An object is a system resource for which access is managed by the ABAC system, such 
as devices, files, records, tables, processes, programs, networks, or domains containing or 
receiving information. It can be the resource or requested entity, as well as anything upon 
which an operation may be performed by a subject including data, applications, services, 
devices, and networks.  
Policy is the representation of rules or relationships that makes it possible to determine if 
a requested access should be allowed, given the values of the attributes of the subject.  
Each subject that uses the system must be assigned specific attributes. The user is 
established as a subject within the system by an administrator and characteristics about that 
user are captured as subject attributes. This subject may have a name, a role, and an 
organization affiliation. Other subject attributes may include US Person status, nationality, 
and security clearance. These subject attributes are assigned and managed by an authority 
within the organization that maintains the subject identity information for the file 
management system. As new users arrive, old users leave, and characteristics of subjects 
change, these subject attributes may need to be updated. Consider the example of the 
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headmaster who wants to encrypt a document to all the professors of 45 years old in the 
computer science department, the document would be encrypted with access structure 
("professor" ∧" CS department" ∧ "age 45"), and only the users who hold the private key 
containing these three attributes can decrypt the document while others cannot get any 
information from the ciphertext.  
Subject attributes are provisioned by attribute authorities—typically authoritative for the 
type of attribute that is provided and managed through an attribute administration point. 
Often, there are multiple authorities, each with authority over different attributes. For 
example, Security might be the authority for Clearance attributes, while Human Resources 
might be the authority for Name attributes.  
Every object within the system must have at least one policy that defines the access rules 
for the allowable subjects, operations, and environment conditions to the object. This policy 
is normally derived from documented or procedural rules that describe the business processes 
and allowable actions within the organization. For example, in a hospital setting, a rule may 
state that only authorized medical personnel shall be able to access a patient’s medical 
record. In some system, if the object is a document with a RecordTypeAttribute of 
PatientMedicalRecord, then the MedicalRecordRule will be selected and processed so that 
the subject with a PersonnelTypeAttribute value of NonMedicalSupportStaff trying to 
perform the Read operation will be denied access and the operation will be disallowed. Note 
that this is only one approach to implementing the connection between attributes and 
rules[215]. 
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a cryptographic primitive that addresses the above 
issues and finds applications to a wide range of settings, from regular users over the world 
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wide web to large multi structural corporations. Being different from an identity-based 
encryption (IBE)[121] , attribute-based encryption (ABE) provides a sound solution to 
encrypt a message for all users who hold the required attributes, without any knowledge of 
their exact identities. The first ABE scheme was proposed by Sahai  and Waters [120] based 
on linear secret sharing, where both the ciphertext and the secret key are labeled with a set of 
attributes. A user can decrypt the ciphertext if and only if there is a match between his secret 
key and the ciphertext. This idea was originally used to design an error-tolerant (or fuzzy) 
IBE. In other words, ABE relates the cryptographic components with attribute sets, 
corresponding to available credentials for users, and access policies, corresponding to the 
possibly complex restrictions that the credentials have to satisfy. Since its introduction, two 
complementary schemes have been proposed, which are: key-policy ABE (KPABE) 
[122][123] and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) [124].In a KP-ABE scheme, the ciphertext 
is defined by a set of attributes; while the secret keys of the user are associated with an access 
policy (access structure).A user can decrypt the ciphertext, if and only if he has the required 
secret keys corresponding to attributes listed in the ciphertext. As a result, the encryptor does 
not have entire control over the encryption policy because the encryption policy is described 
in the keys. Therefore, the encryptor has to trust the key generators for issuing correct keys 
for authorized users. Furthermore, KP-ABE is not naturally suitable to certain applications. 
An example of such applications is a type of sophisticated broadcast encryption, where users 
are described by various attributes and the one whose attributes match a policy associated 
with a cipher text can decrypt the cipher text. On other hand, Ciphertext policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) is becoming a promising cryptographic solution to this issue in 
KP-ABE. It enables data owners to define their own access policies over user attributes and 
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enforce the policies on the data to be distributed. In CP-ABE scheme, there is an authority 
that is responsible for attribute management and key distribution. The authority can be the 
registration office in a university, the human resource department in a company, etc. The data 
owner defines the access policies and encrypts data under the policies. Each user will be 
issued a secret key according to its attributes. A user can decrypt the ciphertext only when its 
attributes satisfy the access policies. Moreover, in CP-ABE schemes, the access policy 
checking is implicitly conducted inside the cryptography. That is, there is no one to explicitly 
evaluate the policies and make decisions on whether allows the user to access the data[124], 
[125]. Most of the ABE approaches take a centralized approach and allow only one single 
authority [114,126-133] for issuing users' keys. Although single authority ABE achieves fine 
grained access control ,it works well only in the setting where data is managed within one 
organization or trust domain. In addition, it still suffers from failure or corruption, which may 
leak out the data because the authority can decrypt all the encrypted data. Furthermore, the 
authority has full control over users' keys so it is able to decrypt all users' encrypted data. 
Moreover, the authority may become the performance bottleneck in the large scale cloud 
storage systems. 
To address this issue, multi-authority or decentralized attribute-based access control 
schemes[17,123,134-140] were proposed, where multiple parties could play the role of an 
authority.  Although, multi-authority ABE tries to solve the problem of single authority CP-
ABE, it needs to  tie together different components of a user’s secret key  from multiple 
authorities(AA). [123,134,135] suggest using a central authority to provide a final secret key 
to integrate the secret keys from different attribute authorities. However, the central authority 
would be able to decrypt all the ciphertext in , since it holds the master key of the system. 
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Thus, the central authority would be a vulnerable point for security attacks and a 
performance bottleneck for large scale systems. To overcome this problem [136,137] , 
propose a multi-authority attribute-based access control schemes without a central authority. 
[136,137] presented secure multi-authority CP-ABE scheme that remove the central authority 
by using a distributed PRF (pseudo-random function). But it has the same limitation of  
defining a pre-determined number of authorities in the system initialization. In addition, they 
can tolerate collusion attacks for up to N-2 authorities' compromise . Besides, they degrade 
the performance of the system due to interaction among the authorities during the system 
setup. [138] is similar to [136,137], as it has a pre-determined  set of authorities, however, it 
requires the interaction among the authorities during the system setup. Moreover, this scheme 
can tolerate collusion attacks for up to m colluding users, where m is a system parameter 
chosen at setup time.[139] proposed a new comprehensive scheme that  is secure against any 
collusion attacks and it can process the access policy expressed in any Boolean formula over 
attributes. However, their method is constructed in composite order bilinear groups that incur 
heavy computation cost. In addition, they did not consider attribute revocation, which is one 
of the major challenges in multi-authority access control for cloud storage.[140] presents a 
fully secure multi-authority CP-ABE scheme in the standard model. In this system, there are 
multiple CAs and AAs. Each CA or AA operates independently from the others. Before 
requesting the attribute-related keys from the AAs, the user must ensure that he has obtained 
the identity-related keys from all the CAs.[17-18], eliminates the collusion problem 







3.4 Revocation  
Revocation is the act of preventing any future usage of the key towards decrypting 
ciphertexts within an encryption scheme. Revocation takes two forms: user revocation and 
attribute revocation. User revocation takes place when one or more attribute are revoked, the 
user loses all the decryption privilege of all the ciphertexts (e.g., a user is leaving a 
company). Attribute revocation takes place when one or more attribute are  revoked, the user 
still can use its other attribute to decrypt ciphertexts (e.g., a user is degraded from PM to 
Developer).User revocation can be solved by either broadcast revocation or dynamic 
revocation or by utilizing proxy re-encryption (PRE)[126,133,141]  to delegate most tasks to 
servers. In a broadcast encryption scheme, the sender (broadcaster) sends a ciphertext to a 
group of recipients such that only non-revoked users inside the group can decrypt the 
broadcasted content. Such a scheme allows the broadcaster to specify the list of revoked 
users who are not allowed to decrypt the digital content that is broadcasted. The main 
drawback of these schemes is that the private key size blows up by a multiplicative factor of 
log(n), where n represents the maximum number of attributes in the system. In addition, 
Broadcast ABE requires knowledge about the list of all possible users during encryption. 
Knowing the list of all possible users in advance do not provide secure systems[142-
144].Dynamic revocation was supplied by Xu and Martin [145], which allows the revocation 
of keys without requiring any modifications to ciphertexts or other keys. This scheme uses a 
proxy which is supplied with an additional part of the ABE keys, and uses this part of the key 
at decryption through an additional pairing. Like other schemes, secret sharing is used to 
convert the user’s share with the values from the proxy in order to get the proper value to 
compute the pairing. Overall, this method is not compatible with the goals of this thesis due 
to the fact that it is based around storage-centric environments, which already handle some 
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issues with key management by having files on a trusted server. The keys revoked through 
this are revoking the access from the trusted servers, not local keys from users. Similar work 
is presented in [146], instead of dividing the ABE key, they split the symmetric encryption 
key and encrypt part by the CP-ABE encryption algorithm while the other part is maintained 
at the server.   
On the other hand,  attribue revocation can be realized by revoking attribute itself using 
timed rekeying mechanism, which is implemented by setting expiration time on each 
attribute. Indeed, these approaches have two main problems. First problem is the security 
degradation in terms of the backward and forward secrecy . An attribute is supposed to be 
shared by a group of users in the ABE systems by nature. Then, it is a considerable scenario 
that membership may change frequently in the group that shares an attribute. Then, a new 
user might be able to access the previous data encrypted before he comes to hold the 
attributes until the data are re-encrypted with the newly updated attribute keys by periodic 
rekeying (backward secrecy). On the other hand, a revoked user would still be able to access 
the encrypted data even if he does not hold the attribute any more until the next expiration 
time (forward secrecy). Such an uncontrolled period is called the window of 
vulnerability[124,147,148]. Ibraimiet al. [149] provides an option for attribute revocation 
within a CPABE scheme. However, this mediated CPABE scheme does not provide much 
functionality with regards to revocation, as it is not immediate revocation, requiring users to 
wait until a time period ends. The revocation is performed by requiring a mediator to hold 
each half of the user’s key for each attribute. These two shares are combined after 
decryption, with both the user and the mediator decrypting using their shares, giving a single 
decrypted message. An advantage of this scheme is that it does allow the mediators to be 
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distributed, not requiring a single proxy server. However, each proxy still has to contain the 
same shares of every user’s key, and a single compromised server can still give a malicious 
user the half of every key. Due to the fact that this only provides revocation of single 
attributes, and the fact that it is not immediate. Moreover, these attribute revocation methods 
are designed only for ABE systems with single authority. 
 
The attribute-based signature (ABS) is a recent cryptography primitive, in which a 
signature does not attest to the identity of a signer, but to a policy regarding the attributes 
possessed by the underlying signer. The advantages of un-forgeability and signer privacy 
make ABS a good prospect in access control and anonymous authentication systems. Digital 
signatures in general are needed for a variety of security services, including data integrity, 
authentication, non-repudiation and certification (in conventional PKC).  The main security 
goal is to prevent forgery, i.e. preventing someone not in the possession of the secret key 
producing a valid signature. In this sense, ABS is similar to signature variants like Group 
signatures [150], Ring signatures [151] and Mesh signatures [152]. The dominant idea of all 
these signature primitives is that they allow the signer fine-grained control over the amount 
of personal information exposed. However, it is important to note that a valid ABS signature 
guarantees that only a person possessing the required attributes that satisfy the predicate can 
produce a signature. The basic concept of ABS, however, has a serious problem that only a 
single authority exists in a system. Therefore, ABS should take into account the scenario of 
multiple authorities, which is more likely to be used by real world applications. The concept 
of multi-authority (MA-)ABS, was introduced [153-157], in which there are multiple 
authorities and each authority is responsible for issuing a secret key associated with a 
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category or sub-universe of attributes, i.e., a user obtains several secret keys, each of which is 
issued by each authority. 
   
3.5 Proxy Re-encryption 
 In a proxy re-encryption scheme, introduced by Mambo and Okamoto [158], a 
proxy is a semi trusted entity which can transform an encryption computed under Bobs’ 
(delegator) public key to an encryption computed under Alice's (delegatee) public key. The 
proxy is a semi-trusted entity i.e. it is trusted to perform only the ciphertext re-encryption, 
without knowing the secret keys of Bob and Alice, and without having access to the plain 
data. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [159] introduced the notion of ”atomic proxy functions” - 
functions that transform ciphertext corresponding to one key into ciphertext corresponding to 
another key without revealing any information about the secret decryption keys or plain data. 
However the scheme presented in [159] is bidirectional where one re-encryption key can be 
used to transform ciphertext from the delegator to the delegatee and vice versa, and is useful 
only for the scenarios where the trust relationship between involved parties is mutual. To 
overcome this situation Jakobsson[160] and Zhou et al. [161] proposed a quorum-controlled 
protocol where a proxy is divided into many components. Dodis and Ivan [162] propose a 
number of unidirectional proxy re-encryption for El-Gamal, RSA and IBE scheme, where the 
delegator’s secret key is divided into two shares: one share for the proxy and one share for 
the delegatee. The drawback of the proposed schemes is that they are collusion-unsafe, i.e. if 
the proxy and the delegatee colludes then they can recover the delegator’s secret key. 
Matsuo[163] and Green and Atteniese [164] propose the identity-based proxy re-encryption 
scheme, where the encrypted data under the public key generated by delegators’ identity is 




3.6 File Sharing 
With the evolution of cloud computing, many individuals and organizations store 
and share their data in the cloud. This implies that the data owners have limited control 
over their outsourced data and that the cloud service provider has excessive privileges in 
terms of control over user's data. This leads to very low level of trust on keeping and 
sharing data on the cloud. Therefore, security of data in cloud storage and through the 
sharing process is a must. Data security in cloud storage implies that only authorized 
users have access to the data and even if an attacker can directly read the content of the 
disk containing confidential data, he cannot get understandable plain data. Moreover, the 
data security in the sharing process requires fine grained sharing. In other words, partial 
access permissions of the confidential data can be shared to the others with satisfying the 
least privilege constraints 
 
G. Zhao et al.[165] propose a scheme for implementing scalable and fine-grained 
access control systems based on attribute-based encryption (ABE). This scheme tries to 
prevent the usage of illegal key sharing among colluding users by defining and enforcing 
access policies based on data attributes through user accountability. Through this method, 
user specific information is inserted with user's attribute private keys so that user's 
attribute private keys can be viewed as default attribute. Therefore, if a user is able to 
share his decryption keys with others, he is not able to change the user specific 
information in the attribute private keys. 
W. Lafayette et al. [166] propose a scheme for delegating privacy-preserving fine-
grained access enforcement to the cloud based on a recent expressive Group Key 
Management (GKM) scheme; unlike the current methods which delegate most of 
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computation for managing keys for access control and encryption for data owners, the 
proposed scheme delegate most of the activity for the access control enforcement to 
cloud storage service; W. Lafayette et al.  proposed a two layer encryption (TLE) 
approach. This approach is based on two layers of encryption for the uploaded data to the 
cloud. In the first layer, the data owner performs a coarse grained encryption over his 
data before uploading it to the cloud in order to ensure the data's confidentiality. While in 
the second layer, the cloud provider performs fine grained encryption over the encrypted 
data uploaded by the data owner based on the attribute-based access control (ABAC) 
policies provided by the data -owner. Therefore, any change in a policy or user dynamics 
will require change only in the outer layer of the encryption. Because the outer layer 
encryption is performed by the cloud provider, there is no need for data transmission 
between the data owner and the cloud. As a result, most of the computation for managing 
access control keys is performed by cloud provider. 
  S. Ruj et al.[167] propose a decentralized access control scheme that not only 
enforces fine-grained access control but also preserve  the authenticity of the user without 
knowing his/her identity. The proposed scheme make use of  the two protocols attribute 
based encryption (ABE) and attribute based signature (ABS) in order to enable only valid 
users to decrypt the stored information and to verify the user’s credentials without 
knowing the identity of the user who stores information. However, the main limitation of 
this scheme is that the cloud knows the access policy for each record stored in the cloud. 
Another category of cryptographic access control focuses on time-based access 
control. An example of this type is web-based electronic newspaper that allows users to 
subscribe to one package for a certain period of time (e.g., a week, a month, or a year). 
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Time control is of particular significance and has been concerned in access control. Y. 
Zhu[168]proposes a scheme for temporal access control for cloud services using three 
cryptographic techniques: integer comparison, proxy-based current-time re-encryption 
and attribute-based encryption (ABE).  In the proposed scheme, user's data is associated 
with an access policy on a set of temporal attributes, e.g., period-of-validity, opening 
hours, or hours of service. Users satisfying assigned privileges and specified time period 
are allowed to access the data.  
In [169], the author tries to have trusted data storage and sharing over entrusted cloud 
storage providers. To ensure data confidentiality in the storage, the author encrypts all the 
data before storing it on the cloud. While for the shared data, the encrypted data will be 
re-encrypted without being decrypted. The re- encryption of data will allow the 
authorized users only to have access to the data. The whole process from encryption and 
re-encryption does not reveal the plain data to the cloud provider and allows only 
authorized users to access the data according to the designated permissions from the data 
owner. 
The process of securing the stored and shared data can be summarized in five steps: 
1) The data owner encrypts his data and stores it on a service provided by a Cloud 
Storage Provider; 2) A data user sends a request to the data owner asking for access 
permission to the data; 3) The data owner sends credential to the Cloud Storage Provider 
for the re-encryption of the data;4) The data owner sends credential for data user to 
decrypt the re-encrypted data with his private key; 5) the data user acquires the re-
encrypted data from the Cloud Storage Provider and decrypts it.In [170], the author tries 
to utilize public key cryptography by allowing users to dynamically derive the symmetric 
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keys at the time of decryption in order to efficiently handle policy changes as well as 
adding /revoking users or identity attributes. To do so,  the author formalize a new key 
management scheme, called broadcast group key management (BGKM) in order to 
support attribute-based access control while preserving privacy of users’ identity 
attributes . By making use of BGKM scheme the author construct a secure construction 
called ACV-BGKM. ACV-BGKM works by assigning some secrets to users based on 
their identity attributes and later allow them to derive actual symmetric keys based on 
their secrets and some public information. In other words, the user is able to decrypt the 
content he is authorized depending on the attributes they have received from the data 
owner. Moreover, the proposed scheme handled adding users/revoking users or updating 
access control policies efficiently by only updating some of the associated public 
information. 
In [171], the author tries to solve the problem of revoking users without key-
redistribution and data encryption. The proposed scheme makes use of attribute-
based/predicate encryption and proxy re-encryption to revoke users without re-encryption 
from the data owner. It works as follows: the data owner encrypts the actual data using 
symmetric key encryption (use random key K for symmetric encryption). Then he picks 
another random key K1 and computes K2 = K⊗ K1.later on encrypts K1 using attribute-
based encryption, and encrypts K2 with proxy re-encryption under owner's own public 
key. From the previous we note that, users that have both K1 and K2 can obtain the data. 
For example, when a data user requests data from the cloud, if he is allowed to access to 
data, the cloud should have the re-encryption key that enables it to transform the part of 
the cipher text corresponding proxy re-encryption into one data user public key. Thus the 
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data user can obtain k2 and as long as user have access rights then  he can get K1, 
therefore, he user is able to access data easily as he has both K1 and K2. In order to 
revoke a user, all the data owner has to do is to simply command the cloud to destroy the 
re-encryption key and create a new re - encryption key. Therefore, the data user will not 
be able to access data with his old keys 
In [172], the author proposes a solution that prevents the leakage of unauthorized data 
when a revoked user rejoins the system different access privileges to the same data 
record. The solution uses homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption schemes to 
solve the problem. Moreover, the proposed solution tries to prevent the information 
leakage in case of collusion between a user and the Cloud Service Provider by using data 
distribution technique. Unlike the proposed scheme in [171] which suffers from problems 
in the re-authorization of revoked users, who rejoin the system but with different access 
privileges, and collusion between a user and the Cloud Service Provider. The proposed 
scheme tries to offer one solution that solves the following issues: 1) achieve fine-grained 
data sharing and access control over data in the cloud; 2) prevent the leakage of 
unauthorized data when a revoked user rejoins the system; 3) prevent collusion between a 
user and the Cloud Service Provider. The proposed solution [Secure Data Sharing (SDS) 
framework] is composed of 5 stages. 
1. Key Generation and Distribution- In this stage the data owner generates two of key 
pairs based on homomorphic encryption. Then he/she distributes them to the cloud and to 
the data users. Moreover, the data owner generates the proxy re-encryption key for each 
authorized users. 
2. Data Outsourcing- In this stage the data owner encrypts his data and generates the 
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authorization tokens associated with this data. Then data owner sends the encrypted data 
along with the associated the authorization tokens to the cloud. 
3. Data Access- In this stage the data user requests the data from the cloud service 
provider who in turn checks whether the data user is an authorized user or not and takes 
the corresponding action. 
4. User Revocation- In this stage the data owner commands the cloud to remove the 
authorization token corresponding to data user. 
5. User Rejoin- In this stage, the data owner grants access to a data user who was 
revoked some time ago. The data owner generates an authorization token corresponding 
to the new set of attributes and sends the token the cloud 
Moreover, the proposed solution solves the problem of information leakage in the 
case of collusion between a user and the cloud by distributing the encrypted data and 
authorization tokens corresponding to the data between two clouds. The author argues 
that this solution is valid as the user can collude with at most one of the clouds. 
In [173], the author proposes a public-key deniable scheme that protects the data 
privacy against powerful adversaries who can force users into opening their encrypted 
content. In particular, the author uses plan-ahead deniable encryption scheme in the 
context of file sharing among collaborating users so that if any participant is forced to 
decrypt one or more shared files, these files just open the non-deniable (fake) files 
without revealing any sensitive information. The developed prototype of a deniable file 
system DenFS considers the cloud storage as un-trusted and does not rely on ACLs for 
access control. Therefore, DenFS implements access control through public key 
encryption. In order to make use of DenFS file system, the user has to determine the 
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mount point, the backend directory, and a password. The backend directory is the 
directory containing sensitive looking files that are used to fill the non-deniable part of a 
deniable encryption. This directory is called non-deniable pool. DenFS can be mounted to 
either deniable or non-deniable mode. When non- deniable mode is used, random data is 
used to fill the deniable part of the cipher text. On the other hand, when deniable mode is 
used, the non-deniable part is filled with the encryption of a file selected from the non-
deniable pool. By following this methodology, any adversary who has access to several 
snapshots of the encrypted content of the shared folder is unable to have a clearly 
distinguish between deniable and non-deniable operations by comparing snapshots. 
 
3.7 Data Integrity 
Ensuring the integrity of data through its transmission requires ensuring the security 
of the communication channel from attacks that eavesdrops data such as man-in-the-
middle attacks. These attacks are cryptographic attacks that take place when an attacker 
can place himself in the communication’s path between the users, which enables his to 
Data Integrity in Cloud Storage modify users' data [174]. Moreover,  current systems 
using cloud communicated with each other anonymously, therefore, full trust between 
cannot be assured between these system[49].As a result,  a secure communication and 
execution service should be supported to prevent the interception and tampering of 
sensitive information. In current cloud systems, the integrity of data-in-transit can be 
guaranteed by the SSL protocol through encryption techniques. However, the data 
integrity depends on not only the security of both the uploading and downloading 
sessions, but also the security of the data in the storage media [175]. 
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To ensure the integrity of the data stored in the cloud, we have to make sure that the 
data is securely stored on cloud servers with no violations (e.g., data is lost, altered, or 
compromised). Data stored in the cloud faces two main threats to its integrity: 1) Data 
loss/ manipulation; 2) Dishonest computation in remote servers. Data can be lost or 
modified in the cloud either maliciously or accidentally. This loss can take place by either 
administration errors (e.g., backup and restore, data migration) or by adversaries that 
initiate attacks benefiting from data owners' loss control over their own data. On the other 
hand, since the user's data is outsourced to the cloud for storage and processing, there are 
no transparent measures that can be used to ensure the integrity of computation executed 
over user's data by cloud provider. The cloud provider may behave unfaithfully and 
return incorrect computing results [176].Therefore, we have a set of requirements that  
should to be satisfied  to face the two threats above:1)The verifier has to ensure data 
integrity without maintaining any copies  of the data; 2) the protocol should be efficient 
in terms of communication;3) It could be possible to run  the verification an unlimited 
number of times;4) The integrity checking have to support dynamic data operations as 
insert, delete,  and modify; 5)Allowing Public verifiability: Public verifiability allows a 
trusted entity other than data owner or service provider  to perform the integrity checking 
operation;6) Privacy should be maintained if the data is verified by a third party verifier 
in order to prevent in data leakage.  (not by a client), the protocol must ensure that no 
private information contained in the data is leaked; 7) the data integrity should be 




 In order to overcome these threats two solutions are available: 1) Provable Data 
Possession (PDP);2) Third Party Auditor (TPA). Provable Data Possession is used to 
check the integrity of static data by client sending a challenge to the cloud server. The 
server answer for the challenge helps the client to determine to prove whether the 
integrity of the data is violated or not [177]. The Provable Data Possession has many 
variations as Original Provable Data Possession, Scalable PDP, and Dynamic PDP. In 
addition, there are two similar schemes that are Proof of Retrievability (POR) and High-
Availability and Integrity Layer (HAIL).Scalable PDP is considered to be an improved 
version of PDP. It is better than PDP in the following:1) It uses symmetric key encryption 
instead of public-key leading to reduction in computation overhead; 2) it supports 
dynamic operations over remote data. However, it have the following limitations: 1) It 
does not support public verification due to symmetric encryption 2) it has to pre-compute 
the all challenges and answers; 3) the number of updates is limited and fixed as a priori 
[178].While Dynamic PDP provides improvement over PDP by supporting full dynamic 
operations such as append, insert, modify, and delete; However, the efficiency of their 
scheme remains in question [179]. In addition, Proof of Retrievability (POR)   which was 
first presented by Juels presents a protocol that enables clients to check the integrity of 
static data only stored on cloud storage without having to retrieve it. The client stores the 
data files along with set of sentinel values embedded in each file. The client checks the 
integrity data by sending a challenge to the cloud server asking for subset of sentinels in 
F’. If the server is notable to solve the challenge, then there is high probability that data 
will be corrupted or lost. It is considered to be a lightweight auditable 
protocol[16].Furthermore, HAIL is considered to a distributed setting where the client 
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distribute the file across multiple servers with redundancy and only store a small constant 
state in local machine[180].On the other hand, TPA is trusted  by the cloud users and 
providers  for  performing the  task of integrity checking  for users data[176].R. S. Kumar 
et al.[181] propose  a protocol  for Proof of retrievability (POR) in cloud. The proposed 
protocol tries to verify that the data stored in the cloud storage is not modified by the 
archive and thereby the integrity of the data is assured. These verifications prevent the 
cloud storage archives from altering or deleting any part of the data without the 
permission of the data owner. In addition, the proposed protocol reduces the 
computational and storage overhead on the client by only storing two functions on client 
side for checking the integrity. These functions are the bit generator function g, and the 
function h which is used for encrypting the data. Finally, the proposed protocol reduces 
the size of the proof of data integrity so as to reduce the network bandwidth consumption. 
L. Wenjun et al. [182] propose a protocol for ensuring data integrity by using HLAs 
and RSA signature with the support public verifiability. The usage of public verifiability 
allows the client to delegate the integrity checking process over the data to the TPA. On 
the other hand, RSA signature is used with large public exponent for enhancing data 
storage security. 
W. Zhi-wei et al. [183] constructed a new scheme called aggregatable signature based 
broadcast (ASBB) that is used to build an efficient homomorphic public verifiable 
scheme with zero knowledge privacy that supports static data only. The proposed scheme 
prevents any adversary from deducing any information through the audit interaction that 
take place between cloud server and the TPA. Therefore, eliminating the load of auditing 
task from the cloud user. In addition, the TPA reduces the client fear from outsourced 
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data leakage. C. Wang et al.[184] propose approaches and system requirements needed to 
be performed in order to make publicly auditable secure cloud storage service become a 
reality. These include a set of systematically and cryptographically desirable properties 
that can be used to make public auditing service a reality in the cloud storage services. In 
other words, the purpose of the paper is to make use of a publicly auditable for delegating 
the auditing process to a trusted entity (TPA) instead on depending on client for verifying 
the data integrity. K. Yang et al. [185] propose a privacy-preserving auditing framework 
for supporting auditing of dynamic data. He proposed framework protects users' data 
privacy in the auditing process from external auditor by   using cryptography method 
with the bi-linearity property of bilinear paring. In addition, it moves the computing loads 
of auditing from the auditor to the server leading to less communication cost and less 
computation cost on the auditor side. Q. Wang et al.[186] construct a model for allowing 
a third party auditor (TPA), on behalf of the cloud client, to verify the integrity of the 
dynamic data stored in the cloud. The constructed model allows the TPA to perform 
improved proofs on dynamic data by manipulating the classic Merkle Hash Tree 
construction for block tag authentication. In addition, it enables the TPA to efficiently 
handle multiple auditing tasks by using bilinear aggregate signature techniques. L. 
Li1[187] propose a TPA mechanism integrated into file sharing system that is build atop 
of service delivery platform  for achieving reliable system. 
From the above, we can conclude that most of PDP and POR schemes do not consider 
the privacy protection of users’ data against external auditors. Because the cloud service 
provider may reveal users’ data to auditors or adversaries during the auditing. In addition, 
most of the work done in data auditing considers only static data files with little attention 
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given for the dynamic data updates. Furthermore, the current provable data possession 
(PDP) or proof of retrievability (POR) schemes support for dynamic operations over data 
lead to security loopholes. Finally, the auditing models that support both public audit-
ability and data dynamics are not fully addressed in the research context. 
 
3.8 Data Availability 
  
 Although there is a great effort done by cloud provider to ensure the availability 
of the data, there is still service interruption. In the year 2008, four of the most popular 
cloud providers announced their service outage. These service providers include AWS, 
Google App Engine, and Gmail. Each of these service providers was not available from 
1.5 to 8 hours [188]. The reasons for these outages include software protocol error, 
programming error authentication service overload, and outage in other contact systems 
[189].  
One of the most famous solutions to address the availability issue is data redundancy 
technique. This technique can be categorized into replication-based solutions and erasure 
codes-based solutions. Data replication is the process of having multiple identical copies 
of the same data on different locations. It is works by copying data from healthy server to 
corrupted server when the data is corrupted on any server. The two main disadvantages of 
replication-based solutions that make them infeasible to apply in cloud are: 1) high 
storage cost; 2) high-throughput requirement, where in cloud there exist a large number 
of users who access the service at the same time and each user wants to access different 
pieces of data on a server leading to less cache hits but frequent disk I/O requests [190]. 
On the other hand, erasure code provides redundancy by breaking a file into smaller 
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chunks and storing the chunks in different locations. Data can be recovered from any 
combination of a smaller number of those chunks. Therefore, when erasure codes-based 
solutions are compared to replication-based ones, they achieve higher reliability level 
with much less data redundancy [191]. Moreover, erasure codes-based solutions better 
fits the cloud environment because every block of data on a server is useful for decoding 
the original data, which leads to a high cache hit rate of the system. However, the main 
disadvantage of existing optimal erasure is the high communication cost needed for 
repairing a corrupted storage server. 
Despite the efficiency of most data redundancy techniques to recovery data, disasters 
can still take out an entire data center and make service unavailable. This means that 
relying on a single cloud service provider exposes data to a single point of failure, despite 
the fact that the failure probability is very small. Therefore, the cloud user should not rely 
on a single cloud service provider but he/she should employ multiple cloud service 
providers [192]. 
Y. Singh et al. [193] propose a secured cost-effective multi-cloud storage (SCMCS) 
scheme. The proposed scheme works by dividing user's data block into data pieces and 
distributing them among different service provider in a way that at least a threshold 
number of service providers can be used to successful retrieval of the whole data block. 
This helps in preventing adversary from retrieving data if he was able to intrude in one 
network, because the complementary pieces of data are stored in the other networks. 
Moreover, the proposed scheme use a redundant distribution scheme that enables it to 
retrieve the data even if adversary causes a service outage even in one of the data 
networks, because there is another server which maintain the same block. P. Liu et al. 
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[194] propose a scheme for selecting multiple cloud providers based on a mathematical 
model. The model is used to derive two algorithms that help in selecting multiple clouds 
but the selection must be within a given budget. In other words, the proposed scheme 
wants to replicate the data over multiple cloud providers but the replication is constrained 
to the cost and performance requirements. E. Pardede et al. [195] propose a Multi-clouds 
Database Model (MCDB) based on Shamir’s secret sharing algorithm for supporting 
multi-clouds service providers instead of single cloud service provider. The Shamir’s 
secret sharing algorithm is used in this model to divide the data among the different cloud 
service providers. Bessani et al. [196] propose a virtual storage cloud system called 
DepSky. Depsky is constituted from different clouds to build a cloud-of-clouds so if one 
of the cloud providers is damaged, users are still able to retrieve data correctly. The 
proposed system achieves availability by using multi-cloud providers, combining 




4 Proposed Approach for Securing Data in cloud Storage 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the details of our secure cloud storage framework. The 
suggested framework transfers the trust from the cloud to a trusted third party service. 
This service provides security for users' data with minimal overhead on cloud users. 
Particularly, this service ensures data confidentiality against cloud and unauthorized 
users. Data confidentiality against cloud   can be achieved by storing data in an encrypted 
format in cloud storage so that malicious insiders are notable to view/decrypt it. Given 
the vulnerabilities found in both client and cloud side encryption services [54, 64, 65, 
103,201], we propose addressing these vulnerabilities by deploying a trusted third party 
(TTP) service. This TTP service has encryption/decryption service that can be employed 
either locally or remotely according to level of severity of the data. This service shall 
remove the burden of key management and maintained from data owners. Moreover, this 
service takes advantage over the current software encryption/decryption service that 
offers full disk encryption and client side storage services that can encryption keys. For 
achieving data confidentiality against unauthorized users, the TTP service collaborates 
with a number of attribute authorities (i.e. more details in section 4.2.1) to achieve fine 
grained access control. By doing so, we prohibit cloud service providers and 
unauthorized users from getting access to owners’ plaintext or credentials, unlike most of 
the currently available cloud storage services that either not do not provide file sharing 
services or give the cloud service provider full power over access control. In addition, we 
support user and attribute revocation without depending on the data owner for re-
encrypting the affected files or regenerating system parameters and users' keys. 
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Moreover, we provide read or write or both accesses to a file stored in the cloud, unlike 
most of the systems that supports 1- write-many-read. Last but not least, we shift most of 
the heavy computations such as verification and re-encryption from the owner/user to the 
cloud. 
4.2 Models and Assumptions 
4.2.1 System Model 
We consider a secure cloud storage system with multiple authorities, as shown in Fig.1. 
The system model consists of six entities: certificate authority (CA), attribute authorities 
(AAs), the cloud storage provider (CSP), trusted third party (TTP) service, the data 










Certificate Authority (CA) is a global trusted certificate authority in the system. It sets 
up the system and accepts the registration of all the users and attribute authorities (AAs) 
in the system. The CA is responsible for the distribution of global secret key (i.e. 
      ,      ) secret key for attribute authority and user respectively) and global public 
key (i.e. (     ,      ) public key for attribute authority and user respectively) for each 
legal user and attribute authority in the system. However, the CA is not involved in any 
creation of secret keys or management of attributes [18]. The CA can be an independent 
government agency. 
 
Attribute Authorities (AAs) are a set of trusted entities which take on the responsibility 
of issuing, revoking and updating users’ attributes according to their role or identity. 
Each AA is an independent attribute authority by itself and it does not communicate with 
other authorities for issuing or revoking users’ keys. Each AA can manage an arbitrary 
number of attributes, but every attribute is associated with a single AA.   
 
The cloud storage provider (CSP), which includes a proxy server, is a semi-trusted 
entity. It is responsible for providing data storage service (i.e. Backend Storage Servers) 
and verification of users' data ciphertexts before it is stored in the cloud. Proxy servers 
are servers that are always available for providing various types of data services (i.e. 
proxy re-encryption technique). Proxy Re-Encrypt is a cryptographic technique that 
transforms the cipher text from one secret key to another without revealing the secret key 
to the proxy server. For example, ciphertext encrypted with Alice secret key can be 
transformed to another ciphertext that can be decrypt by Bob without revealing any 
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information to the proxy server. Homomorphic encryption is the most appropriate 
algorithm used with re-encryption technique. In our framework, we delegate most 
laborious tasks of user/attribute revocation to proxy servers without leaking any 
confidential information to them [159,208]. 
 
Trusted third party (TTP) service: is an independent entity that is trusted by all other 
system components, and has capabilities to perform extensive tasks (i.e. encryption, 
decryption and signature). It maintains a key management service that creates, manages, 
and destroys user's data files encryption and decryption keys (DEK). It stores these keys 
in a trusted hardware to ensure better level of security. It is also responsible for 
encrypting, decrypting and signing users’ data. In addition, it does not store any data at its 
end as it is only confined to provide security service. 
 
Data owner encrypts the data with the help of trusted third party (TTP) service (which 
could be local or remote). Then, the owner defines the access policies over attributes 
from multiple attribute authorities. The access policy (Ā) can be expressed by a 
monotonic access tree (T). The access tree (T) has attributes at its leaf nodes and logic 
gates e.g., AND (∧), OR (∨) as intermediate nodes. The AND gates can be constructed as 
n-of-n threshold gates and OR gates as 1-of-n threshold gates [124]. As an example in 
figure4.2,access tree = (class2010 ∧ (Department of Neurology  ∨Department of 



















Next, he sends the policies to TTP service in order to encrypt the content keys under 
these policies, before transmitting the ciphertext to the cloud service provider (CSP). The 
owner does- not rely on the CSP to do data access control. Instead, the ciphertext can be 
accessed by all the legal users in the system, which means that any legal user who has 
been authenticated by the system somehow, can freely download any ciphertexts from the 
CSP. The access control happens inside the cryptography. That is, only when the user’s 
attributes satisfy the access policy defined in the ciphertext; the user is able to decrypt the 
ciphertext. Thus, users with different attributes can decrypt different number of content 
keys and thus obtain different granularities of information from the same data. As 





















The figure illustrates an access structure that allows faulty of class 2010 that are 
either teaching assistants or university  professors belonging to either neurology or 
computer science or Biology department to access the data. 
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data to the cloud. Then, he encrypts the data with the access policy and distributes 
decryption keys to users (Bob, Alice) according to their roles in the system. In our 
example, Bob is able to decrypt the ciphertext because the attributes associated with his 
keys satisfy access policy while Alice is not able to decrypt ciphertext because her 









Each user has a global identity in the system. A user can be either a reader or a writer and 
a reader who may be entitled a set of attributes. As an example in figure 4.4, users who 
only possess attributes (“class 2010”∨“class 2011”)∧ ( “Biology”∨“Neurology” )can 
decrypt (read) the file, called readers; users who possess attributes “class 2011”∧ (“( 
“Biology”∨“Neurology” ) can not only read the file but can also update the file. we  
differentiate writer from reader not at the individual user level, but at the attribute level. 
Once the owner creates the file, he defines both the decryption policy and verify policy. 
After that, the file is uploaded to the cloud storage server, the update policy (ABS’s 
access structure) will be sent to the cloud storage server for authenticating writers and 
readers. Since the decryption and verification are not executed simultaneously, we are 
able to differentiate readers from writers. The attributes that user possess may come from 
multiple attribute authorities according to his role in the domain. The user will receive a 
secret key associated with its attributes entitled by the corresponding attribute authorities. 
Any user can download the encrypted data from the cloud server. But only the user who 
owns proper attributes can successfully decrypt the encrypted data. Since users obtain 
key from different authorities in multi-authority CP- ABE, we need to prevent collusion 
attacks between users. Collusion resilience implies that if multiple authorized or 
unauthorized users collude by combining their attributes to decrypt a ciphertext that none 
of them can decrypt alone, they are not are not able to do so. Collusion attacks are built 
into the CP-ABE security game of [124], where the adversary may make multiple secret 
















ABS Access Structure (Writers) 
 
Figure 4-4: Access Structure 
4.2.2 Threat Model 
Threats faced by the owner when outsourcing confidential data to a cloud server can 
be primarily divided into two categories, internal and external threats. For internal 
threats, it is considered to be the most dangerous type attack because either the cloud 
service provider or its employees can be self-interested, un-trusted, and possibly 
malicious. Moreover, it may attempt to hide a data loss incident due to management 
errors, Byzantine failures, and so on. For external threats, leaking data confidentiality 
may come from an external beyond the control domain of CSP, for example, the 
economically motivated attackers. Once data is encrypted, CSP cannot learn any 
information from it that can be utilized to compromise privacy of the outsourced data. 
However, these encryption algorithms cannot protect the user from the external threats, 
because users can derive valid decryption key and access outsourced data according to 
these access structures. To eliminate these external threats owner must ban unauthorized 
data access by defining access control policy and enforcing it in the entrusted domain. 















authorized and fraudulent user, yet being able to assist unauthorized user in deriving 
decryption key. 
4.2.3 Assumptions 
In this thesis the following assumptions are considered with the intent of simplicity. 
These assumptions conform to the security model, and do not undermine any of the 
privacy threat: 
a. We consider the cloud service providers (CSPs) are honest but curious. In other 
words, CSP is expected to be curious to learn data content and has full access to 
everything stored in the cloud, but will honestly follow any protocol provided by the 
Data Owner (DO). The honest but curious assumption seems realistic since correctly 
executing its tasks is of personal interest as well. When tasks are not correctly 
executed no customers will use the service. Since correct operation is of personal 
interest for the DSSP the amount of computational power, the storage space and the 
bandwidth is assumed to be considerable.  
 
b. The certificate authority (CA) is fully trusted in the system. The CA is used to certify 
the attribute authorities and the users that wants to join the system and provide global 
secret/public keys to both attribute authorities and the users respectively. Therefore, 
the  fully trusted assumption seems realistic since  the CA will not collude with any 
user or authority. 
 
c. The AAs honestly distribute the keys and send the key updating message, but some of 
them may be corrupted by the adversary which attempts to find out information of the 
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data file as much as possible. We also assume that the AAs will never collude with 
any user. This assumption seems realistic  since attribute authorities, unlike the single 
attribute authority setting,  allow the adversary to adaptively create corrupt attribute 
authorities and learn some of the honest authorities’ secret keys as long as there is at 
least a single honest attribute authority managing one of the attributes required for 
satisfying the policy used in the forgery. 
 
d. We assume that legitimate users behave honestly, by which we mean that they never 
share their decryption key with the revoked users. This is a reasonable assumption 
since this internal person is chosen by the client company itself. Correct execution 
and confidentiality is considered to be at his personal interest as well since it will be 
one of his or her evaluation criteria. If the user and data manager is corrupt, the 
security of the entire system is compromised. Also, it is assumed that the user will not 
collude with the data storage service provider 
 
e. Users can have either read or write or both accesses to a file stored in the cloud. 
 
f. All communications between users/clouds are secured by SSL/TLS protocol in order 
to secure the data in transit. 
 
g. Whenever needed, the access to cloud storage service is always available by wired 
network, Wi-Fi, or 3G mobile network. We will not consider the exceptional cases 
such as connection absence, discontinuity or transmission failure. 
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4.3 Security Requirements 
To build a secure cloud storage services that can secure data, we recognize the 
following unique but not necessarily complete security requirements: 
4.3.1 Data confidentiality against cloud 
Although storing data in cloud storage saves the cost of its management and 
maintenance, it is exposed to a huge number of security threats. Data may be 
compromised through its transfer, use and at rest. Thus, when using cloud storage, 
these security threats must be mitigated. In this section we shall explore two of the 
main data security requirements which are data confidentiality and integrity, while we 
assume that data availability is satisfied.   
1. Confidentiality  
Data confidentiality is one of the most important aspects of data security. It can be 
defined as the assurance that sensitive information is not revealed to unauthorized 
users, processes or devices. In cloud environment, the data owner trusts the cloud 
storage service for managing his data but he/she does not want the cloud to access the 
data. Therefore, we need to assure that the cloud storage provider and other 
unauthorized users are incapable of learning the content of the stored data. In 
addition, the secret key used for the encryption should be securely protected so no 
snooping or stealing of the key is possible. Therefore, measures should be taken so as 
to protect users' confidential data from cloud service providers and external attackers. 
In this thesis, we only focus on data confidentiality for data in transit and at rest only 




2. Integrity  
Another important requirement is the integrity of the data. In the cloud computing 
model, the mobility of data increases the threats that can affect the data integrity. As 
the data is being transmitted to and from the customer and the cloud service provider, 
and also internally within the cloud. Therefore, data integrity should be guaranteed 
within the cloud. Integrity can be defined as the protection of data from unauthorized 
modification that can take place either maliciously or accidentally during processing, 
storage or transmission of data. Specifically, the data owners or writers are the only 
ones that have the privilege to modify the data. Any read operation from data users 
should be consistent with an update from an authorized user. Any unauthorized 
modification should be detected by the user and/or the cloud storage provider. 
 
4.3.2 Data confidentiality against accesses beyond authorized rights 
In reality, an increasing number of people host their sensitive data in cloud 
storage services. Usually, they need to share this data with different users with 
different access privileges over various types of data. In this case, the data owner 
should define flexible access control policies on his data. Therefore, we want to 
manage the access control and key distribution of user's data in a way that ensures 
that unauthorized user and the cloud server cannot access the data and allow users to 
use the cloud resource for data operations. Specifically, new joining users are able to 
decrypt the data stored in the cloud before their participation, and revoked users are 
unable to decrypt the data they have access to in the cloud before the revocation. In 
this section we shall explore the two main security requirements that achieve efficient 
access control in cloud: fine grain access control and efficient revocation. 
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1. Fine grain access control 
In fine grained access control, data access policy for each user is defined at 
different data item level based on the user’s role in the system. This data access 
policy should be enforced at each access attempt without the data owner’s 
involvement. In particular, the access policy should be able to define a unique set of 
data items that the user is authorized to access, and must be enforced via a 
cryptographic method. In other words, we want the data owner to define unique 
access control that designates the type/set of files that the user is allowed to access. In 
addition, we want to prevent CSP from learning either the plaintexts of data files or 
user access privilege information. All these security goals should be achieved 
efficiently in the sense that the computation load should be affordable to all types of 
cloud users.  
2. Efficient user Revocation 
In practical application scenarios, users may join or leave the system frequently. 
Therefore, we need an effective and efficient user management mechanism that deals 
with user access privilege revocation. Revocation can take place in one of the two 
following cases: a) revoking a subset of attributes from a user (attribute revocation), 
b) revoking the minimal attribute set form a user (user revocation). Specifically, we 
want to support scalable revocation to take advantage of the abundant resources in the 
cloud by delegating the ciphertext update to cloud instantly and efficiently. In order to 
ensure efficient revocation, we shall satisfy two properties: collusion-resistance and 
forward/backward secrecy. Collusion resilience implies that if multiple authorized or 
unauthorized users collude by combining their attributes to decrypt a ciphertext that 
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none of them can decrypt alone, they are notable to do so. On the other hand, forward 
secrecy means that the revoked user cannot decrypt the ciphertext which is created 
after he is revoked. While backward secrecy means that the new user are able to 
decrypt the data stored in the cloud before their participation. 
Along with these basic security requirements, we consider some general security 
features as scalability, availability and mobile access. Scalability can be achieved by 
allowing multiple devices/users to be connected to a cloud application 
simultaneously, while the security of all sessions is maintained. In addition, in an 
enterprise system, users may be created or removed at great frequency, and 
communication costs related to key management scale accordingly. Availability can 
be achieved in terms of key distribution services and availability of cloud servers. 
Key management services must always be available to users to ensure uninterrupted 
communication and continuity of cloud services. Mobile access should consider the 
challenges associated with mobile devices in terms of network rate limitations, 
intermittent connectivity and processing capabilities. 
4.4 Design Goals 
In this section, we present the technical details of our cloud-based data sharing 
framework, in which outsourced data, access control policy and identity attributes of a 
user are considered as confidential information. The proposed framework shall ensure 
that outsourced data can only be accessed (decrypted) by authorized users, and during the 
whole process cloud server is unable to learn any useful information that can lead to a 
potential privacy breach. To achieve the privacy of these components, our scheme 
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processes the data in three fundamental steps: data outsourcing, file access and 
revocation.  
Notation Description 
CA Certificate Authority 
AA Attribute Authority 
Λ Security Parameter 
GPP Global Public Parameter 
GMSK Global Master Key of the system 
     Attribute Universe 
Uid User unique identifier 
Aid Attribute Authority unique identifier 
   u-th Owner/User 
   k-th attribute authority 
   Set of attributes that user    possesses 
   Set of attributes that user    possesses as claim attributes 
Ÿ Claim predicate 
Ā Access Policy 
H Hash function 
CT Ciphertext 
T Timestamp 
T Access structure(Access control) 
   the encryption set ,  set of  AAs from the   involved in the encryption 
   set of all attribute authorities 
   set of all users 
F Data File 
DEK Encryption symmetric key 
         Set of attributes  that describes the user  in an attribute authority       
H(C) Hashed Ciphertext 
δ Signature 
      Revoked attribute from user(uid) from attribute authority       
(     ,     ) Attribute’s authority Private/Public Key Pair 
(      ,       ) User’s Global Public Keys 
(      ,       ) User’s Global Secret Keys 
      User Certification 
                  Public attribute keys of all the attributes managed by       
                  Attribute version keys of all the attributes managed by       
          Secret key update 
          Ciphertext update key 





4.4.1 Data confidentiality against cloud 
 Data Confidentiality  
To our knowledge, there is still no purely software based solution for 
providing complete confidentiality for data stored on a public cloud from a 
potentially un-trustworthy cloud provider. Therefore, in this thesis, we propose a 
whole service that allows users to protect their data. The service protects user's 
data before uploading it to the cloud by an encryption service and decrypts it after 
it is downloaded from the cloud by decryption service. Our service can be either 
employed locally or build on top of a cloud storage service as a layer of 
protection. Since users' data does not have the same level of importance, users can 
divide data into three categories based on its sensitivity (i) not sensitive, (ii) 
moderately sensitive and (iii) highly sensitive. According to these three levels of 
trust, user can either use the service locally or remotely on top of the cloud 
storage. The service can employed locally if the user does not trust the cloud or 
any trusted third party for his data and his keys. While he uses it remotely when 
the user trusts the trusted third party for managing the service remotely but does 
not trust the cloud service provider. The trusted third party service does not store 
users' data, it only stores the encryption and decryption keys that shall be used in 
uploading and downloading user’s data. These keys are critical components that 
should be handled securely, therefore, we store them separately using a Hardware 
Security Module (HSM) or other secure elements, as smart card, TPM or secure 
USB token or ARM TrustZone technology, which provide mobile device 
hardware-based key management [197]. In addition, offering a flat encryption 
schemes without looking at the importance of data by  applying the same 
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encryption algorithm for all types of data  make the client(third party software 
service) machine suffer from huge computation cost[198][199][200]. Not all data 
offers the same value and not all require the same degree of protection even if it is 
encrypted locally on user machine. Therefore, the data need to be encrypted with 
the different encryption algorithms.  
Consider the following example as an illustration of how the service works. 
When a user Alice wants to upload her data to the cloud, she will choose either to 
use the service locally or remotely. In both cases the user is requested to choose 
the level of sensitivity of the data. Next, TTP will chose symmetric encryption 
algorithm according to the level of sensitivity and create encryption keys 
accordingly. After that, the service uses this symmetric key to encrypt the 
uploaded data. After the encryption, the service encrypts the symmetric key with 
access control key according to user's privilege (we will explain in details this 
point in the next section).The user only stores the key and uploads the data to the 
cloud for storage. On the other hand, when Alice wants to download a file from 
the cloud, the data decryption service will get the key related to the file, and then 
use the key to decrypt the download, then Alice gets the plaintext. The details of 
this operation will be presented in the next section. 
 
 Analysis 
The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement stated above, because 
all user sensitive data sent to the CSP are encrypted. Therefore, the cloud has no 
access to plaintext. In addition, the decryption keys are stored in hardware device 
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which make it inaccessible to the attacker. Moreover, this solution allows all 
cloud users to access data from anywhere and from any device allowing mobile 
users with limited capabilities to securely store their data in cloud. 
As listed in assumptions above, to ensure data confidentiality in transmission, 
we make use of the SSL/TLS protocol for encrypting transmissions. This protocol 
to great extend overcome the network attacks as web spoofing and man-in-the-
middle (MITM) attacks [83]. 
 
4.4.2 Data confidentiality against accesses beyond authorized rights 
 Fine grained access control 
In section 4.4.1, we provide a scheme to ensure data confidentiality by making the 
decryption keys inaccessible to attackers. However, there remain issues with sharing 
data with unauthorized users, efficiently revoking users’ privileges without re-
encrypting massive amounts of data and re-distributing the new keys to the authorized 
users, collusion between users. In the following subsections, we shall explore these 
issues. 
One of the most challenging issues in data sharing systems is the enforcement of 
access policies. Fine-grained data access control is essential in any cloud storage 
service where data is shared among multiple users with different levels of trust. 
However, in cloud storage service, the roles of the data owner are separate from the 
data service provider, and the data owner does not interact with the user directly for 
providing data access service. Moreover, the cloud server cannot be fully trusted by 
data owners and traditional server-based access control methods are no longer 
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applicable to cloud storage systems. Therefore, fine-grained data access control with 
effective management of rights is considered a challenging issue in cloud storage 
systems.  
 To achieve these goals, we propose a novel data sharing protocol by combining 
and exploiting two of the latest attribute based cryptographic techniques, ciphertext 
policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) [124] and attribute-based signature (ABS) 
[214]. Based on multi-authority ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (MA CP-
ABE) in [18] [204] and attribute-based signature (ABS) in [205] [153] [155], we 
provide fine-grained attribute-based access control scheme for multi authority cloud 
storage applications with flexible many-write-many-read framework while placing 
minimal trust on the cloud storage server to ensure data confidentiality. In our 
proposed scheme, initially, the data owner defines two flexible access policies over 
descriptive attributes (read access structure and write access structure). Then he calls 
the service to encrypt the data before uploading it to the cloud severs. The service in 
turn encrypts the data with symmetric key and encrypts the key by MA-CP-ABE 
according read access structure Ā and then signs the encrypted file by user's write 
access policies (access structure) Ÿ. In order to prevent reply attack, we add a period 
of validity t (timestamp) along with hashed ciphertext to prevent malicious reader 
from impersonating the valid writer by uploading an old version encrypted file with its 
old signature which was signed by a former writer to the cloud storage server is valid. 
Next, the TTP sends encrypted outsourced data      , the attribute based encrypted 
decryption key                , signature and claim predicate Ÿ to the cloud storage 
server. The cloud verifies the authenticity of the user without knowing the user's 
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identity before storing information by verifying the signature. If it is a valid signature, 
the cloud stores the ciphertext (CT) along with the encrypted key, otherwise reject. 
The cloud shall use the claim-predicate Ÿ to verify the modified file that will be 
uploaded after a write operation.  Later on, whenever the owner wants to share the data 
with any user, he defines the set of attributes the user is allowed to access (either for 
read or write) and send it to the different authorities to create decryption keys that the 
user shall use to access the data. A user is authorized to access the data only if he 
possesses proper attributes which satisfy the access policy deployed in the data.   
 
At a system level, we are interested in the following high level operations: File 
Creation, User Grant, and File Access. 
1. New File creation 
The file creation process passes with two phases: Encrypt Phase and Sign Phase 
Encrypt Phase:  
Step 1: Data owner selects the file along with sensitivity level to be uploaded, defines 
a set of attributes   for read access policy and a set of attributes   for write claim 
predicate  
Step 2: It sends the file with its sensitivity level along with read access policy and 
write claim predicate to trusted third party (TTP) service. 
Step 3:  TTP service asks the different authorities for the related public/secret keys for 
access policy and claim predicate based on their attributes. 
Step 4: Each AA run SKeyGen algorithm and return related secret keys and public 
keys for both access policy (Ā) and claim predicate (Ÿ) 
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Step 5: (TTP) service generates a symmetric key according to the sensitivity level.  
Step 6: The TTP service encrypts data file (F) with symmetric key (DEK) and 
encrypts DEK with the different authorities' public keys              producing 
ciphertext CT. 
CT             CP-ABE.Encrypt(GPP,             ,DEK , Ā ) 
 
Sign Phase 
 After the encryption, the TTP signs the CT both for reader/writer differentiation and 
for providing integrity verification to all parties that want to access the file.  
Step 7: TTP service first hashes the CT which is generated in the Encrypt Phase to 
produce (H(c)). A timestamp is attached with hash code to prevent replay attacks 
(H(c) ||t). 
 
Step 8: The hash is then signed by the secret key of claim predicate (Ÿ) to produce 
the signature δ 
δ           CP-ABS.Sign(GPP, h(CT)|| t, Ÿ ,              ,(       
,       ),         ) 
 
Step 9:  After the Encrypt Phase and Sign Phase, trusted third party service will send 
the ciphertext CT, the attribute based encrypted decryption key                  
  , 
the signature δ, period of validity t and claim predicate Ÿ {    ,                   
, δ , 




Step 10: The owner will upload {   ,                  
, δ , t , Ÿ } to the cloud storage 
provider (CSP).  
 
Step 11: The cloud storage provider (CSP) first checks the validity of t with current 
time, and obtain all verification keys that corresponds to attributes depicted in the 
claim predicate Ÿ from the AAs, then verify the δ by the boolean value result 
R0→Verify (GPP, h(CT)|| t, δ, Ÿ ,               ) 
Step 12: If the signature is a valid signature, the CSP will accept the upload request 








2. New User Grant 
When a new user wants to join the system, he goes through the following steps: 
Step 1: the data owner defines the role of user and determines if he is a reader or 
writer and sends this information to attribute authorities (AAs). 
Step 2: The user send his certificate to AAs to get his designated keys  
Step 3:  Each AA validates the signature to check if the user is a legal user or not. 
Step 4: If the user is a legal user, then each AA will assign him an attribute set S that 
is related to his identity/role in its administration domain. Otherwise, it aborts.  
Step 5: Each AA runs the SKeyGen algorithm to generate all secret key components 
for the user. If the user is a reader, he will only receive secret key components to 
decrypt the ciphertext. If he is a writer, he will receive secret key components to 
decrypt the data. In addition to, secret key components to sign the data. 
Step 6: After the user receives the key, he is able to either read or write to data files 









3. File Access(read/write) 
Whenever a user wants to read the file, he processes as follows: 
Step 1: The reader request the file from the CSP 
Step 2: the cloud sends the file {CT,                  
, δ , t , Ÿ }  to the reader 
Step   3: the user sends {CT,                 
, δ , t , Ÿ }  to TTP    
Step4: TTP request corresponding public keys from AA to verify signature (δ)  
  R1→Verify (GPP, h(CT)|| t, δ, Ā ,               ) 
Step 4: If the signature is valid, the TTP uses user's secret keys (                    
to decrypt attribute based encrypted decryption key                and get 
symmetric decryption key   .  Otherwise, abort. 
Step 5: The TTP decrypts encrypted file CT using symmetric decryption key      to 
obtain plaintext F. 




Figure 4-7: Read File 
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Whenever a user wants to update a file, he processes as follows: 
Step 1: download the file as a reader (Same steps as stated above) to get plaintext. 
 Step 2: The user encrypts the plaintext F as in the encryption phase producing CT1 
Step 3: Then the user sign the CT1 as in sign phase producing new signature δ1 with 
a new timestamp 
Step 4: upload the updated encrypted file CT1, the attribute based encrypted 
decryption key               , the new signature δ1 with a new timestamp t1and 
claim predicate       to the cloud storage provider (CSP).  
Step 5: The cloud storage provider (CSP)  will first check the validity of t1, then 
verify the δ1 by the Ÿ and verification keys  to check if the user is able to update the 
file according to his secret keys or not. 
Step 6: If the user is valid user, the updated file will be stored on the cloud otherwise 




Figure 4-8: Write to file 
Page 161 
 
 Analysis  
The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement in section 4.3. Fine-grain 
access control is achieved by employing multi-authority ciphertext policy attribute-
based encryption (MA CP-ABE). MA CP-ABE defines each user access structure as a 
logic formula over data file attributes that represents any desired data file set. Instead 
of defining permissions based on roles as role based access control [118] or attach a 
list of privileged users to each file as in access control lists (ACL)[117], user files are 
described in terms of  attributes in attribute-based encryption (ABE). Attributes are 
any bit of data, or label that describes a user, resource, target, object, environment, or 
action. In ABE, the file is encrypted once under the access policy and decrypted many 
by different users, each carrying a decryption key corresponding to access privileges 
(Appendix A). In this work, we have used a variant of attribute-based encryption 
(ABE) which is ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE). In CP-ABE 
enables data owners to define their own access policies over user attributes and 
enforce the policies on the data to be distributed. In CP-ABE scheme, there is an 
authority that is responsible for attribute management and key distribution. The 
authority can be the registration office in a university, the human resource department 
in a company, etc. The data owner defines the access policies and encrypts data under 
these policies. Each user will be issued a secret key according to his attributes. A user 
can decrypt the ciphertext only when his attributes satisfy the access policies. 
Moreover, in CP-ABE schemes, the access policy checking is implicitly conducted 
inside the cryptography. That is, there is no one to explicitly evaluate the policies and 
make decisions on whether allows the user to access the data [124], [125]. Therefore, 
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the data owners does not need to deal with any keys for data sharing. Despite the 
advantages associated with CP-ABE, one of the problems associated with CP-ABE is 
that the access structure, representing the security policy associated with the encrypted 
data, is not protected. Therefore, a curious storage provider might get information on 
the data by accessing the attributes expressed in the CP-ABE policies. The problem of 
having the access structure expressed in clear text affects in general all the CP-ABE 
constructions. Therefore, this mechanism is not suited for protecting the 
confidentiality of the access policies in an outsourced environment [206]. We solve 
this problem in our work [18] by implicitly associating the access structure inside the 
ciphertext. Furthermore, most of the existing CP-ABE schemes 
[26,114,127,129,131,132] have only one authority, which is responsible for issuing the 
secret keys for all users in the whole system. However, the applications in real world 
often require a user to obtain some attributes from different authorities (e.g., different 
government agencies, different commercial services he has subscribed to, different 
social networks he is registered with and so on) making it impractical to depend on a 
single authority. Moreover, single CP-ABE authority suffers from two drawbacks. The 
first one is that once the authority has been compromised, all secret keys are revealed. 
The second one is that it is difficult to find an authority trusted by all parties in large-
scale network environment. Therefore, in this thesis, we used multi-authority CP-
ABE. Several multi-authority attribute-based access control schemes [17,134-140] 
have been proposed. However, some of these [123,134,135] rely on a central authority 
(CA) to tie user's secret that are issued by different authorities for decrypting all 
ciphertexts. As a result, the CA has full control over user's data and is considered a 
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central point of failure. Another variant of MA CP-ABE, that  removes the global 
authority is found in[139][140].Although[139], requires no global authority, it cannot 
scale well because authorities communicates with each other for creating  the user's 
secret key  leading to collusion attacks if the number of authorities is less than two. 
Therefore, our work is based on [18], because it is scalable, requires no global 
authority and avoids collusion attacks (details in system design section). 
In addition, we delegate most of the computation load either to the cloud (as in 
revocation and write access enforcement) or to the trusted authorities (as it manages 
and distributes keys to users for data sharing). Furthermore, we provide a flexible 
many-write-many-read by combining and exploiting the CP-ABE and ABS. This 
many-write-many-read is designed to resist the replay attack by attaching a timestamp 
to the signature in order to prevent malicious reader from impersonating a valid writer 
by uploading an old version encrypted file with its old signature [205]. In addition, the 
insurance of data integrity is carried out by the cloud server whenever a user requests 
to update a file. This operation does not place any load on the owner because the ABS 
delegates the verification to the storage server. Moreover, users' data will not be leaked 
because it is stored in encrypted format no plain text is stored in the cloud. 
 
 Revocation 
Users may join and leave the system frequently, leading to constant key re-
generation and re-distribution through additional communication sessions to handle 
user revocation. In a highly scalable system composed of thousands of users as the 
cloud, such events may occur at relatively high frequency. Therefore, revocation is 
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considered a challenging issue in this many one-to-many communication system with 
the data encrypted once and decrypted many. In MA CP-ABE, this issue is even more 
difficult since each attribute is conceivably shared by multiple users and the attributes 
comes from different authorities. Revocation in ABE systems come into two flavors: 
user revocation, and attribute revocation. User revocation takes place when the user's 
attributes donor satisfy the access structure. On the other hand, attribute revocation 
takes place when one attribute is revoked from user attributes. The removal of one or 
more attribute from the user does not mean that the user cannot decrypt ciphertexts. 
The user can still decrypt ciphertexts even after the removal of a subset of his/her 
attributes as long as the remaining attributes satisfy the access policy. 
In this thesis, we propose a revocation approach for the multi-authority CP-ABE 
scheme. We want to support revocation process that removes the access from user 
either partially or totally without depending on the data owner for issuing new keys to 
other users or re-encrypting existing ciphertexts. Basing on the work in [19, 204, 18], 
we realize efficiently immediate attribute-level along with user revocation while 
achieving forward and backward secrecy. In our scheme, whenever an attribute 
revocation takes place, the corresponding attribute authority that possess this attribute 
generates a new version key for this revoked attribute and generates two update keys. 
One for non-revoked users whiles the other for updating ciphertext. By using their 
update key, the non-revoked users only updates the component associated with the 
revoked attribute in the secret key, while other components are kept unchanged. In 
this way, the used scheme can greatly improve the efficiency of attribute revocation. 
In addition, by this key updating process, the non-revoked users who hold the 
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revoked attributes update their secret key while revoked user do not. Hence forward 
security is achieved. On other hand, we make use of the abundant resources of the 
cloud to update the components associated with the revoked attribute in the 
ciphertext. We can do this by delegating the workload of updating attribute in the 
ciphertext to the server by using the proxy re-encryption. The goal of the proxy re-
encryption is to securely enable the re-encryption of ciphertexts from one secret key 
to another key without worrying about illegal users who can see the data. By 
delegation the ciphertext update to proxy server, newly joined users are able to 
decrypt the data stored in the cloud before their participation, which was encrypted 
with the previous public keys, if they have attributes satisfying the access policy 
(backward security). Furthermore, by updating the ciphertexts, user do not need to 
keep records on all the previous secret keys because they hold the latest secret, unlike 
traditional methods that  requires the user to keep record of re-generated keys 
distributed by the owner. In addition, delegation of ciphertext update to proxy 
eliminates the huge communication overhead between data owners and cloud server, 
and the heavy computation cost on data owners.  
 
Whenever an attribute revocation take place: Update Key Generation by AAs, 
Secret Key Update by Non-revoked Users (those users who possess the revoked 
attributes      but have not been revoked because their remaining attributes still 
satisfy the access structure) and Ciphertext Update by Server 
Step 1: The AA that possesses the revoked attribute will run UkeyGen algorithm 
to produce two update keys. 
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UkeyGen(           ,        ) → (        ) ,         ,          ) 
 One for  non-revoked uses to update their secret  keys, while the other is send to 
proxy server to re-encrypt all ciphertexts that contain this revoked attribute. 
 
Step 2: The non-revoked users run the SKUpdate algorithm to update his secret 
key to be able to decrypt the data files later after the revocation. 
 SKUpdate (         ,         ) →           
 
Step 3: The CSP will run CTUpdate algorithm to re-encrypt all ciphertexts that 
contain the revoked attribute. 
  CTUpdate(CT,         ) →CT" 
 
User revocation is set of attribute revocation calls, the number of calls depends on 
the minimum number of attributes that make the user unable to satisfy the access 
structure. Whenever the data owner wants to revoke a user, the attribute authority 
determines the minimal subset of attributes   without which he cannot access the 
data. Then, for each attribute in the attribute set  , the attribute authority performs an 
attribute revocation. Although, this method may incur huge computation overhead, 
however, the use of proxy servers in the cloud for updating ciphertext decreases much 






Whenever a user revocation take place: 
Step 1: The AAs will rum Aminimalset algorithm to get the minimum set of attributes 
that will make the user unable to decrypt the ciphertext. 
   AMinimalSet(T) →   
 
Step 2: For each attribute in the minimum attribute set, we perform an attribute 
revocation process. 
 
However, it is important to note that, whenever an attribute is removed from a 
user, all the ciphertext associated with this attribute shall be updated. Therefore, all 
re-encrypted data shall be signed with a new signature, since we do not trust the 
server for the signing process. The simple solution is to download all affected files 
and sign. However, this solution will incur high overhead on user. Therefore, we 
leave this problem as a future work and assume whenever a re-encryption takes place 





The proposed scheme satisfies the security requirement stated above in section 
4.3.To achieve forward security, in the secret key update phase, the corresponding 
AA generates an update key for each non-revoked user that  is associated with the 
user’s global identity uid. Since each non-revoked user updated key include his global 
identity uid which is unique for each user, the revoked user cannot use update keys of 
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other non-revoked users to update its own secret key, even if it can compromise some 
non-revoked users.  In addition, even if the revoked user was able to corrupt some 
other AAs (not the AA corresponding to the revoked attributes), the item in his secret 
key that distinguishes attributes from different AAs can prevent users from updating 
their secret keys with update keys of other users, since this item is only known by the 
authority and kept secret to all the users. On the other hand, the proposed scheme in 
[18] solves the collusion problem between users and attribute authorities and users 
and user. If a number of users collude together by combining their attributes to 
decrypt the ciphertext, they are not able to decrypt the ciphertext alone. Due to the 
random number t and the global identity of each authority id (aid)  that is embedded 
in  their secret key which makes  each component associated with the attribute in the 
secret key is distinguishable from each other, although some AAs may issue the same 
attributes. Furthermore, each user secret key is also associated with his globally 
unique identity uid. Thus, users cannot collude together to gain illegal access by 
combining their attributes together. 
 
4.4.3 Comparison with State-of-the-art Solutions 
 
 Data Confidentiality 
For data at rest, current cloud storage services provide their users with two 
solutions: server side encryption and client side encryption. For server side 
encryption, the data owner relies on the service for securing its data; however, this 
solution is not feasible for two reasons. The first reason is that the user will send his 
sensitive data in plaintext which exposes it to internal attacks where the attacker can 
exploit vulnerabilities of servers to achieve user’s data. While for the second reason, 
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there is no guarantee that the service will encrypt the data before storing it in the 
cloud. On the other hand, in client side encryption, the data owner encrypts his data 
locally on his machine by using either client side cloud storage service as wuala [102] 
or encryption software such as TrueCrypt or BoxCryptor[103][201]. Although, these 
solutions seem to solve the problem, they do not address all aspects of the problem. In 
encryption software such as TrueCrypt, user's data is encrypted using full-disk 
encryption (FDE) methodology which encrypts virtual hard disks that can be mounted 
into the user’s local file system and synchronized with. FDE is effective in protecting 
private data in certain scenarios such as stolen laptops and backup tapes; the concern 
is that it cannot fulfill data protection goals in the cloud, where physical theft is not 
the main threat. In addition, the encrypted data by itself is not feasible for sharing 
among users, these tools will not help much unless Encryption keys are shared among 
participating users over a secure out-of-band channel (or an elaborate PKI system is 
deployed). This is clearly a drawback in terms of usability [202]. Furthermore, these 
solutions have the drawback that the encryption and decryption process relies on 
software-based keys, which are stored on the respective client device and under some 
conditions could be accessible by unauthorized parties [103][201].  On the other hand, 
cloud storage services that provide client side encryption are not in a better situation, 
because the client software of these services may be exposed to the following threats: 
a) key disclosure: the client software uses the decryption key stored on user machine 
to decrypt the encrypted data send from the cloud storage provider to obtain the clear 
text. The client software might send this key to the provider or some other 
unauthorized party's; b) Manipulated file content: since these cloud services support 
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public key cryptography, the public keys of the users are known by some parties, 
including the provider. Server software may encrypt a malicious content making use 
of user's public key. The user can decrypt this content without detecting the fraud. 
This usually takes place because the data is usually not signed; c) the most dangerous 
threat that this solution exposed to is a secret agent working at the provider. This 
agent may be able to manipulate the client software. This agent can be used to inject 
malware in the customer's system [104,54] 
Even the most secure client side storage service, Wuala, which supports convergent 
encryption [213] for securing files and optimizing storage by using de-duplication, 
suffers from confirmation of a file attack. In this attack, the attacker can effectively 
confirm whether a target possesses a certain file by encrypting an unencrypted, or 
plain-text, version and then simply comparing the output with files possessed by the 
target exposing user's data to dangers [203]. Therefore, most security experts advise 
cloud users who want to store their data in the cloud without any leakage to encrypt 
the data locally before uploading it to the cloud. Although, this method ensures that 
the data and the keys will not be leaked, it will not be feasible as it will incur too 
much burden to the client in terms of key management and maintenance, especially, if 
the user stores huge amount of data in the cloud. 
From the previous, we note that the current solutions offered by cloud storage 
services for ensuring data confidentiality are not sufficient. We address the state of 
the art problem by transferring the trust to a trusted third party service (TTP). This 
service acts as middleware between the cloud and the user where it offer a level of 
trust between user and cloud. Although, it is not an optimal solution, but it tries to 
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achieve sufficient level of security while it maintains performance. This service can 
be managed locally on users' machine for those who do not trust anyone for their data 
and remotely for others. In addition, the user can encrypt each file separately taking 
an advantage over encryption software that encrypts the full disk. The user can also 
store his data keys on hardware devices that make it to great extent inaccessible to 
attacks taking advantage over client side storage service. Moreover, the service offers 
better performance by providing different levels of encryptions for data uploaded to 
the cloud. It also reduces the load for managing keys if the users encrypt the data by 
themselves. Furthermore, it can be used by devices with limited capabilities as 
mobiles. These devices can make use of the two varieties of service either by 
employing it or using it remotely. 
 
 
 Fine Grain Access Control 
Existing cloud storage services only provide basic access control mechanisms, 
and the limited research on secure, shared cloud repositories often require extensive 
deployment of infrastructure services that undermines their manageability. To prevent 
the un-trusted servers from accessing sensitive data, traditional methods usually rely 
on the data owners for encrypting files by using the symmetric encryption approach 
with content keys and then use every user’s public key to encrypt the content keys 
and only users holding valid keys can access the data. These methods require 
complicated key management schemes and the data owners have to stay online all the 
time to deliver the keys to new user in the system. Moreover, these methods incur 
high storage overhead on the server, because the server should store multiple 
encrypted copies of the same data for users with different keys. This methodology 
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cannot be used with cloud storage sharing services that separates the roles of the data 
owner from the data service provider. In addition, it did not provide direct interaction 
between the data owner and the user directly for providing data access service 
[128,207-209]. Another prevalent methodology for enforcing access control policy is 
to provide the remote cloud server the power of key management and distribution 
under the assumption that the server is trusted or semi-trusted. However, the server 
cannot be trusted by the data owners in cloud storage systems and thus these methods 
cannot be applied to access control for cloud storage systems [210-211] 
From the previous we note that, our proposed scheme provides a better way for 
ensuring the data confidentiality against service provider since cloud storage services 
have no access to plain text. Moreover, cloud storage services have no knowledge 
about user access privilege information, it only performs computational tasks. In 
addition, users (data owner/data users) are able to share data without direct interaction 
and without managing any data or control access keys. Furthermore, our approach 
allows only authorized users to have access to the shared files. In addition, our 
approach provides a flexible many-write-many-read method for data sharing where 
owners neither need to be always online nor need to distribute any credentials to other 
users individually. Compared with the current commercial cloud-based file sharing 
services, our solution provides a novel fine-grained access control mechanism to the 
file sharing services which enables real-life development of secure service. Since, the 
current cloud-based file sharing services offered by the cloud storage services did not 
provide a good means for securing data or ensuring data confidentiality against 
accesses beyond authorized rights. Most of these cloud storage services did not 
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include the file sharing feature [211,212]. However, those who support file sharing 
are able to view either the plaintexts of data files or user access structure or both. 
Even the most secure ones as wuala [102] still suffer from data leakage. In these 
secure cloud-based file sharing service (e.g. wualaa) the inviting user ask the service 
for the public key of the invitee. Then the inviting encrypts the decryption key by the 
invitee public key and sends this cryptogram to the provider which in turn sends the 
cryptogram to the invitee. However, this idea seems to be good, there is a problem 
associated with solution. The problem is that the inviting user can not verify the 
authenticity of invitee's key, because there is no independent public key 
infrastructure. So in the worst case, the inviting user encrypts the decryption key for 





The state-of-the-art MA CP-ABE schemes provide limited support for key 
revocation. Several multi-authority attribute-based access control schemes 
[134,139,140] lack revocation approach. On the other hand, others support revocation 
schemes that lack efficiency as in [137].In [137], the revocation can take place by any 
user with re-encryption privilege to re-define the access policy. He then recovers the 
plaintext message before re-encrypting. This method affects the confidentiality of the 
data and is not suitable and efficient in the cloud. Although, our proposed 
methodology is not the most efficient one to resolve the revocation problem, we try to 
propose a system that maintains the tradeoff between performance and security. In 
our scheme, we combine both user revocations along with attribute revocation 
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without leaking any information to server about revoked users and decreasing the 
computation cost, unlike [145,146] that delegate key updating to server which may 
not be appropriate for protecting the users’ privacy and the data security because the 
cloud maintain user revocation lists containing information about revoked users. Our 
method only makes use of cloud for ciphertext update. However, our attribute as user 
revocation put some burden on attribute authorities for computing new update key for 
each unrevoked user even if the attribute is revoked from only one user. Our solution 
tries to maintain the tradeoff between performance and security. 
 
 
4.5 Detailed Description of the Proposed Architecture Algorithms 
 
Our framework for securing data in cloud storage while maintaining access control scheme is a 
collection of algorithms. These algorithms combine a set of multi-authority CP-ABE algorithms 
along with ABS algorithms. These algorithms are: CASetup, AASetup, AARegistration, 
UserRegister, KeyGen, Encrypt, Decrypt, Sign, and Verify. 
 
General Overview 
i. System Initialization 
The system initialization phase contains Certificate Authority setup and Attribute 
Authorities setup 
a) Certificate Authority Setup 
 
CASetup (λ) → (GMSK, GPP, {(      ,       ), (      ,       ), 
     (uid)}) 
The CA setup algorithm is run by the CA. It takes no input other than the implicit 
security parameter λ. It generates the global master key GMSK of the system and 
the global public parameters GPP. For each user uid, it generates the user’s global 
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public keys (      ,       ), the user’s global secret keys (      ,       ) 
and a certificate      (uid) of the user. 
 
b) Attribute Authorities Setup 
 
AASetup(    )→(     ,     ,{                        ) 
The attribute authority setup algorithm is run by each attribute authority. It takes 
the attribute universe     managed by the      as input. It outputs a secret and 
public key pair (     ,     ,) of the      and a set of version keys and public 
attribute keys                          for all the attributes managed by the 
      . 
 
ii. Secret Key Generation 
SKeyGen(GPP,      ,       ,       ,       ,        ,                         ) 
→          
The secret key generation algorithm is run by each AA. It takes as inputs the global 
public parameters GPP, the global public keys (      ,         and one global secret 
key       of the user uid, the secret key of the attribute authority (        , a set of 
attributes          that describes the user uid in that attribute authority       and their 
corresponding version keys and public attribute keys {             }. It outputs a secret 
key          for the user uid which is used for decryption. 
 
iii. Data Encryption and Signature by Owners 
Encrypt(GPP,             , DEK, Ā )→CT. 
The encryption algorithm is run by the third party software service to encrypt the content 
keys. It takes as inputs the global public parameters GPP, a set of public keys 
             } for all the AAs in the encryption set   ,  the content key DEK and an 
access policy Ā. The algorithm encrypts DEK according to the access policy and outputs 
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a ciphertext CT. We will assume that the ciphertext implicitly contains the access policy 
A. 
Sign(GPP,H(C)|| t , Ÿ ,              ,(       ,       ),         )→δ 
The signing algorithm is run by third party software service. It takes as inputs the global 
public parameters GPP, message M(hashed CT) , claim predicate Ÿ, set of public keys 
             } for all the AAs in the signing set   , and all corresponding user keys as 
input. Then it returns signature δ if user's attribute set satisfies claimed access structure. 
Otherwise, it returns null. 
 
iv. Data Decryption and Verification  by Users 
All the legal users in the system can freely query any interested encrypted data. Upon 
receiving the data from the server, the user runs the verify algorithm to verify the data, if 
the verifications succeed. The user runs the Decrypt algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext 
by using its secret keys from different AAs. Only if the attributes the user possesses 
satisfy the access structure defined in the ciphertext CT, the user can get the content key. 
 
Verify (GPP, M, δ, Ÿ ,               )→{valid, invalid} 
The verification algorithm is run by any user/server who wants to verify whether attribute 
set of user satisfies claimed access structure Ā. It takes as inputs the global  public 
parameters GPP, message M , claim predicate, signature δ , and all public keys 
                as input, then returns one bit to tell whether the signature is valid or not.  
 
Decrypt (CT,       ,       ,                  ) →DEK. 
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The decryption algorithm is run by users to decrypt the ciphertext. It takes as inputs the 
ciphertext CT which contains an access policy A, a global public key        and a 
global secret key         of the user uid, and a set of secret keys                     
from all the involved AAs. If the attributes                    of the user uid satisfy the 
access policy A, the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return the content key DEK 
 
v. User/Attribute Revocation 
The revocation comes in two forms: user revocation and attribute revocation. Attribute 
revocation consists of  three steps: Update Key Generation by AAs, Secret Key Update 
by Non-revoked Users(those users who possess the revoked attributes      but have not 
been revoked  because their remaining attributes still satisfy the access structure) and 
Ciphertext Update by Server. On the other hand, user revocation has the same three steps 
in attribute revocation, in addition to, minimalset which determining the minimal set of 
attributes with which the users cannot access the data. 
 
UkeyGen(           ,        ) → (        ) ,         ,          ) 
The update key generation algorithm is run by the corresponding       that manages the 
revokedattribute      . It takes as inputs the secret key       of      , the revoked 
attribute       and its current version key       . It outputs a new version key         and 
the update key          (for secret key update) and the update key          .(for ciphertext 
update). 
 
SKUpdate (         ,         ) →           
The secret key update algorithm is run by each non-revoked user uid. It takes as inputs 
the current secret key of the non-revoked user           and the update key         . It 





CTUpdate(CT,         ) →CT" 
The ciphertext update algorithm is run by the cloud proxy server. It takes as inputs the 
ciphertexts which contain the revoked attribute      , and the update key          . It 
outputs new ciphertexts CT" which contain the latest version of the revoked attribute 
     . 
 
AMinimalSet(T) →   
The AMinimalSet is run by AAs. It takes as input an access tree T. It finds a minimal 
subset of attributes without which T will never be satisfied. It outputs the minimum set of 
attributes that restrict user access to the data file  . 
 
 
Details of the construction 
 
I. System Initialization  
 
a) Certificate Authority Setup 
Let    and    denote the set of attribute authorities and the set of users in the 
system respectively. Let Ԍ and    be the multiplicative groups with the same 
prime order p and e: G×G→  be the bilinear map. Let g be the generator of G. 
Let H {0, 1}∗→G be a hash function that matches the string to an element in G, 




The  certificate authority (CA) sets up the system by running the CA setup 
algorithm (CASetup), which takes a security parameter λ as input. The CA first 
chooses two multiplicative groups G and GT with the same prime order p and a 
bilinear map e such that e:G×G→GT. It also chooses a hash function H: 
{0,1}∗→G that matches the string to an element in G. Then, the CA chooses two 
random numbers a, b    as the global master key GMSK=(a,b) of the system and 
computes the global public parameters as GPP = ( ,   ,   , ,H).  
After creation of the system public/secret keys, the CA is ready to accept both 
User Registration and AA Registration. 
 
1) User Registration: When a user joins the system, the CA first authenticates this 
user. If the user is an authorized user in the system, the CA will  assign him a 
globally unique user identifier uid .After that, the CA  generates two random 
numbers     ,          in order to create the user's global secret keys as 
(      ,       ). It then generates the user’s global public keys as 
(      ,       ) for each user with unique identifier (uid). In addition, the CA 
generates a certificate      (uid) for each user. Then, it sends one of the user’s 
global public keys        , one global secret key         and the Certificate 
     (uid)  to the user. 
 
2) AA Registration: Each AA should register itself to the CA during the system 
initialization. If the AA is a legal authority in the system, the CA will assign it a 
global attribute authority identifier aid. After that, the CA sends the other global 
public/secret key of each user (        ,      ) to the      together with the 
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system global public parameter GPP. It also sends a verification key to the       
which can be used to verify the certificates of users issued by the CA. 
 
b) Attribute Authorities Setup 
 
  Let      represent the set of attributes managed by each attribute authority       
(          . Each     (k    ) runs the authority setup algorithm AASetup. It 
chooses three random numbers                  as the authority secret 
key     .It also generates        as its public key. In addition, for each attribute 
    ∈    , the      generates a public attribute key       by implicitly 
choosing an attribute version key      . All the public attribute keys 
                  along with the public key      of the      are published on 
the public bulletin board of the       . 
II. Secret Key Generation 
For each user      (uid∈  ) and each authority      (aid∈  ), the user has to 
authenticate himself to an       to prove that he is a legal user before he can be 
entitled some attributes from that     . The user authenticate himself as a legal 
user by submitting his certificate      (uid) to the      . The       then 
authenticates the user by using the verification key issued by the CA. If the user is 
a legal one, the       entitles a set of attributes         to the user uid according 
to its role or identity in its administration domain. Otherwise, it aborts. After that, 




III. Data Encryption and Signature by Owners 
Before uploading the data ( m)  to cloud servers. Data owner first encrypts the 
data (m) with content keys (DEK) by using symmetric encryption algorithm, then 
he runs the encryption algorithm Encrypt to encrypt the content key. It takes as 
inputs the as inputs the global public parameters GPP, a set of public keys 
             } for all the AAs in the encryption set   , the content key DEK and 
the access policy (M,ρ) over all the involved attributes. 
 
Let M be a ʃ ×  n matrix, where ʃ denotes the total number of all the attributes. 
The function ρ maps each row of M to an attribute. To encrypt the content key κ, 
the encryption algorithm first chooses a random encryption exponent s   and 
chooses a random vector v = (s,    ....,  ) ∈  
 , where    ....,   are used to share 
the encryption exponent s. For i = 1 to ʃ, it computes  
  = v ·   , where    is the vector corresponding to the i-th row of M. Then, it 
randomly chooses    ....,      and computes the ciphertext CT. 
 
It is important to note that, the encryption set    consists of a set of  AAs from the 
   that are involved in the encryption, because not all the attributes of the access 
structure come from all AAs. In addition, we assume that the ciphertext implicitly 
contains the access policy in order prevent malicious CSP from deducing any 





IV. User/Attribute Revocation 
Attribute Revocation 
Let      denotes the revoked attribute and     
  denotes the revoked user. Suppose an 
attribute      is revoked from the user    
 , the revocation method performs the 
following three steps: 
 
1) Update Key Generation 
In this step, the        generates new version key for revoked attribute, update key 
for non-revoked users and an update key of ciphertext update  to enable the users 
access the file after and the revocation. By theses update keys the revoked user is not 
able to access the file because his keys are obsolete and are cannot to decrypt the 
ciphertext. On the other hand, non-revoked users can access the file after updating 
their secret keys. 
When an attribute      is revoked from the user   
 , the corresponding authority 
      that governs this attribute runs the update key generation algorithm UKeyGen 
to compute the update keys. The algorithm takes as inputs the secret key 
      of      , the revoked attribute     . It then generates a unique update key 
         for secret key update by each non-revoked user uid and generates the update 
key           for ciphertext update. 
Next, the       sends the           to non-revoked user uid and sends        . To the 
cloud proxy server. 
Then, the       updates the public attribute key of the revoked attribute       and 
publishes it on its public bulletin board. Then, the       broadcasts a message for all 




2) Secret Key Update by Non-revoked Users 
In this step, the non-revoked user receives the update key      
       
 from the 
corresponding      . After that, he updates his/her secret key by running the new 
secret key update algorithm SKUpdate. The algorithm takes the non-revoked user's 
current secret key             and the update key                        and outputs a 
new secret key            for the non-revoked user uid.  
It is important to know that, this algorithm only updates the component associated 
with the revoked attribute      in the secret key, while other components are kept 
unchanged. 
 
3) Ciphertext Update by Cloud Server 
In this step, the cloud server receives the update key          .from the 
corresponding      . Next, it forwards it to the proxy server, which in turn, runs the 
ciphertext update algorithm CTUpdate to update the ciphertext associated with the 
revoked attribute      . The algorithm takes the current version of ciphertext (CT) that 
is  associated with the revoked attribute       and the update key                       
and outputs a new ciphertexts  CT" which contain the latest version of the revoked 
attribute      . 
User Revocation 
The user revocation is set of attribute revocation calls with the outputs minimum 
number of attributes that make the user unable to satisfy the access structure. 
Whenever the data owner wants to revoke a user, the         runs the AMinimalSet 
algorithm to get minimal subset of attributes   without which he cannot access the 
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data. This algorithm takes as input an access tree T and outputs minimal subset of 
attributes   without which T will never be satisfied. For each attribute in the attribute 
set  , the        perfroms an attribute revocation. 
 
4.6 Security Analysis 
To validate the conceptual design presented earlier, a security proof (analysis) has 
been constructed. Through this security proof (analysis), we shall investigate the 
possibility of attacks from unauthorized users and cloud service provider to gain access to 
the outsourced data that they are not allowed to access. The security proof investigates 
the proposed scheme on each step of its fundamental steps.   
 
1. Data initialization and Key generation  
In multi-authority CP-ABE, user keys come from different authorities. Therefore, 
user's secret keys must be tied together for the same user without exposing it to any 
collusion attacks. The collusion attacks in multi-authority environment appear in the 
following cases: users collude with each other or with attribute authorities. In this thesis, 
based on [18], these issues are resolved. This work is able to tie secret keys using by 
employing a certificate authority (CA), which is not involved in any creation of secret 
keys or management of attributes. The certificate authority (CA) is responsible only for 
issuing global keys and global unique identities to legal users and authorities along with 
global master key GPMK. Since each user has a unique global identifier uid and, secret 
keys issued by different AAs for the same uid can be tied together for decryption without 
the need for a central authority as in [134]. Therefore, a colluding user cannot combine 
his secret keys from a certain set of  authorities with another user who has enough keys 
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from the other authorities to decrypt the ciphertext, because each key  has its user identity 
(uid)  embedded inside so different key from different users cannot make up user secret 
key. In addition, each user key contains a random number t for randomizing the key.  Due 
to this random number t and the AA global identifier aid, each component associated 
with the attribute in the secret key is distinguishable from each other. Therefore, users 
and authorities cannot collude by combine their keys to get access to user's data, even if 
some AAs may issue the same attributes. Furthermore,  the CA do not have full control 
over encrypted data, because its GPMK is a share of  the key not the whole key as in 
[134].In[134], user's data  are encrypted with system unique public key (generated by the 
unique master key) that is owned by central authority. Therefore, the central authority 
[134] has full control over encrypted data. However, CA it is considered a single point of 
failure and if it is corrupted, the whole system will be totally down. Therefore, we assume 
it is it fully trusted and we can use a backup for the CA, to avoid the single point of 
failure issue.  
Moreover, each user is issued a certificate from the CA that it is presented to AA for 
requesting the secret keys. The AA validates this certificate using the verification keys 
issued from CA before issuing any keys to users. By doing his validation step, we prevent 
any user from using a fake uid to request a decryption keys from AAs. 
In addition, this certificate prevents attribute authorities from colluding with each 
other, because, users do not present their unique identifiers to every authority for 
requesting the key. However, they just submit their certificate. This certificate is a 
pseudonym based on user unique identifier that proves to the attribute authority that he 
has this uid, without revealing the uid itself. 
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2. File creation 
Initially, the trusted third party (TTP) service encrypts users data using a symmetric 
key selected by the user according to sensitivity of data either locally or remotely. The 
keys are stored on a hardware device which makes them it hard to for attackers to break. 
3.  File access 
Our design offers two-layer encryption for data before outsourcing it to the cloud. 
The data is encrypted according to the level of sensitivity chosen using a symmetric key 
algorithm by TTP. Then, the encryption key is encrypted with MA- CP-ABE secret key. 
After that, the encrypted outsourced data      , the attribute based encrypted decryption 
key                , encrypted decryption key, signature and claim predicate      are 
uploaded to the cloud. In order for the adversary to extract any information about F, he 
has to decrypt DEK firstly in order to extract any information about F. However, such 
session key (DEK) is encrypted with the access control policy (τ) it would further require 
MA-CP-ABE secret key (SK) that can satisfy (τ).  Since, SK is only shared with the 
legitimate users by the data owner, the computational complexity for an attacker would 
be equal to deciphering CP-ABE without SK. Actually, MA-CP-ABE  used in this thesis 
is provably secure under [125] given the decisional q-parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman 
Exponent (q-parallel BDHE) problem is hard. Therefore, the intuitive scheme is secure 
under the same model. Since the ciphertext implicitly contains the access policy (τ), the 
attackers cannot track the user or infer the sensitivity of ciphertext by eavesdropping the 
access policies. Furthermore, unauthorized users cannot update any file, because any user 
must be authenticated he to the cloud by providing the secret keys that satisfy its claim 
predicate     . Since these users cannot present these credentials to the cloud, they are not 
allowed to update the file. Therefore the message integrity with non-repudiation can be 
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provided by our proposed scheme. Moreover, our proposed scheme is resistant to replay 
attacks, because, whenever a revoked writer or a reader tries to write data to file by 
uploading an old version encrypted file with an old signature which was signed by a 
former writer to the cloud storage server, they are not able to replace data with stale 
information from previous writes. This is because of the period of validity t (time stamp) 
associated with each file. So, any write operation has to attach a new time stamp τ and 
sign the message H(C) ||τ again. Since they do not have valid attributes, they are not able 
to create a valid signature. 
 
4.  User revocation 
Our scheme can achieve forward security whenever attribute or user revocation takes 
place. Upon the revocation of an attribute, the attribute authorities generate update keys 
for non-revoked users to update their current key with the new version key for the 
revoked attribute. Since the updated key includes the user’s global identity uid, only non-
revoked users can update their keys. On the other hand, the revoked users cannot make 
use of these keys to update their secret key as it does not include   their (uid) s. Moreover, 
the revoked user cannot collude with other attribute authorities to get the updated key, 
because each attribute authority has a secret random number  
   
 that is used for attribute 
revocation embedded in its secret key. Therefore, whenever, an attribute revocation take 
place, the AA generates update keys to non-revoked including this random number 
making colluding an authority with another an impossible task.  
The proposed scheme achieves backward security by utilizing the attribute version 
key. After each attribute revocation process, the revoked attribute version key is updated. 
Any new user joining the system will be assigned secret keys associated with these 
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attributes with the latest version. By using proxy server, the previously published 
ciphertexts that was encrypted under attributes with old version with be re-encrypted into 
the latest attribute version. Therefore, any new user who joins the system can still decrypt 
previously published ciphertexts, if their attributes can satisfy access policies associated 
with ciphertexts. Consequently, backward security satisfied. 
4.7 Discussions 
We compare our scheme with the two other access control schemes (in the table 
below) that are similar to ours. We will show that our scheme supports many features that 
the other schemes did not support. The three schemes support fine grain access control 
and multi-read-multi writes. However, they differ in that [167] and ours support MA- CP-
ABE, while [205] support single authority CP-ABE. Although [167] support 
decentralized CP-ABE, the decentralized CP-ABE algorithm that [167] is based on incurs 
a very significant loss in efficiency. This loss of efficiency is costly enough to limit the 
potential applications of fully secure system. In addition, it did not consider the collusion 
attack that takes place between authorities.  Our scheme support revocation operation that 
both [205] [167] did not consider. Moreover, both of the two schemes depend on owner 
for managing data encryption and decryption, unlike our scheme that rely on TTP to 






















Encryption Revocation Collusion 
Resistance 
[205] Yes Single Yes CP-
ABE 
Yes Owner No Partially 




Ours Yes Multi Yes CP-
ABE 
Yes TTP Yes Fully 
 
 
In the following lines, we shall investigate and analyze the requirements 
traceability. 
To achieve data confidentiality in transit in our design, we employed a SSL/TLS 
protocol in the communication channel between the cloud users and cloud service 
provider. Data confidentiality against cloud service provider is maintained by using a 
trusted third party service which encrypts the data before uploading it to the cloud and 
decrypt it upon user's request to access. Therefore, we are able to achieve data 
confidentiality at rest. In addition, the trusted third party stores user's encryption / 
decryption keys on hardware device to protect it for key snooping or stealing.  
For data integrity, the trusted third party service signs user's data with private keys 
issued from attribute authorities according to a claim predict defined by the data owner. 
The cloud service provider checks data integrity before storing it in the cloud by 
requesting the public keys from designated attribute authority in each upload process. 
By doing so, the data owners or writers are the only ones that have the privilege to 
modify the data. In addition, whenever, the data is downloaded from the cloud, the 
trusted third party service requests the public keys from designated attribute authority 
to verify consistent of updated data and detect any unauthorized modification.  
To achieve data confidentiality against accesses beyond authorized rights, trusted 
third party service encrypts user's data with public keys issued from attribute authorities 
according to the access policy defined by the data owner. The access policy is defined 
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at attribute level using multiple authority ciphertext policy attribute based encryption. 
Therefore, we achieve fine grained access control over encrypted data and allow 
authorized users only to have access to the data according their assigned attributes.  
To achieve effective and efficient revocation, the AAs generate update keys to 
update the keys of non-revoked users and update keys to re-encrypt data associated 
with revoked attributes. We delegate the task of re-encrypting the data to proxy servers 




5 Conclusion and Future Work  
Cloud storage services provide a cost effective solution to deal with the problem of on 
demand data accessibility. These services enable their subscribers to share, collaborate, 
archive and synchronize data across different devices and domain, without the concerns 
of data provisioning and availability. Cloud infrastructure associated with these services 
is owned, managed and operated by an un-trusted entity called cloud service provider 
(CSP). Since, CSP is in-charge of processing, persisting and provisioning of outsourced 
data there is a great deal of privacy concerns when confidential data is outsourced to such 
services. 
To ensure data privacy and confidentiality often cryptographic methodologies are 
employed (i.e., encryption algorithms); however, these methodologies are not enough to 
achieve fine-grained access control. Access control policies ensure fine-grained access 
control. However, conventional methodologies were designed to restrain illegal data 
access in a trusted domain in which only user accessing data could behave maliciously. 
Contrary to that, cloud storage services were provisioned from public domain by an un-
trusted entity. Thus, conventional access control policy could be exploited by a cloud 
service provider to compromise privacy of the outsourced data. 
In this dissertation we address these problems by designing a secure file sharing 
service. The proposed service transfers the trust from the cloud to a trusted third party 
service. It also provides security for users' data with minimal overhead on cloud users. 
Particularly, this service ensures data confidentiality against cloud and unauthorized 
users. Data confidentiality against cloud   can be achieved by storing data in an encrypted 
Page 192 
 
format in cloud storage so that malicious insiders are not able to view/decrypt it. Since 
the currently deployed encryption services in either the cloud or inside client side cloud 
storage services are vulnerable to security attacks, we address these vulnerabilities by 
using a trusted third party (TTP) service. This TTP service has encryption/decryption 
service that can be employed either locally or remotely according to level of severity of 
the data. This service shall remove the burden of key management and maintained from 
data owners. Moreover, this service takes advantage over the current software 
encryption/decryption service that offers full disk encryption. For achieving data 
confidentiality against   unauthorized users, the TTP service collaborates with a number 
of attribute authorities to achieve fine grained access control. By doing so, we prohibit 
the cloud and unauthorized users from getting access to owner's plaintext or credentials, 
unlike most of the currently available cloud storage services that either do not provide file 
sharing services or give the cloud provider full power over access control .In addition, we 
support user and attribute revocation without depending on the data owner for re-
encrypting the affected files or regenerating system parameters and users' keys. 
Moreover, we provide read or write or both accesses to a file stored in the cloud, unlike 
most of the systems that supports 1- write-many-read. Last but not least, we shift most of 
the heavy computations such as verification and re-encryption from the owner/user to the 
cloud. We believe that our proposed scheme combine different algorithms to form a 
larger and more generic solution that supports the needs of a cloud-based collaboration 
environment. 
We validate our design by security analysis. The analysis demonstrates the feasibility 
of the entire design as it is described above. Through this security proof (analysis), we 
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investigate the possibility of attacks from unauthorized users and cloud service provider 
to gain access to the outsourced data that they are not allowed to access. 
 
Contribution  
1) We defined a secure storage system that utilizes a trusted third party service that 
enables users to share data over any web-based cloud storage platform while data security 
is preserved. This service protects the confidentiality of the communicated data and it can 
be employed locally or remotely. We take advantage over almost all existing work that 
depends on data owner, client side cloud storage services, or encryption software tools 
for encrypting users' data, which expose users' data to leakage. 
 2) We constructed a new multi-authority CP-ABE scheme that achieves fine grained 
access control. Based on multi-authority CP-ABE [18], we realize efficient fine grained 
access control. Different from [18], we support many-write-many-read for users(which 
means after the owner creates one encrypted file on the storage server, other users with 
appropriate attributes can also update the encrypted file at a later time without any help 
from files’ original owners) instead of 1-write-many-read. By employing multi-authority 
CP-ABE, we take a step on most of the existing work that are based on single authority 
CP-ABE for issuing private access keys. Moreover, almost all existing multi-authority 
CP-ABE based cloud storage systems did not consider the insurance of outsourced data 
integrity, unlike our scheme that supports data integrity checking. Furthermore, we 
support many-write-many-read for users that is almost lacked by all systems that support 
multi-authority CP-ABE schemes. 
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 3) We proposed an efficient revocation approach for the proposed multi-authority CP-
ABE scheme. Basing on the revocation method [19], we realize efficiently immediate 
user/attribute-level revocation while achieving both the backward and forward secrecy. In 
addition, we delegate the re-encryption right to cloud proxy servers to make use of cloud 
abundant resources. We take advantage over systems that support either do not support 
revocation in multi-authority CP-ABE or support either user or attribute revocation not 
both. 
Future Work 
There are several directions of future work related to this thesis. In this section we list a 
number of interesting topics that need further research. In this thesis we have proposed 
two methodologies to realize data confidentiality so that the cloud storage cannot disclose 
user's data and data confidentiality by implementing a fine-grained access control 
mechanism with privacy considerations. In this work, we focus on data confidentiality for 
data stored on cloud storage in two states: data in transit and at rest while did not consider 
data in use. Data in use refers to processing of data that is stored on a remote server. 
However, the system may suffer from scalability issue if the number of requests exceeds 
millions requests, therefore, the scalability issue would be an interesting future research 
topic. In addition, we shall work on providing formal approaches for validating our 
proposed architecture along with a prototype. Another direction for future work could be 
ensuring data confidentiality while the data is used for processing purposes. For 
cryptographic-based data access control, user access is enabled by possessing the 
corresponding data decryption key(s). This opens the door for an authorized but 
malicious user to share her secret key with unauthorized users. More seriously, in 
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copyright-sensitive applications pirates may take this advantage to make profits by 
selling their secret keys (and hence access privileges) to others. These kinds of attacks are 
extremely harmful for copyright-sensitive applications since it very easy for key abusers 
to duplicate and distribute data decryption keys to others by ways such as email. Another 
threat that comes from attribute authorities in CP-ABE is their engagement in any 
malicious activities (as signing messages, generating and distributing keys) without the 
threat of being detected as they are treated as trusted entities. This is still a new area of 
research as almost work done in CP-ABE treats attribute authorities as trusted entities. 
Therefore, another direction for future work could be key abuse resistance. Last but not 
least, updating the signature whenever a revocation operation takes place can be a good 
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Background on CP-ABE Systems 
 
Our proposed framework is build upon the ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-
ABE) scheme. The concept of ABE was introduced along with another cryptography called 
fuzzy identity-based encryption (FIBE). Therefore, we can best understand CP-ABE by first 
introducing bilinear maps and LSSS.  Knowledge of finite fields and elliptic curves is required to 
better explain the actual implementation of cyclic groups in bilinear maps. In this section, we 
give required background material on bilinear maps, LSSS, the formal definition of a CP-ABE 
scheme. We also present the formal definitions for multi-authority CP-ABE schemes. 
 
I. Bilinear Maps 
There are several definitions of bilinear maps, or pairings, in a cryptography paradigm. 
The differences between the expressions of these definitions are subtle. Generally 
speaking, bilinear maps associate pairs of elements from two algebra group to yield an 
element of a third algebra group that is linear in each of its arguments. According to 
Ben Lynn [1], the essential property of bilinear maps is that they give cyclic groups 
additional properties. We outline three definitions of bilinear maps in order of 
restrictiveness. 
 
The General Bilinear Pairing 
 
Definition: Let G1, GT be cyclic group of prime order p. Let G2 be a group where 
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each element has order dividing r. In particular G2 is not necessarily cyclic. A 
bilinear pairing or bilinear map e is an efficiently computable function 
 
                e: G1 x G2      
such that   
 
(i) (Non-degeneracy) e (g1;  g2)            for all g2 ϵ  G2 if and only if g1 =   , 
and  e (g1;  g2)  1GT for all g1 ϵ  G1 if and only if g2 =   . 
 
 
(ii) (Bi-linearity) for all g1 ϵ  G1 and g2 ϵ  G2 and e (  
a
,     





for all a,  b ϵ  Z. 
 
 
The general bilinear pairing is the most  f l exibility. It solve the hash problem by 
reduce G2 to be not necessarily cyclic. However, in this setting, the hardness 
assumption must be changed. Based on different scheme, we have to assume certain 




  ϵ G1 
and g2 ϵ  G2, there is no efficient algorithm to compute   
 . 
 
II. .Linear Secret-Sharing Scheme 
The idea of linear secret-sharing scheme (LSSS) and monotone span programs was 
discussed by Amos Beimel [2]. In a LSSS, dealer holds a secret and distributes the shares 
of the secret to parties. Parties can reconstruct the secret from a linear combination of 
the shares of any authorized set. A famous example of LSSS is  the Shamir t -out-
of-n threshold scheme[3]. In that scheme, the hardness of secret reconstruction 
depends on the hardness of polynomial reconstruction.  




Ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is becoming a promising 
cryptographic solution. It enables data owners to define their own access policies over 
user attributes and enforce the policies on the data to be distributed. In CP-ABE scheme, 
there is an authority that is responsible for attribute management and key distribution. 
The data owner defines the access policies and encrypts data under the policies. Each 
user will be issued a secret key according to its attributes. A user can decrypt the 
ciphertext only when its attributes satisfy the access policies. Moreover, in CP-ABE 
schemes, the access policy checking is implicitly conducted inside the cryptography. That 
is, there is no one to explicitly evaluate the policies and make decisions on whether 
allows the user to access the data. 
 
Basic Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (CPABE)[4]scheme consists of four 
algorithms: Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, and Decrypt. 
 
Setup(λ ,U). The setup algorithm takes security parameter λ and attributes universe 
description as input U. It outputs the public parameters PK and a master key MK. The 
public key is used for encryption. The master key, held by the central authority, is used to 
generate user secret keys. 
KeyGen(MK,S,PK). The key generation algorithm takes as input the master key MK, the 
public parameters PK, and a set of attributes S that  describe the key. It outputs a 
private key SK associated with S. 
 
Encrypt(PK,M,A). The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, a 
message M, and an access structure A over the universe of attributes. The algorithm will 
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encrypt M and produce a ciphertext CT such that only a user that possesses a set of 
attributes that satisfies the access structure will be able to decrypt the message. We 
assume that A is implicitly included in CT. 
 
Decrypt (PK, CT, SK). The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameters PK, 
a ciphertext CT, which contains an access policy A, and a private key SK, which is a 
private key for a set S of attributes. If the set S of attributes satisfies the access structure A 
then the algorithm will decrypt the ciphertext and return a message M. 
A CP-ABE system is said to be correct if whenever PP, MSK are obtained by 
running the setup algorithm, CT is obtained by running the encryption 
algorithm on PP, M, A, SK is obtained by running the key generation algorithm 
on MSK, PP, S and S satisfies A, then Decrypt(PK, CT, SK) = M . 
 
IV. Multi-Authority CP-ABE Definition 
 
 
We now present formal definitions for multi-authority CP-ABE systems . A 
multi-authority Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption system is 
comprised of the following five algorithms: 
 
Global Setup (λ) → GP The global setup algorithm takes in the security 
parameter λ and outputs global parameters GP for the system. 
 
Authority Setup(GP) → SK, PK  Each authority runs the authority setup 





Encrypt (M,  A, GP,  {PK}) → CT   the encryption algorithm takes in a 
message M , an access structure A, the set of public keys for relevant authorities, 
and the global parameters. It outputs a ciphertext CT. 
 
KeyGen (GID,  GP,  i,  SK) → Ki,GID  The key generation algorithm takes 
in an identity GID, the global parameters, an attribute i belonging to some 
authority, and the secret key SK for this authority. It produces a key Ki,GID 
for this attribute, identity pair. 
 
Decrypt(CT, GP, {PK}, {Ki,GID}) → M  The decryption algorithm takes in a 
ciphertext, the global parameters, the public keys for the relevant authorities, and 
a collection of keys corresponding to attribute, identity pairs all with the same 
fixed identity GID. It outputs the message M when the collection of 
attributes i satisfies the access structure corresponding to the ciphertext. 
 
A multi-authority CP-ABE system is said to be correct if whenever GP is 
obtained from the global setup algorithm, {PK, SK} are obtained by running the 
authority setup algorithm, CT is obtained from the encryption algorithm on the 
message M using the public keys {PK}, and {Ki,GID} is a set of keys 
obtained from running the key generation algorithms with {SK} for the same 
identity GID and for a set of attributes satisfying the access structure of the 
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